Buddhism on Epiphenomenalism

I recall Mi pham stating in his bsDus tshan something to this effect: The position that “matter arises out of mind” is Buddhistic, whereas the position that “mind arises out of matter” is materialistic. So the latter position would be epiphenomenalism? The former would be a kind of Buddhist idealism?

I am trying to typologize Buddhist idealism:

(a) There are no external phenomena—a kind of ontological/metaphysical/objective idealism. Synchronic idealism?

(b) There are external phenomena, but these are ultimately caused by or rooted in mind. This may be called causal or diachronic idealism.

(c) We cannot directly perceive external phenomena, and all that we know is our own perception. This would be epistemological/subjective idealism. Representational idealism?

Upaniṣadic Pyrology

My interest in the Upaniṣadic pyrology (i.e., Feuerlehre or Fire-doctrine) is related to what Erich Frauwallner in his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie states (pp. 174–175):

“Can the mention of the ‘I’ or a soul be completely avoided in the doctrine of deliverance? Was one not straightway forced to speak of a subject who is bound and released? The Buddha knew how to avoid the difficulty with consummate dexterity. Thereby occurred to him one of the basic views on which the Buddhist doctrine of deliverance is built. As soon as, for instance, the law of a psychical organism had formed itself in the circles of philosophical schools, the question arose, as we have shown in the description of Epic philosophy, whether the senses and the psychical organ are reckoned in the sphere of the soul or in the sphere of matter. The answer which was given in different doctrines ran differently. In the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati (Manu-Bṛhaspati-Saṃvādaḥ) we have got acquainted with the doctrine according to which the psychical organism arises out of the soul and returns back to it after deliverance from the cycle of being. The second possibility was, above all, represented by the Sāṃkhya system and its first steps in the Epic, in which all the psychical organs with their functions are ascribed to matter, arise out of it and return back to it. This thought rests on the attempt which had its origin in the Fire-Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and continued in the Epic and especially continued in the Sāṃkhya, to free the soul of all earthly definitions and to remove it from the orbit of origination and causal occurrences. Therefore in the Sāṃkhya, as we shall see in the sequel, all activity is removed to the sphere of matter and the soul is an inactive, pure onlooker. And the same view lies at the basis of the Buddhistic doctrine of deliverance. This is, no doubt, the most important and essential agreement of the oldest Buddhism with the Sāṃkhya.”

Buddhist Cynicism or Cynicism in Buddhism

Hajime Nakamura in his A Comparative History of Ideas. London / New York: Kegan Paul International, 1986 [Revised Edition of Tokyo 1975] devotes a section with the title “The Seeking of Dishonor.” For the context, I cite the following two paragraphs (p. 180):

Cynicism appeared in Athens about the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Although the ethical teachings of Cynicism owed much to Antisthenes (c. 446–366 B.C.), it was Diogenes of Sinope (404–323 B.C.) who was first called kyon, the dog, from which the name ‘Cynicism’ derives. The popular sermons of the Cynics exerted considerable influence in the days of the Roman Empire until the fifth century A.D.

Antisthenes derived his form of Cynicism from a particularized interpretation of some of Socrates’ doctrines. Socrates, we may recall, sought to keep his independence from physical wealth and mass popularity so that he could more freely pursue what he considered to be the higher good of wisdom (sophia). For Antisthenes, independence itself was embraced as wisdom or the true good. Self-sufficiency or independence from earthly possessions and pleasures became for him an end in itself.

In the Indian context, Nakamura mentions, among others, the Pāśupatas of Śaivism as a point of comparison. 

And then, he states (p. 182):

Han-shan (Kanzan) and Shih-te (Jittoku), Chinese counterparts of the Cynics and Pāśupatas, were recluses in the Tang period. Han-shan lived in caves and on rocks and Shih-te lived in the precincts of a certain temple. When Han-shan came, Shih-te gave him the remaining scraps of meals forsaken by temple monks. They were wont to suddenly shout or revile towards the sky. They wore ragged clothes and acted like mad persons. When a high official came to see them they departed, sending a smile to him in arrogance. It is said that they indulged in gaily sweeping away moonbeams, when they were not telling each other Zen jokes. They were regarded as the ideal of idiot sages. Han-shan, Shih-te and their admirers did not deliberately seek for dishonor, although when it came their way they did not resist it. 

In addition, we may claim that a form of Buddhist cynicism, or cynicism in Buddhism, can be found in the Mahāsiddha tradition in India and the “mad masters” (bla ma smyon pa, a neologism) tradition in the Tibetan cultural sphere. Some doctrinal seeds of Buddhist cynicism, or cynicism in Buddhism, may be traced in Vinaya asceticism and in Mahāyoga Tantricism. The idea of unmattavrata (smyon pa brtul zhugs kyi spyod pa) would be relevant here. The idea of sanity and insanity in Buddhism is, in itself, a fascinating topic. If we consider the life of dPal-sprul (1808–1887), who, by the way, called himself an “old dog” (khyi rgan), he can be considered a “Buddhist cynic,” and his approach in and attitude to life may be characterized as a form of “Buddhist cynicism.”

Heils-Privatismus

In Wangchuk 2007, I translated “Heils-Privatismus” as “salvific privatism.” Maybe, I should now try with “salvatory privatism.” Unfortunately, the following source had been overlooked then:

LS-CP-2, pp. 526–527: “Hinzu kommt aber wohl auch die wie für die meisten indischen Religionen so auch für den frühen und ‚konservativen‘ Buddhismus charakteristische Tendenz zu einer Art ‚Heils-Privatismus‘, d. h., dass es dem einzelnen in erster Linie um das eigene Heil geht. Für den Mahāyāna-Buddhismus trifft dies allerdings nicht zu.”

Here, LS attributes “salvatory privatism” only to conservative Buddhism. I, by contrast, argued in 2007 that it applied also to Pāramitāyāna and Mantrayāna. Of course, following LS’s explanation, “salvatory privatism” would indeed not apply to those traditions insofar as their salvatory aspiration is not directed first and foremost toward oneself, but toward all sentient beings. My thinking then was that the salvatory breakthrough can only be made by the individual; no one can do that for another—not even the most skilled teacher. Teachers merely show the way, but one must do one’s own walking.

LS-CP-2 = Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi, Michael Pahlke & Alexander von Rosspatt (eds.), Lambert Schmithausen Collected Papers: Volume II: 1978–1999. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series 34b. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, 2023.

Buddhist Semiology

Some Notes on Buddhist Semiology 

§1. Semiology is said to be another term for “semiotics,” which in turn, is said to be “the study of signs and symbols and their use or interpretation.” §2. Is it justified to talk of a “Buddhist semiology”? Obviously. Let us keep it very basic. The signs, significations, the signified. Think of: abhidhāna and abhidheya; lakṣaṇa and lakṣya, saṃketa, sāṃketika and pāramārthika. Add Tibetan words for these. There are many more terms and concepts that relevant for semiology. §3. Physical, verbal, and conceptual signs have some referents as the signified. Sounds and symbols are signs only if there is something signified. §4. Those factors which bind signs with the signified are conceptual constructions. Without conceptual constructions, semiology would not possible. §5. Take terms such as vinaya, abhidharma, prajñāparamitā, tantra. Always two: abhidhāna and abhidheya; pada and artha. §6. Rong zom pa speaks of brdar gyur pa, sgrar grags pa, sgrar snang ba. All of these are signs. §7. All signs are conceptually signed. Verbal and sign languages operate according to a similar principle: sgra don ’dres ’dzin. As such, related with language and logic. §9. The terms nimitta and saṃjñā. No saṃjñā without nimitta. Ontology and soteriology. Note: nimitta as a cause: material cause and logical cause. Former in a narrow sense is gender specific signs: such as male and female physical attributes and organs. §9. Gender specific nimittas (real or imagined) activate or instigate feelings and sensations. Tackle nimitta and saṃjñā. §10. aśubhabhāvanā presuppose nimitta and saṃjñā. §11. rgyu mtshan ma med pa, chos thams cad mtshan ma med pa = chos thams cad stong pa. Ontological tabula rasa. Leave no room for mtshan ma. No mtshan ma, no saṃjñā. §12. Tantric: mtshan bcas mtshan med rdzogs rim. Using mtshan ma in a soteriologically beneficial way. §13. visual mudrās, verbal mantras, visualization also signs. dhamas as signs and dharmatā as signified. §14. Using all possible phenomena such as the 5 skandhas, all letters and syllables as signs. saṃsāric phenomena as signs and nirvāṇic reality as the signified. §15. All colors, all shapes, all times, as signs and substrates of the purity and reality. §16. All maṇḍalas, all temples, all stūpas, objects such vajra and bell are ascribed with significance of all teachings of the Buddha.

A Grammatical Term: yin byed kyi mtha’ can

If we do a search in the BuddhaNexus, we would find a couple of occurrences of the grammatical expression yin byed kyi mtha’ can, that occurs in some śabdaśāstras and pramāṇaśāstras. It is also used by Rong-zom-pa. This must refer to a kind of Sanskrit suffix. It occurs in the context of taddhitapratyaya (de la phan pa’i rkyen) “secondary suffix” and kṛtpratyaya (byed pa’i rkyen) “primary suffix.” Some sources mention yin byed kyi rkyen. We may, for now, take rkyen and mtha’ to be synonymous. This can be deduced from the use of the expressions kṛtpratyaya and kṛdanta. For the want of a better suggestion, I am considering if yin byed kyi mtha’/rkyen is a Tibetan rendering of bhāvapratyaya, which has been translated elsewhere as dngos po’i rkyen. In Rong-zom-pa’s case, the term yin byed kyi mtha’ can should not be understood as the suffix itself but as referring to a word with this suffix. If this holds, the term yin byed kyi mtha’ can may be translated as “a [word] that possesses being-making/causing suffix.” This bhāvapratyaya is said to be an “abstraction/nominalizing suffix” (i.e. tva or tā).

Buddhist Yuktiology

I need this word: Yuktiology. It should refer to the study, theory, or, conception of yukti. What is a yukti? There we begin with the problem. As a point of departure, we may begin with the four kinds of yukti. There are several Indian Buddhist sources for this. We have many more Tibetan sources. But my concern here is Rong zom pa’s Yuktiology, which may be described as an “extraordinary or exceptional Yuktiology,” from the point of view of the Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda system of the  “extraordinary or exceptional  Mahāyāna.” For now, we shall contend that the causal efficacy of things, effects’ dependency on their causes, the reality or essentiality of things, and the logicality or rationality of reasons and reasoning may all be called yukti. 

Addendum:
(1)  reasoning of intrinsic reality,

(2)  reasoning of causal efficacy/affectivity (knowing effect through cause),

(3) reasoning of result’s dependency (knowing cause through effect), and

(4) reasoning that demonstrates the rationality/logicality of reason.

Buddhist Axiology

§1. Is there anything in Buddhist philosophy that can be said to have an intrinsic value, that is, any entity or reality that has a value-in-itself or is an end-in-itself? One might debate about whether the Summum bonum according to each Buddhist system can be attributed with an intrinsic value but otherwise nothing can be said to have an intrinsic value inasmuch as the physical-psychical complexes (skandha: phung po) that constitute the entire conditioned existence is fleeting, hollow, and essence-less. But because nothing has an intrinsic value everything can be attributed with an extrinsic/instrumental/contributory value. Some Mahāyāna thinkers might argue that even the Buddhahood itself has only an instrumental value insofar as it is meant to serve as a mere means of benefiting other sentient beings. Can benevolence and beneficence then be attributed with an intrinsic value, at least according to some Buddhist philosophers? If so, can we assume that some Buddhists attributed intrinsic value to ethical values? §2. How about aesthetic values (or sensori-emotional values)? Is there a Buddhist philosophical standpoint on aesthetic values? How did Buddhist philosophers view the nature and status of art, beauty, and taste? What did they think of the creation and appreciation of beauty? Here, too, perhaps, they could have not denied the instrumental value of aesthetic values but certainly they would not have attributed any intrinsic value to sensori-emotional values. Importantly, the Buddhist concept of beauty and the appreciation of beauty seem to determined by the Buddhist concept of purity and the appreciation of purity, on both mundane and supra-mundane, physical and spiritual levels. That is, I find something or someone beautiful because I assume that something or someone is pure. (Thinking of what Āryadeva said with regard to the association between the notion of purity and desirability.) The spiritual and supra-mundane purity would override the physical and mundane purity. A pure mind/heart is a beautiful mind/heart. §3. How about epistemic values? I suppose that only instrumental value can be attributed to epistemic values. §4. Perhaps an objection: Some things, such as venom or ambrosia (“elixir of life”), must have an intrinsic value because of their intrinsic (i.e. ontologically existent) efficacy and efficiency to kill or cure. Response: The efficacy and efficiency of these substances are due to their instrumental value not because they have an intrinsic value. There is nothing that has an inherent existence. If substances such as elixir and poison have the intrinsic potential to kill or cure, they should be able to kill or cure anybody and at all times, but this obviously not the case. Even venom can sometimes cure somebody, whereas even elixir can kill somebody. This idea is stated clearly in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (T, fol. 190a3–4): kha chig bdud rtsi ’thungs pas ’chi mi ’gyur || kha chig gis ni ’thungs nas ’chi bar ’gyur || kha cig dug ’thung pas kyang ’chi mi ’gyur || kha cig gis ni ’thungs nas ’chi bar ’gyur || Some do not die after drinking elixir. Some do die after drinking [it]. Some do not die even after drinking poison. Some do die after drinking [it]. 

§5. I contend that Buddhist ethical-spiritual values have been crystallized or embodied in the so-called six perfections (pāramitā: pha rol tu phyin pa). 

§6. Mahāyānic ethical-spiritual could be subsumed under compassion (karuṇā: snying rje) and insight (prajñā/jñāna: shes rab / ye shes) and these are further crystallized as bodhicitta. 

§7. Mātṛceṭa, Varṇārhavarṇastotra 6. 28 (Hartmann 1987: 207). The pāda b is missing. The basic idea is that duḥkha or sukha, if not meaningful or purposeful, should be abandoned. If so adopted. Implication: duḥkha or sukha may be meaningful or meaningless. See Jens-Uwe Hartmann (ed. & tr.), Das Varṅārhavarṇastotra des Mātṛceṭa. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden XII. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987.

Coronology

The world is reeling under fears and risks of Coronavirus. Many scheduled events had to be put on hold. Perhaps it is the nature’s way to tell humans: “Slow down! Don’t run around like crazy!” We can notice that the turbulence of our 84,000 cognitional-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa) is at its peak. We are drowning in our own five kinds of dregs or scums (kṣaya: snyigs ma) that Buddhist sources speak of. All of us who identify ourselves as politically and ideologically left, right, or centrist are seething with self-righteousness and hatred for all others who think, believe, and act differently. For those of us who believe that we have received and abide by bodhisattva precepts, there is a real risk that it is a mere bubble of illusion that we have created for ourselves. If one hates a single individual and thus mentally abandons him or her, one would incur the “transgression of abandoning sentient beings” (sems can yal bar ’dor ba’i ltung ba). A solution? Disagree with our prajñā, but with our karuṇā, we should embrace everyone without exception! The attitude that I love most of my leftist comrades but hate Trump and his supporters is simply incompatible with one’s bodhisattva precepts. Well, each of us is responsible for our own ethical-ascetical integrity. The beauty of Buddhism is that one has the freedom to go to hell, that is, if one chooses. I personally would like to believe that our external 84,000 illnesses or diseases are mere symptoms of our inner 84,000 cognitional-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa). We can temporarily try to fight the external 84,000 illnesses or diseases, but as long as we nurture and intensify our 84,000 cognitional-emotional defilements, these will find a way to emerge as pandemic diseases. We just have to recall that kleśas are pan-saṃsāric! This is a small personal thought associated with the coronology.

Buddhist Anomalogy

In a world of political correctness, where epistemic and ethical correctness no longer or hardly plays a role, to speak of anomaly may carry a hint of criminality. What is standard, normal, or expected? We would be reprimanded by the self-righteous and self-declared vice squad. Nonetheless, I wish to speak here of “Buddhist anomalogy,” that is, theories or doctrines in Buddhism, that seem to deviate from what is  regarded as standard, normal, or expected. The tradition, for example, the Tibetan tradition, itself seems to characterize such elements as “uncommon” (thun mong ma yin pa) as juxtaposed or opposed to those that are mainstream/standard and thus “common.” Importantly, those who endorse anomalous doctrines would, however, never reject those that are standard and common. Many aspects of Buddhist anomalogy can be found in the domains of Buddhist ontology, Buddhist soteriology, Buddhist epistemology, Buddhist gnoseology, Buddhology, Saddharmology, Buddhist axiology, Buddhist cosmology, Buddhist phenomenology, Buddhist psychology, Buddhist sentientology, Buddhist eschatology, and so on. These are mere venues of explorations. I wish to return to these points in the near future. 

Buddhist Phobiology or Buddhist Fearology

When one is doing or supposed to do an assignment “x” but ends up doing or wants to do “y,” then one is under the spell of māra. This is the idea of mārakarman (bdud kyi las). It is one of the many kinds of mārakarman. Such a karman is not necessarily evil or intrinsically unwholesome. It just hinders one from getting things done. I am right now under such a spell. My article on secrecy is not getting done in time. It is dragging on. There are so many obstacles. There are so many details that need to be traced and verified. One such detail is the element of fear or phobia. The more I think of it, the more I think it is desirable to talk about “Buddhist phobiology” or “Buddhist fearology,” that is, a kind of Buddhist philosophy or psychology of fear.

            Here are some points to consider. (1) The semantic distinction between “fear” and “danger/risks” is warranted. Both Sanskrit bhaya and Tibetan ’jigs pa have these two semantic facets. (2) Psychologists would tell us that there is difference between rational fear for real dangers and irrational fear for imaginary dangers. (3) Perhaps from a Buddhist perspective, although I am not sure, perhaps one may state that strictly speaking all “fears” are irrational. That is, fear is a psychological state of mind associated with conceptual construction, which is not a valid cognition. Some, on the one hand, even without knowing any real danger, may be gripped with fear. Some, on the other hand, may remain fearless even while knowing the dangers and risks. (4) The Buddha is said to be characterized by four kinds of fearlessness. The question is what makes a buddha or beings like himself fearless and what makes one fearful? (5) Perhaps the most fundamental cause that makes fear possible is the notion of self. The fear of losing one’s existence and continuance. Let us call it “existential fear.” And then comes the fear of losing what one believes is one’s own. The fear of not getting what one wants, the fear of getting what one does not want. The fear of becoming what one does not want to be, and the fear of not becoming what one wants to become. The list can go on. (6) Normally a regular being would be fearful of, let us, hellish existence, and be hopeful of celestial existence. Wise beings, according to Buddhism (e.g. CŚ 7.14), are, however, said to be as terrified of celestial existence as of hellish celestial existence! Why? The axiological orientation is different. Similarly, normally it is said that one should be afraid of saṃsāra, and seek nirvāṇa. But for bodhisattvas, who wish to remain active in saṃsāra for the benefit of sentient beings, premature or undesired slip into nirvāṇa is seen as a kind of danger. This, as I pointed out elsewhere presupposes an early notion of nirvāṇa. No such danger would be posed by, for example, non-fixed nirvāṇa. (7) From a Buddhist point of view, saddharma is like a powerful medicine. The more profound a saddharma is, the greater is the benefit but also greater are the risks involved. Vajrāyānic saddharma is said to be even more profound and thus even riskier. These risks are not imaginary. There are real risks involved. The risks involved are as real as the risks of playing with a king cobra! (8) The idea of fear seems to be closely related with the idea of kṣānti. There are many kinds of kṣānti. It seems to be a kind of intellectual-psychological capacity to bear or encounter any entity or reality, no matter how unpleasant, how painful, how disgusting, or how profound!