Madhyamaism

I propose characterizing the teaching or doctrine of the Buddha, and Buddhist philosophy and religion more broadly, as “Madhyamaism.” Buddhist philosophy can, of course, be characterized generally and specifically in many ways, depending on the philosophical domain under consideration (e.g., ontology, epistemology, gnoseology, soteriology, Buddhology, psychology, methodology, and the like) and on which Buddhist school, system, source, or scholar one examines. One challenge is that whatever term we employ to characterize a given philosophy or doctrine potentially carries semantic baggage and thus tends to bring undesirable associations and connotations. I am aware that “Madhyamaism,” too, would raise eyebrows and questions. Obviously, no term can perfectly characterize a doctrine, idea, or philosophical position. However, past and present scholars engaged in the study of Buddhism would, I hope, more or less agree that not only all subsequent Buddhist philosophical schools and systems, but even the Buddha himself, as far as we can judge from some of the oldest Buddhist sources, adopted the idea, approach, and attitude of the middle way (madhyamā pratipad: dbu ma’i lam). Every single Buddhist system is likely to claim that its doctrine embodies the middle way,¹ not just the Madhyamaka school (Madhyamakavāda). This is precisely why I propose “Madhyamaism” rather than “Madhyamakaism.” An additional advantage of “Madhyamaism” is its broader applicability. Already in the Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra, the noble eightfold path has been collectively, though not each element individually, regarded as the middle way. However, it seems quite reasonable to interpret each of the eight limbs of the path as embodying a middle way approach. Thus “Madhyamaism” need not be confined to the idea of middle way in ontology and epistemology but also in other domains encompassing both theory and praxis.

I am, however, aware of at least two cases of exception. Firstly, we encounter cases of extremism such as “extreme asceticism” (e.g., in the Jātakas), which may seem contrary to the principle or philosophy of Madhyamaism. Secondly, we also encounter in exclusive Mahāyāna sources that one should not stand even in the middle way, but transcend it. These exceptions prove rather than disprove the rule.

I therefore believe that the neologism “Madhyamaism” most accurately captures the pan-systemic nature of Buddhist philosophy.

¹ Consider, for example, what Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge in his lTa ba’i shan ’byed states (p. 2.2–6): de la spyir grub mtha’ smra ba bzhi po thams cad kyang rang rang gi grub mtha’ nas bshad pa’i lam de nyid rtag chad spangs pa’i dbu ma’i lam du ’dod cing | de’i tshe dngos por smra ba dag gis grub mtha’ bzhi’i phyi ma la dbu ma zhes mi brjod par ngo bo nyid med par smra ba zhes brjod do ||.