Two points should be kept in mind here. First, in the Buddhist context, we should differentiate between “nihilism” (nāstikavāda: med par lta ba) and “annihilationism” (ucchedavāda: chad par lta ba). Second, two kinds of nihilism are mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi (as pointed out in Schmithausen 2001: 257–258), namely: (a) a view that denies the moral values and transcendental efficacy of gift, sacrifice, and so on, and (b) a view that denies the existence of anything in any regard. These two notions of nihilism may be described, following Schmithausen, as the non/pre-Mahāyānic view of nihilism and the Mahāyānic view of nihilism (found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, i.e., Tattvārthapaṭala). This distinction is important! For Tsong-kha-pa, philosophical or ontological nihilism is connected with epistemological scepticism and moral relativism (Jinpa 2002: 34, 175).
yes, I´m also convinced that this observation is an important factor; far too often this term is "misused"...; thank´s; mikael.
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