Some of my friends and students must be tired of hearing this: “We do philology because
we have to. We do philosophy because we want to.” Those of us who love to do
Buddhist philosophy of the past have no choice but to do Buddhist philology as
well. Because, in my view, there can be no (textual) Wortphilologie without (contentual-contextual) Sachphilologie, and no Sachphilologie
without Wortphilologie, philology
must necessarily be an academic discipline that deals with both and one that seeks
to gain a diachronic and synchronic views of the texts and ideas. As such
philology is inextricably linked his history. A philologist is necessarily also
a historian of ideas. But what kind of a historian are we talking about? This
reminds me of the typology of historian proposed once by Edward Conze.
According to him, there are three types of historian: scientific, humanistic,
and transcendental. I quote (Conze 1967 = 2000: 28): “The first studies a
butterfly after killing it and fixing it with a pin into a glass case, where it
lies quite still and can leisurely be inspected from all angles. The second
lets it fly in the sun, and looks wonderingly at its pretty ways. The third
assures us that a man will know a butterfly only if he becomes one.” Using the
idea of intellectual deconstruction (i.e. rigs
pas gzhig pa) and physical destruction
(i.e. gnyen pos gzhig pa), I
would like to propose that what a historian of ideas usually seeks to do is to pursue
analytical dissection but not a physical one, and hence one actually does not
have to kill the butterfly. Or, after having analytically dissected the object
of study with one’s prajñā, one can, out
of one’s karuṇā, assemble all the
parts and put them back to its original form.
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