Soteriopragmatism

Scholars have characterized the Buddha and his doctrine in various ways. One such characterization, offered by Lambert Schmithausen, presents the Buddha as a “radical pragmatist” (radikaler Pragmatiker). I am referring to Schmithausen’s unpublished lecture draft on “Buddhistische Philosophie.” What Schmithausen underscores with this characterization is that the Buddha’s primary concern was not the theoretical-philosophical (das Theoretisch-Philosophische) but rather the spiritual-practical (das Spirituell-Praktische). The Buddha, to judge from early Buddhist sources, consistently and categorically rejected purely theoretical speculations as not only irrelevant but also detrimental to one’s salvific aspirations.

To be sure, Schmithausen does not, to my knowledge, employ the term “radical pragmatism” himself, though such a characterization may be justified—provided, of course, that it does not carry undesirable connotations and associations. One could characterize the Buddha’s radically pragmatic approach as “soteriopragmatism.” This term emphasizes the primacy of the spiritual-practical (das Spirituell-Praktische) as opposed to the theoretical-philosophical (das Theoretisch-Philosophische) aspect of Buddhist soteriology. In what follows, I have compiled secondary sources that characterize the Buddha's teaching as some form of pragmatism. As we shall see, pragmatism has also been attributed to Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti.

de La Vallée Poussin 1917: Pragmatism (i.e., of the Buddha)

Louis de La Vallée Poussin, The Way to Nirvāṇa. Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism as a Discipline of Salvation. Hibbert Lectures, Manchester College, Oxford, February–April 1916. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917, p. 126:  “These evidences are to be found in a number of texts which profess to state the position taken by Śākyamuni as concerns metaphysics, as concerns the existence of a soul (jīva) distinct from the body, as concerns the survival of a Saint. This position is a sort of agnosticism or pragmatism.”  

Jayatilleke 1963: Pragmatism (i.e., of the Buddha or Early Buddhism)

K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963, p.  [(603) “This pragmatism of Buddhism is also strongly suggested by the  parable of the arrow (M. I.429) and the parable of the raft (M. 1.134).” Ibid. (pp. 358–359): “(604) We may conclude from this that the truths of Buddhism were also considered to be useful (atthasaṃhitaṃ) for each person until one attains salvation. This is confirmed by what is stated in the passage quoted above (v. supra, 594) where it was said that the Buddha speaks only what is true and useful, whether pleasant or unpleasant. We may sum this up by saying that the truths of Buddhism were considered to be pragmatic in the Buddhist sense of the term, but it does not mean that Early Buddhism believes in a pragmatist theory of truth. (605) According to the pragmatist theory of truth ‘a belief is true if it is useful and false, if it is not, or more widely … a belief is true if “it works”’. Now in the passage quoted above (v. supra, 594), the possibility was granted that there could be statements which were true but useless. This means that a statement could be useless without being false, thus showing that utility (atthasaṃhitaṃ) was not considered to be a definition or an infallible criterion of truth. But on the other hand, it is curious that the list of possibilities mentioned in the passage are only six and as we have shown (v. supra, 594) there is a failure to mention statements which are both false as well as useful (pleasant or unpleasant). It is difficult to say whether this omission was accidental or intentional, for we have to depend on an argumentum e silentio. If it was intentional, we would have to say that it was not reckoned one of the possibilities either because it was considered self-contradictory to say of a statement that it was false but useful or because such statements did not in fact exist. This (i.e. both these latter alternatives) seems likely not because of any pragmatist theory of truth but because of the peculiarly Buddhist use of the term ‘useless’ (na atthasaṃhitaṃ). Here attha- (s.v. PTS. Dictionary) is not just ‘what is advantageous’ in the broad utilitarian sense of the term, but what is morally good in the sense of being useful for the attainment of the goal of Nirvāṇa. Since falsehood or the assertion of a statement which is false (musāvāda) was considered a moral evil, it would have been held to be logically or causally impossible for what is false, i.e. what is morally evil to result in what was useful in the sense of being morally advantageous or good (atthasaṃhitaṃ).” 

Sullivan 1988: Religious Pragmatism (i.e., of Kumārajīva)

Kevin Sullivan, “Nāgārjuna’s Critique of Metaphysics.” De Philosophia 7, 1988, pp. 88–104 [not seen].  Ethan Mills in his “Nāgārjuna’s Scepticism about Philosophy” (In Buddhism and Scepticism: Historical, Philosophical, and Comparative Perspectives, edited by Oren Hanner. Hamburg Buddhist Studies. Bochum/Freiburg: projekt verlag, 2020, pp. 55–81 (p. 74) states: “Kevin Sullivan calls Kumārajīva’s attitude ‘religious pragmatism’ because the role of emptiness is purely soteriological rather than descriptive (Sullivan, 1988, pp. 98–100). Although Kumārajīva and Sengzhao may ultimately be mystics rather than sceptics, there is at least some affinity with my sceptical interpretation in their use of philosophical negation to cultivate stillness of mind.”

Tillemans 1999: Pragmatism (i.e., of Dharmakīrti)

Tom J.F. Tillemans, Scripture, Logic, Language Essays on Dharmakirti and his Tibetan Successors. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Boston, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 1999, pp. 6–12.

Huntington 2003: Soteriological Pragmatism (i.e., of Candrakīrti)

C. W. Huntington, Jr., “Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?” In The Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus & Sara McClintock. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. Boston, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications, 2003, pp. 67–91 (p. 81): “a very strict soteriological pragmatism” (i.e., of Candrakīrti).  

Wynne 2024: Spiritual Pragmatism (i.e., of Early Buddhism)

Alexander Wynne, “Proto-Madhyamaka in the Pāli Canon Revisited: Early Buddhism, Gandhāra and the Origin of the Prajñāpāramitā.” Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies 24, 2024, pp. 1–41 (p. 26): “spiritual pragmatism” (i.e., of Early Buddhism).

Madhyamaism

I propose characterizing the teaching or doctrine of the Buddha, and Buddhist philosophy and religion more broadly, as “Madhyamaism.” Buddhist philosophy can, of course, be characterized generally and specifically in many ways, depending on the philosophical domain under consideration (e.g., ontology, epistemology, gnoseology, soteriology, Buddhology, psychology, methodology, and the like) and on which Buddhist school, system, source, or scholar one examines. One challenge is that whatever term we employ to characterize a given philosophy or doctrine potentially carries semantic baggage and thus tends to bring undesirable associations and connotations. I am aware that “Madhyamaism,” too, would raise eyebrows and questions. Obviously, no term can perfectly characterize a doctrine, idea, or philosophical position. However, past and present scholars engaged in the study of Buddhism would, I hope, more or less agree that not only all subsequent Buddhist philosophical schools and systems, but even the Buddha himself, as far as we can judge from some of the oldest Buddhist sources, adopted the idea, approach, and attitude of the middle way (madhyamā pratipad: dbu ma’i lam). Every single Buddhist system is likely to claim that its doctrine embodies the middle way,¹ not just the Madhyamaka school (Madhyamakavāda). This is precisely why I propose “Madhyamaism” rather than “Madhyamakaism.” An additional advantage of “Madhyamaism” is its broader applicability. Already in the Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra, the noble eightfold path has been collectively, though not each element individually, regarded as the middle way. However, it seems quite reasonable to interpret each of the eight limbs of the path as embodying a middle way approach. Thus “Madhyamaism” need not be confined to the idea of middle way in ontology and epistemology but also in other domains encompassing both theory and praxis.

I am, however, aware of at least two cases of exception. Firstly, we encounter cases of extremism such as “extreme asceticism” (e.g., in the Jātakas), which may seem contrary to the principle or philosophy of Madhyamaism. Secondly, we also encounter in exclusive Mahāyāna sources that one should not stand even in the middle way, but transcend it. These exceptions prove rather than disprove the rule.

I therefore believe that the neologism “Madhyamaism” most accurately captures the pan-systemic nature of Buddhist philosophy.

¹ Consider, for example, what Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge in his lTa ba’i shan ’byed states (p. 2.2–6): de la spyir grub mtha’ smra ba bzhi po thams cad kyang rang rang gi grub mtha’ nas bshad pa’i lam de nyid rtag chad spangs pa’i dbu ma’i lam du ’dod cing | de’i tshe dngos por smra ba dag gis grub mtha’ bzhi’i phyi ma la dbu ma zhes mi brjod par ngo bo nyid med par smra ba zhes brjod do ||.

A Typology of Buddhist Idealism

I am proposing the following typology of Buddhist idealism.

(a) Ontological/metaphysical/objective idealism: There are no external phenomena; that is, extra-mental objects (bāhyārtha: phyi don) do not exist. Even as we seem to perceive extra-mental objects, such objects do not exist. In a dream, we might “perceive” a boulder, but such an object has never been there. Tibetans called it phyi don med pa’i sems tsam. I wonder if we can call such an idealism “synchronic idealism.” This proposition can be attributed to Cittamātravādins. According to some scholars, Vasubandhu in his Viṃśikā is said to propose also ontological idealism.

(b) Causal or diachronic idealism: There are external phenomena, but these are ultimately caused by or rooted in mind. Such an idealism negates any metaphysical prima causa (be it theistic or non-theistic). Some Tibetan sources seem to describe it as byed pa po gzhan med pa’i sems tsam. This should be acceptable to Buddhism in general, including scholars such as Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. I wonder if I should call it causal or diachronic idealism. I recall Mi pham stating in his bsDus tshan something to this effect: the position that “matter arises out of mind” is Buddhist, whereas the position that “mind arises out of matter” is materialistic. The latter position (“materialism”) is suggestive of epiphenomenalism. The former would qualify as causal or diachronic idealism.

(c) Epistemological/subjective/representational idealism: We cannot directly perceive external phenomena, and all that we know is our own perception (or act of making known). This is expressed by the term vijñaptimātra(tā). Mi pham would put it thus: shes pa la snang ba yin na shes pa yin dgos (dBu ma rgyan ’grel, p. 184.3) = gang snang thams can sems la snang ba tsam (p. 196.4) = gang snang thams cad rnam rig tsam (Theg bsdus mchan, p. 554.4). This should then be epistemological/subjective idealism, or perhaps representational idealism. This is perhaps the kind of idealism that Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti proposed, although the nuances and implications of their positions need not be seen as identical. According to some scholars, Dharmakīrti proposes an epistemological/representational idealism (e.g., by means of sahopalambhaniyama reasoning) while remaining agnostic regarding ontological idealism. Vasubandhu in his Viṃśikā, on the other hand, starts off with epistemological/representational idealism and moves on to ontological idealism. Perhaps one should capture such an idealism in Tibetan: snang tshad rnam rig tsam yin pa’i sems tsam or sems la snang tshad sems yin pa’i sems tsam or shes pa la snang tshad  shes pa yin pa’i sems tsam.

(d) Solipsistic idealism: Most Buddhist philosophers would reject a kind of idealism implying solipsism. Dharmakīrti’s Santānāntarasiddhi shows how seriously this objection was taken. Ratnakīrti may be an exception. He is fascinating and controversial. His arguments sometimes seem to push idealism toward solipsism, though scholars debate whether he really endorsed this or was exploring it dialectically. His position might be: “If you push vijñaptimātra(tā) to its logical extreme, you get something uncomfortably close to solipsism—so perhaps we need to reconsider the premises.” At minimum, his work shows that solipsism was recognized as a potential reductio ad absurdum of certain forms of idealism. Perhaps in Tibetan, we should call it: rgyud gzhan med pa’i sems tsam.

(e) Classificatory question: The question remains as to which type of idealism one should use to categorize the kind suggested by Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 35, which states that the four gross elements (mahābhūta) are contained in vijñāna. Does this mean type (a): the gross elements do not exist externally, only as contents of vijñāna? Does it mean type (b): the gross elements arise from or are caused by vijñāna? Or does it mean type (c): we only know the elements as they appear in vijñāna?

Upaniṣadic Pyrology

My interest in the Upaniṣadic pyrology (i.e., Feuerlehre or Fire-doctrine) is related to what Erich Frauwallner in his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie states (pp. 174–175):

“Can the mention of the ‘I’ or a soul be completely avoided in the doctrine of deliverance? Was one not straightway forced to speak of a subject who is bound and released? The Buddha knew how to avoid the difficulty with consummate dexterity. Thereby occurred to him one of the basic views on which the Buddhist doctrine of deliverance is built. As soon as, for instance, the law of a psychical organism had formed itself in the circles of philosophical schools, the question arose, as we have shown in the description of Epic philosophy, whether the senses and the psychical organ are reckoned in the sphere of the soul or in the sphere of matter. The answer which was given in different doctrines ran differently. In the dialogue between Manu and Bṛhaspati (Manu-Bṛhaspati-Saṃvādaḥ) we have got acquainted with the doctrine according to which the psychical organism arises out of the soul and returns back to it after deliverance from the cycle of being. The second possibility was, above all, represented by the Sāṃkhya system and its first steps in the Epic, in which all the psychical organs with their functions are ascribed to matter, arise out of it and return back to it. This thought rests on the attempt which had its origin in the Fire-Doctrine of the Upaniṣads and continued in the Epic and especially continued in the Sāṃkhya, to free the soul of all earthly definitions and to remove it from the orbit of origination and causal occurrences. Therefore in the Sāṃkhya, as we shall see in the sequel, all activity is removed to the sphere of matter and the soul is an inactive, pure onlooker. And the same view lies at the basis of the Buddhistic doctrine of deliverance. This is, no doubt, the most important and essential agreement of the oldest Buddhism with the Sāṃkhya.”

Buddhist Cynicism or Cynicism in Buddhism

Hajime Nakamura in his A Comparative History of Ideas. London / New York: Kegan Paul International, 1986 [Revised Edition of Tokyo 1975] devotes a section with the title “The Seeking of Dishonor.” For the context, I cite the following two paragraphs (p. 180):

Cynicism appeared in Athens about the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Although the ethical teachings of Cynicism owed much to Antisthenes (c. 446–366 B.C.), it was Diogenes of Sinope (404–323 B.C.) who was first called kyon, the dog, from which the name ‘Cynicism’ derives. The popular sermons of the Cynics exerted considerable influence in the days of the Roman Empire until the fifth century A.D.

Antisthenes derived his form of Cynicism from a particularized interpretation of some of Socrates’ doctrines. Socrates, we may recall, sought to keep his independence from physical wealth and mass popularity so that he could more freely pursue what he considered to be the higher good of wisdom (sophia). For Antisthenes, independence itself was embraced as wisdom or the true good. Self-sufficiency or independence from earthly possessions and pleasures became for him an end in itself.

In the Indian context, Nakamura mentions, among others, the Pāśupatas of Śaivism as a point of comparison. 

And then, he states (p. 182):

Han-shan (Kanzan) and Shih-te (Jittoku), Chinese counterparts of the Cynics and Pāśupatas, were recluses in the Tang period. Han-shan lived in caves and on rocks and Shih-te lived in the precincts of a certain temple. When Han-shan came, Shih-te gave him the remaining scraps of meals forsaken by temple monks. They were wont to suddenly shout or revile towards the sky. They wore ragged clothes and acted like mad persons. When a high official came to see them they departed, sending a smile to him in arrogance. It is said that they indulged in gaily sweeping away moonbeams, when they were not telling each other Zen jokes. They were regarded as the ideal of idiot sages. Han-shan, Shih-te and their admirers did not deliberately seek for dishonor, although when it came their way they did not resist it. 

In addition, we may claim that a form of Buddhist cynicism, or cynicism in Buddhism, can be found in the Mahāsiddha tradition in India and the “mad masters” (bla ma smyon pa, a neologism) tradition in the Tibetan cultural sphere. Some doctrinal seeds of Buddhist cynicism, or cynicism in Buddhism, may be traced in Vinaya asceticism and in Mahāyoga Tantricism. The idea of unmattavrata (smyon pa brtul zhugs kyi spyod pa) would be relevant here. The idea of sanity and insanity in Buddhism is, in itself, a fascinating topic. If we consider the life of dPal-sprul (1808–1887), who, by the way, called himself an “old dog” (khyi rgan), he can be considered a “Buddhist cynic,” and his approach in and attitude to life may be characterized as a form of “Buddhist cynicism.”