Soteriopragmatism

Scholars have characterized the Buddha and his doctrine in various ways. One such characterization, offered by Lambert Schmithausen, presents the Buddha as a “radical pragmatist” (radikaler Pragmatiker). I am referring to Schmithausen’s unpublished lecture draft on “Buddhistische Philosophie.” What Schmithausen underscores with this characterization is that the Buddha’s primary concern was not the theoretical-philosophical (das Theoretisch-Philosophische) but rather the spiritual-practical (das Spirituell-Praktische). The Buddha, to judge from early Buddhist sources, consistently and categorically rejected purely theoretical speculations as not only irrelevant but also detrimental to one’s salvific aspirations.

To be sure, Schmithausen does not, to my knowledge, employ the term “radical pragmatism” himself, though such a characterization may be justified—provided, of course, that it does not carry undesirable connotations and associations. One could characterize the Buddha’s radically pragmatic approach as “soteriopragmatism.” This term emphasizes the primacy of the spiritual-practical (das Spirituell-Praktische) as opposed to the theoretical-philosophical (das Theoretisch-Philosophische) aspect of Buddhist soteriology. In what follows, I have compiled secondary sources that characterize the Buddha's teaching as some form of pragmatism. As we shall see, pragmatism has also been attributed to Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti.

de La Vallée Poussin 1917: Pragmatism (i.e., of the Buddha)

Louis de La Vallée Poussin, The Way to Nirvāṇa. Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism as a Discipline of Salvation. Hibbert Lectures, Manchester College, Oxford, February–April 1916. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917, p. 126:  “These evidences are to be found in a number of texts which profess to state the position taken by Śākyamuni as concerns metaphysics, as concerns the existence of a soul (jīva) distinct from the body, as concerns the survival of a Saint. This position is a sort of agnosticism or pragmatism.”  

Jayatilleke 1963: Pragmatism (i.e., of the Buddha or Early Buddhism)

K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963, p.  [(603) “This pragmatism of Buddhism is also strongly suggested by the  parable of the arrow (M. I.429) and the parable of the raft (M. 1.134).” Ibid. (pp. 358–359): “(604) We may conclude from this that the truths of Buddhism were also considered to be useful (atthasaṃhitaṃ) for each person until one attains salvation. This is confirmed by what is stated in the passage quoted above (v. supra, 594) where it was said that the Buddha speaks only what is true and useful, whether pleasant or unpleasant. We may sum this up by saying that the truths of Buddhism were considered to be pragmatic in the Buddhist sense of the term, but it does not mean that Early Buddhism believes in a pragmatist theory of truth. (605) According to the pragmatist theory of truth ‘a belief is true if it is useful and false, if it is not, or more widely … a belief is true if “it works”’. Now in the passage quoted above (v. supra, 594), the possibility was granted that there could be statements which were true but useless. This means that a statement could be useless without being false, thus showing that utility (atthasaṃhitaṃ) was not considered to be a definition or an infallible criterion of truth. But on the other hand, it is curious that the list of possibilities mentioned in the passage are only six and as we have shown (v. supra, 594) there is a failure to mention statements which are both false as well as useful (pleasant or unpleasant). It is difficult to say whether this omission was accidental or intentional, for we have to depend on an argumentum e silentio. If it was intentional, we would have to say that it was not reckoned one of the possibilities either because it was considered self-contradictory to say of a statement that it was false but useful or because such statements did not in fact exist. This (i.e. both these latter alternatives) seems likely not because of any pragmatist theory of truth but because of the peculiarly Buddhist use of the term ‘useless’ (na atthasaṃhitaṃ). Here attha- (s.v. PTS. Dictionary) is not just ‘what is advantageous’ in the broad utilitarian sense of the term, but what is morally good in the sense of being useful for the attainment of the goal of Nirvāṇa. Since falsehood or the assertion of a statement which is false (musāvāda) was considered a moral evil, it would have been held to be logically or causally impossible for what is false, i.e. what is morally evil to result in what was useful in the sense of being morally advantageous or good (atthasaṃhitaṃ).” 

Sullivan 1988: Religious Pragmatism (i.e., of Kumārajīva)

Kevin Sullivan, “Nāgārjuna’s Critique of Metaphysics.” De Philosophia 7, 1988, pp. 88–104 [not seen].  Ethan Mills in his “Nāgārjuna’s Scepticism about Philosophy” (In Buddhism and Scepticism: Historical, Philosophical, and Comparative Perspectives, edited by Oren Hanner. Hamburg Buddhist Studies. Bochum/Freiburg: projekt verlag, 2020, pp. 55–81 (p. 74) states: “Kevin Sullivan calls Kumārajīva’s attitude ‘religious pragmatism’ because the role of emptiness is purely soteriological rather than descriptive (Sullivan, 1988, pp. 98–100). Although Kumārajīva and Sengzhao may ultimately be mystics rather than sceptics, there is at least some affinity with my sceptical interpretation in their use of philosophical negation to cultivate stillness of mind.”

Tillemans 1999: Pragmatism (i.e., of Dharmakīrti)

Tom J.F. Tillemans, Scripture, Logic, Language Essays on Dharmakirti and his Tibetan Successors. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Boston, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 1999, pp. 6–12.

Huntington 2003: Soteriological Pragmatism (i.e., of Candrakīrti)

C. W. Huntington, Jr., “Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?” In The Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus & Sara McClintock. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Boston, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 2003, pp. 67–91 (p. 81): “a very strict soteriological pragmatism” (i.e., of Candrakīrti).  

Wynne 2024: Spiritual Pragmatism (i.e., of Early Buddhism)

Alexander Wynne, “Proto-Madhyamaka in the Pāli Canon Revisited: Early Buddhism, Gandhāra and the Origin of the Prajñāpāramitā.” Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies 24, 2024, pp. 1–41 (p. 26): “spiritual pragmatism” (i.e., of Early Buddhism).