A Typology of Buddhist Idealism

I am proposing the following typology of Buddhist idealism.

(a) Ontological/metaphysical/objective idealism: There are no external phenomena; that is, extra-mental objects (bāhyārtha: phyi don) do not exist. Even as we seem to perceive extra-mental objects, such objects do not exist. In a dream, we might “perceive” a boulder, but such an object has never been there. Tibetans called it phyi don med pa’i sems tsam. I wonder if we can call such an idealism “synchronic idealism.” This proposition can be attributed to Cittamātravādins. According to some scholars, Vasubandhu in his Viṃśikā is said to propose also ontological idealism.

(b) Causal or diachronic idealism: There are external phenomena, but these are ultimately caused by or rooted in mind. Such an idealism negates any metaphysical prima causa (be it theistic or non-theistic). Some Tibetan sources seem to describe it as byed pa po gzhan med pa'i sems tsam. This should be acceptable to Buddhism in general, including scholars such as Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. I wonder if I should call it causal or diachronic idealism. I recall Mi pham stating in his bsDus tshan something to this effect: the position that “matter arises out of mind” is Buddhist, whereas the position that “mind arises out of matter” is materialistic. The latter position (“materialism”) is suggestive of epiphenomenalism. The former would qualify as causal or diachronic idealism.

(c) Epistemological/subjective/representational idealism: We cannot directly perceive external phenomena, and all that we know is our own perception (or act of making known). This is expressed by the term vijñaptimātra(tā). Mi pham would put it thus: sems la snang na sems yin pas khyab. This should then be epistemological/subjective idealism, or perhaps representational idealism. This is perhaps the kind of idealism that Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti proposed, although the nuances and implications of their positions need not be seen as identical. According to some scholars, Dharmakīrti proposes an epistemological/representational idealism (e.g., by means of sahopalambhaniyama reasoning) while remaining agnostic regarding ontological idealism. Vasubandhu in his Viṃśikā, on the other hand, starts off with epistemological/representational idealism and moves on to ontological idealism. 

(d) Solipsistic idealism: Most Buddhist philosophers would reject a kind of idealism implying solipsism. Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi shows how seriously this objection was taken. Ratnakīrti may be an exception. He is fascinating and controversial. His arguments sometimes seem to push idealism toward solipsism, though scholars debate whether he really endorsed this or was exploring it dialectically. His position might be: “If you push vijñaptimātra(tā) to its logical extreme, you get something uncomfortably close to solipsism—so perhaps we need to reconsider the premises.” At minimum, his work shows that solipsism was recognized as a potential reductio ad absurdum of certain forms of idealism.

(e) Classificatory question: The question remains as to which type of idealism one should use to categorize the kind suggested by Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 35, which states that the four gross elements (mahābhūta) are contained in vijñāna. Does this mean type (a): the gross elements do not exist externally, only as contents of vijñāna? Does it mean type (b): the gross elements arise from or are caused by vijñāna? Or does it mean type (c): we only know the elements as they appear in vijñāna?

Upaniṣadic Pyrology

My interest in the Upaniṣadic pyrology (i.e., Feuerlehre or Fire-doctrine) is related to what Erich Frauwallner in his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie states (pp. 174–175):

“Can the mention of the ‘I’ or a soul be completely avoided in the doctrine of deliverance? Was one not straightway forced to speak of a subject who is bound and released? The Buddha knew how to avoid the difficulty with consummate dexterity. Thereby occurred to him one of the basic views on which the Buddhist doctrine of deliverance is built. As soon as, for instance, the law of a psychical organism had formed itself in the circles of philosophical schools, the question arose, as we have shown in the description of Epic philosophy, whether the senses and the psychical organ are reckoned in the sphere of the soul or in the sphere of matter. The answer which was given in different doctrines ran differently. In the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati (Manu-Bṛhaspati-Saṃvādaḥ) we have got acquainted with the doctrine according to which the psychical organism arises out of the soul and returns back to it after deliverance from the cycle of being. The second possibility was, above all, represented by the Sāṃkhya system and its first steps in the Epic, in which all the psychical organs with their functions are ascribed to matter, arise out of it and return back to it. This thought rests on the attempt which had its origin in the Fire-Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and continued in the Epic and especially continued in the Sāṃkhya, to free the soul of all earthly definitions and to remove it from the orbit of origination and causal occurrences. Therefore in the Sāṃkhya, as we shall see in the sequel, all activity is removed to the sphere of matter and the soul is an inactive, pure onlooker. And the same view lies at the basis of the Buddhistic doctrine of deliverance. This is, no doubt, the most important and essential agreement of the oldest Buddhism with the Sāṃkhya.”

Buddhist Cynicism or Cynicism in Buddhism

Hajime Nakamura in his A Comparative History of Ideas. London / New York: Kegan Paul International, 1986 [Revised Edition of Tokyo 1975] devotes a section with the title “The Seeking of Dishonor.” For the context, I cite the following two paragraphs (p. 180):

Cynicism appeared in Athens about the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Although the ethical teachings of Cynicism owed much to Antisthenes (c. 446–366 B.C.), it was Diogenes of Sinope (404–323 B.C.) who was first called kyon, the dog, from which the name ‘Cynicism’ derives. The popular sermons of the Cynics exerted considerable influence in the days of the Roman Empire until the fifth century A.D.

Antisthenes derived his form of Cynicism from a particularized interpretation of some of Socrates’ doctrines. Socrates, we may recall, sought to keep his independence from physical wealth and mass popularity so that he could more freely pursue what he considered to be the higher good of wisdom (sophia). For Antisthenes, independence itself was embraced as wisdom or the true good. Self-sufficiency or independence from earthly possessions and pleasures became for him an end in itself.

In the Indian context, Nakamura mentions, among others, the Pāśupatas of Śaivism as a point of comparison. 

And then, he states (p. 182):

Han-shan (Kanzan) and Shih-te (Jittoku), Chinese counterparts of the Cynics and Pāśupatas, were recluses in the Tang period. Han-shan lived in caves and on rocks and Shih-te lived in the precincts of a certain temple. When Han-shan came, Shih-te gave him the remaining scraps of meals forsaken by temple monks. They were wont to suddenly shout or revile towards the sky. They wore ragged clothes and acted like mad persons. When a high official came to see them they departed, sending a smile to him in arrogance. It is said that they indulged in gaily sweeping away moonbeams, when they were not telling each other Zen jokes. They were regarded as the ideal of idiot sages. Han-shan, Shih-te and their admirers did not deliberately seek for dishonor, although when it came their way they did not resist it. 

In addition, we may claim that a form of Buddhist cynicism, or cynicism in Buddhism, can be found in the Mahāsiddha tradition in India and the “mad masters” (bla ma smyon pa, a neologism) tradition in the Tibetan cultural sphere. Some doctrinal seeds of Buddhist cynicism, or cynicism in Buddhism, may be traced in Vinaya asceticism and in Mahāyoga Tantricism. The idea of unmattavrata (smyon pa brtul zhugs kyi spyod pa) would be relevant here. The idea of sanity and insanity in Buddhism is, in itself, a fascinating topic. If we consider the life of dPal-sprul (1808–1887), who, by the way, called himself an “old dog” (khyi rgan), he can be considered a “Buddhist cynic,” and his approach in and attitude to life may be characterized as a form of “Buddhist cynicism.”