Recently
in a conference in Düsseldorf, a colleague protested every time someone
employed a term already used in some Western intellectual culture and context,
to such an extent that one began to feel that Buddhist ideas should be
transported in its target language without employing the target language at
all. Or, one can only try to express Buddhist ideas in English, for example, by
leaving all the technical terms in its source language (e.g. Sanskrit, Chinese,
and Tibetan) un-translated. Or, as I often do for the sheer fun of it, create
new terms. “Buddhist vegetarianology” is one such neologism. But in our digital
age, one is bound to realize that whatever term one wishes to coin has already
been coined by someone else although not in the same context that one prefers
to employ. The term “vegetarianology” can already be found on the web though
not in any standard literary or reference work. “Buddhist vegetarianology” is
to be understood here as the “study of the idea of vegetarianism found in Buddhist
literature and culture.” It would naturally also include the study of Buddhist
attitude towards meat-eating. One the one hand, it is perhaps inappropriate for
a non-vegetarian to talk about the topic of vegetarianism in Buddhism. On the
other hand, I could still try to play the role of a śrāvaka who transmits the teachings of a bodhisattva. The analogy
of a bodhisattva giving śrāvaka teachings would not work here.
My interest here is in knowing the history of the idea of vegetarianism in
Buddhism. Lambert Schmithausen has pursued in-depth studies on the topic from a
historical-philological perspective and also, in my view, shown the possibility
for contemporary Buddhists to make creative and innovative reorientation
without having to deny the historical development of vegetarianism and
non-vegetarianism in Buddhism. He is currently pursuing a major study on the
topic. Anyone interested in the topic would greatly benefit from his hitherto pertinent and forthcoming publications. What follows is a small attempt to understand a fragment of the paper that he recently gave in Düsseldorf.
§1. The crux of the problem is that basically meat-eating is permissible
for both ordained and lay Buddhists, whereas killing of animals, insofar as it
is an unwholesome action, should be refrained by both ordained and lay Buddhists.
The difficulty, in other words, is how to reconcile the permission of meat-eating and prohibition
of (or abstention
from) injuring sentient beings (ahiṁsā). Of the three kinds of Buddhists, it must have been the most difficult
for Buddhists who were fishermen, hunters, butchers, and kings (like Aśoka) to eat
meat and yet abstain from killing animals. For Buddhists who were
merchants, artisans, and the like, it was possible to eat meat without having
to kill an animal (i.e. by buying meat in the market). For ordained
persons, it was much easier to eat meat (if offered as
alms) without having to kill an animal. Initially (perhaps) both
ordained Buddhists and Jain ascetics were supposed to live on the leftovers of
meals of lay families.
§2. Unlike Jain ascetics, Buddhist monks and nuns,
however, were also permitted to accept food prepared specially for them and
even accept invitations. This must have created a new difficulty. A Buddhist
monk or nun could get indirectly involved in the killing if the animal was
killed just him or her. Jains must have made this accusation against the
Buddhist order. Thus in order to avoid a direct or close causal association with the act of killing and
in order to avoid such an accusation
by the Jains, ordained monks and nuns were permitted to accept meat (and fish)
only if pure from three points of view (trikoṭipariśuddha: rnam gsum dag pa).
§3.
Meat-eating, in whatever form, had yet another difficulty. It did not conform
the norms of asceticism inasmuch as meat
and fish (like ghee, butter, milk, sesamum oil, honey, and molasses) were
considered exquisite food and hence as luxury. Unlike non-Buddhist radical
ascetics, who abstained from meat and fish as elements of severe austerities,
Buddhists renunciants were permitted to accept any food and consume it in
moderation, be it exquisite or frugal. Unless ill, they were not permitted to
ask for exquisite food. For early Buddhism, the emphasis was not so much on
external asceticism but rather on
inner asceticism (as a kind of inner
detachment). There are indications in early Buddhism that there has been
certain shift in setting the degree of the stringency of asceticism. On the one
hand, there has been a tendency of certain laxation
in asceticism (e.g. invitations were acceptable and alms-tour reduced to
optional). On the other hand, there was an opposite tendency of rigidization of asceticism (e.g. calling
for a strict and obligatory adherence to severe practices). In the various
versions of the Vinaya (except that of the Mahāsāṃghikas),
there is a report of an attempt of categorical prohibition of meat and fish
(and, in some sources, even ghee, milk and salt), which is, however, associated
with Devadatta and explicitly rejected. According to one version of the Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya,
Devadatta calls for a ban on meat-eating not on the grounds of ascetism but on the grounds of ethicism (i.e. meat-eating presupposes
the killing of animals).
§4. Eating special kinds of meat (e.g. of human, dog, horse, elephant,
snake, etc.) was problematic for reasons of tabooism
or social in-acceptability, which could jeopardize the social prestige of the Buddhist order.
§5. Eating special kinds of meat (e.g. of predators) and eating of meat and
fish by certain monks such as those who practice in the cemeteries have been
seen as problematic for security reasons
and hence should be abstained for the sake of self-protection.
§6. In short, in early Buddhism, there was no total prohibition of meat-eating for the
ordained as well as lay persons. There were only certain restrictions, especially for ordained persons, mainly to anonymize
and dissociate them from responsibility for the killing, to avoid loss of
social prestige, and for self-protection. But there was a tendency to rigidify ascetism by calling for the prohibition
of meat-eating and also on the ground of ethicism.
§7. But there was also tendency of an idealization
of a world or epoch without meat-eating, and thus, so to speak, towards
vegetarianism.
§8. Only one (and not even a strong) strand of
Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism calls for abstention from meat-eating.
§9. Mahāyānic scriptures such as the Ratnameghasūtra, Hastikakṣyasūtra, Mahāmeghasūtra, Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra,
Aṅgulimālīyasūtra, Laṅkāvatārasūtra, and the like are said to propose vegetarianism
to varying degrees and with shared or specific arguments. On the one hand, one
can find inauguration of new ideas in
accordance with the fundamentals of Mahāyāna spirituality and on the other hand
practical adaptations to social
developments. This was considered necessary for the social reputation of the bodhisatvas
and the Buddhist Order. Some of the arguments for total abstention from
meat-eating found in these sources may be called “self-protection argument,” “altruism-argument” (DW), “all-beings-are-my-relatives
argument” (LS), in which case meat-eating would amount to endo-cannibalism, tathāgatagarbha (or “one-and-same-element argument” (DW), in
which case meat-eating would amount to autophagy, “physical-social-impurity
argument” (DW), “complicity-argument” (DW) or “consumer-argument”
(LS), and so on.
§10. Schmithausen has not dealt with the abstention of meat-eating in the
Kriyā system of Mantrayāna. One possible implicit argument would be the
“physical-impurity argument.” Meat-eating would render one impure and unfit as
a recipient of the mundane and supra-mundane siddhis.
§12. Vegetarianism has been propagated strongly by
several past and present prominent Tibetan Buddhist masters, occasionally even to the detriment
of the health of some nomadic people (e.g. pregnant women) in Tibet and in Tibetan cultural sphere. A
systematic study of their arguments for the abstention of meat-eating would be
worth a study.
§13. Lastly a point from a certain Tibetan Buddhist (Tantric) perspective
may be made. “Meat is eaten by one who has compassion. Alcohol is drunk by one
who has Tantric commitment” (sha snying
rje can gyis bza’ || chang dam tshig can gyis ’thung ||). So it is said.
This might sound like an excuse for one’s greed. I have heard some Tibetan
masters say that one may eat meat only if one can eat it as if one were forced
to eat the meat of one’s only child. That is, with so much compassion and remorse,
and with no greed or pleasure whatsoever. The bottom-line, for some Tibetan
masters, would be, if you eat meat, eat it with compassion. If you abstain from
it, do so out of compassion. An Atiyogin would, however,
neither demand meat nor reject it.
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