Cultism, Guruism, Scandalism, and Blind-Faitheism in Buddhism

As I am wont to claim, I philologize because I have to but I philosophize because I want to. Someone posted a list of Buddhist teachers who are potential cult figures. The list and the issues connected with it made me reflect on, or so to say, “philosophize” the phenomena of what I like to call “cultism,” “guruism,” “scandalism,” and “blind-faitheism” in Buddhism. In this regard, I would like to reflect as an independent Buddhist thinker without committing my loyalty to any specific master or tradition. I can, however, only make a few random statements here. First, I think we should recognize that there are elements and tendencies of what I call “cultism,” “guruism,” “scandalism,” and “blind-faitheism” in Buddhism. By “cultism” I wish to express a “phenomenon of excessive, irrational devotion to a particular religious leader (guru: bla ma), who and whose followers leave no room for a healthy, commonsensical, and constructive criticism of the main figure and his or her religious institution.” Such a form of “cultism” often tends to be “an irrational form of guruism” (i.e. guru-devotionalism) based on “blind-faitheism” and is often a cause of “scandalism.” Such cultism should be seen as unhealthy and undesirable development within the Buddhist traditions. Second, it may not always be easy to separate “Buddhist cultism” from what one might call “main-stream Buddhism” because one person’s “Buddhist cultism” may turn out to be another person’s “main-stream Buddhism” and vice versa. A Buddhist master or institution that is ruled by a strong sense of Buddhist rationality and sensibility of ethical-moral integrity, responsibility, and accountability, and promotes compassion and wisdom, should not be considered a cult. Any master or institution that is ruled by a ideology of violence, bondage, death, and destruction should be cognized and recognized as dangerous. Third, it is also important to recognize that not all masters who have been scandalized are power-hungry, sex-hungry, and dangerous. Having said that in any given “cultism,” I hold the cult figures primarily responsible. Fourth, the antidotes for “cultism,” “guruism,” “scandalism,” and “blind-faitheism” in Buddhism can be found in Buddhist teachings themselves. If Buddhist teachers and disciples adhere to the adhiśīla, adhicitta, and adhiprajñā, there would be no “cultism,” “guruism,” “scandalism,” and “blind-faitheism.” Everyone involved with Buddhism should try to open their prajñāic eyes, stick their asses to samādhic cushion, and self-guard themselves by remaining within the bounds of self-restraints, which includes avoiding causing mutual harm. Buddhist rationalism should be an antidote to “blind-faitheism.” It is crucial to remind ourselves that our masters are human beings (even when we are supposed to see them as an Awakened Beings). Just like ourselves, our masters, too, have their strengths and weaknesses. In contrast to the Buddhist tradition, I do not believe that there is such a thing as a perfect person. For the Buddhists, may be the Buddha can be regarded a perfect person. But what would this mean? A person with whom no one will have a problem? I do not think such a person is possible. If the Buddha were my roommate, I am afraid, I may start disliking some of his behaviors. So our masters (and note that even one’s enemy can be one’s master) are masters only insofar they impart dharma that is supposed to benefits us. A master is a like a doctor who prescribes medicine. A master should be, by no means, idealized or idolized as an infallible person. A master’s private life (so long as it does not harm others) should not be a disciple’s personal matter. If a master deliberately harms the disciple, however, he or she should be held accountable just like a doctor who deliberately harms his or her patients should be held accountable. My personal stance is that if a master abides by his or her śīla, there should be no scandalism. It seems very beneficial for all masters to realize that they are all fallible mortals and should mend mistakes whenever they make, and be modest enough to admit that they are human beings with all kinds of intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa). Masters would easily fall into a trap when they claim that they are Awakened Beings with no intellectual-emotional defilements. Being an honest human being is a prerequisite for being a good Buddhist. Being a good Buddhist is a prerequisite for being a good master. Fifth, I personally do not find attempts to “black-list” and “criminalize” certain masters or traditions particularly beneficial or constructive. Such campaigns have been rampantly pursued in Tibet beginning from the tenth century but have only fueled sectarianism and polemicism. Using one master’s argument to ostracize another master is like attacking one form of cultism by following another form of equally dubious cultism. Raising awareness of self-responsibility and self-reflection is, of course, fine. Of course in very obvious cases where a cult figure robs off freedom, self-determination, independence to think for oneself from his or her followers, and propagates an ideology of hatred, death, and destruction, the society as such must take appropriate measures. Sixth, just as I accept my parents (with all their strengths and weaknesses, pluses and minuses), I personally accept my teachers (with all their strengths and weaknesses, pluses and minuses) because they are bka’ drin can for me. The Tibetan word bka’ drin does not mean “kindness.” A master may be kind or unkind to me but he or she is still bka’ drin can for me because he or she happens “to be one who deserves (or is worthy of) my gratitude.” I may not, however, totally share the ideology of my master. In sum, a very imperfect disciple like myself cannot demand a perfect master. If one does not like one’s master, or if one’s master does not suit one, one may leave him or her. Just like one leaves one’s girl-friend or boy-friend. If the master does not allow one to leave, be warned. That is a sign of cult! This is all the more a reason to leave! Seventh, by changing our attitude or perception, we can even change adverse conditions or bad masters into factors conducive to bodhi and hence into kalyāṇamitra. On the other hand, if our attitude or approach is worldly, we can change everyone and everything into factors opposed to bodhi and hence into pāpamitra. Because no one or nothing is by nature kalyāṇamitra or pāpamitra, we can change anyone and anything into either kalyāṇamitra or pāpamitra. Eighth, ultimately, the Teaching (bstan pa), in many regards, is the best Teacher (ston pa).

Buddhist Blasphemism? Blasphemism in Buddhism?

Recently the topic of blasphemy, or, let us call, “blasphemism,” in Buddhism became an issue. Many scholars commented on it and I must admit most comments seemed to remain at the periphery of the topic. The first question is whether there is at all what one might call “blasphemy” in Buddhism? What would be the terms used in Buddhist sources that might indicate blasphemy? What types of blasphemy may be found? Most importantly, what does it mean in Buddhism to commit a blasphemy? And do/should a Buddhist react to (or deal with) blasphemy? Is there such a thing as Anti-Blasphemy law/rule/ regulation in Buddhism? These issues are perhaps important so as to raise awareness among Buddhist intellectuals and spiritual leaders so that they can impart a clear understanding of blasphemy and educate Buddhists not to think and behave in a way that would make one a “Buddhist Taliban” or a “Buddhist Ayatollah.” Let us look at the word itself. The word is said to come from Latin blasphemia and Greek blasphēmía. It is said to mean not just any kind of “slander” but “the action or offense of speaking sacrilegiously about God or sacred things.” Some of the words listed as synonyms or quasi-synonyms of “blasphemy” are “profanity, profaneness, sacrilege, irreligiousness, irreverence, taking the Lord’s name in vain, swearing, curse, cursing, impiety, impiousness, ungodliness, unholiness, desecration, disrespect; formal imprecation; archaic execration,” and “reverence” is said to be its antonym. The first important question for me is if there is “blasphemy” (in any sense of the word) in Buddhism? The answer should be certainly in the affirmative. In a narrow sense, “blasphemy” in Buddhism may be defined as “mental, verbal, or physical actions involving depreciation/deprecation, desecration, defamation, or, destruction of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha and of anything or anyone that represents them.” In a broader sense, “blasphemy” in Buddhism may be defined as “mental, verbal, or physical actions involving depreciation/deprecation, desecration, defamation, or destruction of anyone or anything that is worthy of respect.” The greatest difficulty in this regard is whether the idea or concept of “worthy of respect” would differ from person to person; from culture to culture; from religion to religion; and so on, or whether we can we talk of a universally valid idea and standard of respect. I would personally think that while the mode or manner of expressing one’s respect may differ from culture to culture, “respect” (in the sense of “a feeling of deep admiration for someone or something elicited by their abilities, qualities, or achievements”) is something universal. This would be true also with “disrespect.” The matter then seems to be not about whether there is an idea, concept, or norm, of “respect” or “disrespect” in any given cultural tradition or religion but rather about how does or should one deal with “respect” and “disrespect” (especially of what one considers to be “sacred” or “holy”). From a Buddhist philosophical perspective, so long as there are beings with intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa)—such as ignorance, hatred, and desire—there are bound to be “blasphemies.” Just as our “blasphemies” are symptoms of our unchecked intellectual-emotional defilements so too are our negative or destructive reactions to blasphemies symptoms of our unrestrained intellectual-emotional defilements. Both of these are caused by one’s obsessive attachment (or addiction) to one’s own religion (and ultimately to oneself) and excessive aversion against anything that is associated with others, and both addiction and aversion are rooted in ignorance/confusion/disorientation. To be sure, all human beings, defined by the notion of “I” or “self” and “mine,” are prone to addiction/passion and detestation. We tend to be pleased if other people praise, for examples, us and our religion. We tend to be hurt and angry if other people blame, for examples, us and our religion. That may be natural. But the question is how should we react if other people ostracize and criticize, for example, us and our religion. In this regard, it is surprising that we tend to be infantile and immature and think and act like spoiled children. I cannot speak for other religions, but I feel that Buddhist religion in this regard is quite mature, that is, even when Buddhists (who fail to see the very purpose of Buddhist religion being under the sway of intellectual-emotional defilements) may misbehave or think and act adharmically. Of course, admittedly the ideal Buddhist teachings and the real Buddhists may not and cannot always conform. Buddhist teachings prescribe several ways of combatting one’s own intellectual-emotional defilements. Reacting negatively or destructively to an act of (perceived) blasphemy (e.g. wanting and seeking to kill someone on its account) would be seen in Buddhism as becoming a slave of one’s own intellectual-emotional defilements. A Buddhist should be able to cope with any form of “blasphemy” against Buddhism by considering many arguments. First, it would be completely preposterous to assume that everyone will respect the Three Jewels. Everyone should but not everyone will. Second, as a mature Buddhist, one should be able do deal with both respect and disrespect of any kind, or with all “eight worldly concerns.” Third, by generating hatred (or by giving in to hatred) towards those who seek to destroy, desecrate, or depreciate the Three Jewels and their representations, a Buddhist would stoop to the same level as those who perpetrate those acts of disrespect. Fourth, those who perpetrate those acts of disrespect should be objects of one’s compassion but not of one’s hatred. One is primarily responsible for sowing one’s “positive” or “negative” seeds and for reaping one’s desirable or undesirable “fruits.” People are free to sow any kind of seeds in the Three Jewels that are fertile “fields” (kṣetra: zhing). They are free to respect or disrespect the Three Jewels and their representations. If they respect these, they do so for their own benefit. If they disrespect these, they do so at their own risks. By disrespecting or insulting, for example, the Buddha, one would accrue “negative earnings” or “detrimental resources” (pāpa: sdig pa) so that one brings about one’s own destruction, downfall, pain, or suffering. By respecting, for example, the Buddha, one would accrue “positive earnings” or “beneficial resources” (puṇya: bsod nams) so that one brings about one’s own wellbeing and happiness. Fifth, those who perpetrate those acts of blasphemy against the Three Jewels and their representations are de facto one’s wholesome teachers insofar as they teach one to practice moderation and toleration. They teach one to be more humane in the face of inhumanity; tolerance in the face of intolerance. Sixth, instead of being concerned about other people committing blasphemy, one should be more concerned that one does not commit oneself not just blasphemies but any negative deeds especially those five infinitely heinous deeds and five that resemble them. Charity begins at home, so it is said. Here it would more appropriate to say: Responsibility begins with self-responsibility! There is, however, one difficulty in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Is it not permissible to exterminate those who seek to exterminate Buddhism or those seek to annihilate countless sentient (or human) beings? Perhaps only precariously and conditionally! If a bodhisattva is capable of doing so, that is, if he is able to do so without being tainted by intellectual-emotional defilements, he would be principally permitted to do so, but how can one and who can guarantee that such an act comes to be beneficial? In the light of inadequate insight and compassion, such an endeavor, though theoretically permissible, would hardly be feasible or implementable. If a bodhisattva decides to go ahead and should it turn to be beneficial or disastrous, he should bear full responsibility for his motivation and action. Sometimes, a bodhisattva may be willing to take full responsibility of his motivation and action and if necessary even be prepared to go to the deepest hell!

Madhyamic Deconstructionism

I am not a specialist of Jacques Derrida’s (1930–2004) philosophy of “Deconstruction,” which is said to be based principally on his 1967 work Of Grammatology. I have tried to understand the quintessence of his philosophy but I failed because it turned out to be quite slippery and jelly-like. His critics, however, seem to make better sense to me. According to John Rogers Searle’s (b. 1932) critique of it (Wikipedia), “the consistent pattern of Derrida’s rhetoric is: (a) announce a preposterous thesis, e.g. “there is no outside-text” (il n’y a pas de hors-texte); (b) when challenged on (a) respond that you have been misunderstood and revise the claim in (a) such that it becomes a truism, e.g. il n’y a pas de hors-texte means nothing else: there is nothing outside contexts;” (c) when the reformulation from (b) is acknowledged then proceed as if the original formulation from (a) was accepted. The revised idea—for example—that everything exists in some context is a banality but a charade ensues as if the original claim—nothing exists outside of text [sic]—had been established. Searle wrote in The New York Review of Books that he was surprised by “the low level of philosophical argumentation, the deliberate obscurantism of the prose, the wildly exaggerated claims, and the constant striving to give the appearance of profundity by making claims that seem paradoxical, but under analysis often turn out to be silly or trivial.” Actually, the term “deconstructionism” would seem more suitable for characterizing the philosophical approach of the Madhyamaka school. That is, according to (I would assume all) schools or strands of Madhyamaka school, a phenomenon, entity or reality (“x”) seems existent only when viewed naively and non-analytically (ma brtags gcig pur nyams dga’ bar), but in actuality no entity or reality can withstand the Madhyamic analysis. There is no entity or reality that one cannot “deconstruct.” All phenomena, realities, or propositions are deconstructible. According to my understanding of the eleventh-century Tibetan philosopher Rong-zom-pa, there is no nothing that cannot be deconstructed by logical reasoning (rigs pas gzhig tu mi rung ba) and there is nothing that cannot be deconstructed by antidote (gnyen pos gzhig tu mi rung ba). According to dGe-lugs-pa exegetes, however, what is existent (e.g. kleśa) cannot be deconstructed by logical reasoning and one can only deconstruct what is non-existent (e.g. bden par grub pa). So actually dGe-lugs Mādhyamikas cannot be considered “deconstructionists”? In the Buddhist context, “deconstructionism” would include the approach of taking phenomena or realities apart by means of logical analysis (i.e. via theoretical examination) and also the aspect of actual or practical destruction of phenomena (i.e. through meditation or practical application just like destroying a clay pot with a hammer) and hence “deconstructionism” (in this context) would also include a kind of “destructionism.”

Buddhist Fideism or Fideism in Buddhism?

As usual, whenever I ponder over a question as to whether there is an idea or theory of “x” in Buddhism. I try to see how the word “x” is understood outside “Buddhism.” In this case, it is “Fideism.” What is “Fideism” supposed to mean and is there such a thing as “Fideism” in Buddhism? It is supposed to be “an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths…. The word fideism comes from fides, the Latin word for faith, and literally means ‘faith-ism.’ Theologians and philosophers have responded in various ways to the place of faith and reason in determining the truth of metaphysical ideas, morality, and religious beliefs. A fideist is one who argues for fideism. Historically, fideism is most commonly ascribed to four philosophers: Pascal, Kierkegaard, William James, and Wittgenstein; with fideism being a label applied in a negative sense by their opponents, but which is not always supported by their own ideas and works or followers. There are a number of different forms of fideism” (Wikipedia, s.v.). 

The question in the Buddhist context would be what we mean by “faith” and whether there is at all such a thing as “faith.” Some of the words that come to my mind are dad pa, dang ba, mos pa, and so on. We can also consider Sanskrit, Pāli, and Chinese terms for these. We shall have to see how these words have been explained or defined, for example, in Abhidharmic sources. While mos pa (adhimokṣa or adhimukti) is a kind of “believing trust” (in something or someone), dang pa and dad pa seem to be described as a clear state of mind which is able to reflect the good qualities of others (i.e. of the Three Jewels); a state of mind which is capable of appreciation (and emotions such as compassion, although objects  of appreciation and compassion are different). A person with dad pa and dang ba is often touched or moved by the good qualities of others; is capable of tears of appreciation (e.g. upon hearing the teaching of emptiness)(and compassion, e.g. upon witnessing sentient beings in pain and suffering). The former case is expressed very eloquently by Candrakīrti in his Madhyamakāvatāra. Faith, if it is one and in this sense, is, of course considered positively in Buddhism. 

But the question is whether faith in this sense is seen (a) as self-sufficient and independent of reason and is thus capable of causing one to gain direct meditative access to the true reality thereby causing one to attain one’s soteriological goal; (b) if faith is seen hostile or contradictory to reason, and (c) if faith is superior to reason. Most Buddhist philosophers would perhaps propose that (a) faith is inadequate and not totally independent of reason, (b) faith and reason are not mutually exclusive, and (c) faith is not superior to reason. An aspirant would need both faith and reason; a reason-based faith is ideal and possible. One can, however, begin one’s spiritual aspiration with either faith or reason, or both at the same time. A faith-oriented person is usually considered dull and a reason-oriented person usually sharp (i.e. in terms of cognitive faculty) but to be noted is that theoretically one can also consider dull or sharp in terms of one’s “faculty of faith” (dad pa’i dbang po). It seems that both faculties of faith and reason are seen as means of gaining direct access into the true reality and for some faith works better and for others reason works better. In either case, what counts is that one is capable of penetrating the true reality with one’s direct meditative insight for which there is no other alternative.

There is, however, a statement according to which one can realize the ultimate truth only through faith. Such a position seems to be indicate Fideism in Buddhism but even faith in such a context may be easily reconcilable with reason. Buddhism would normally deprecate faith (such as faith in the Creator God) as being completely detrimental to one’s aspiration for one’s nirvāṇic release, for a faith in an non-existent God or substantial (or metaphysical) Self is an “acquired/superimposed ignorance/nescience” (kun tu btags pa’i ma rig pa), induced through indoctrination. Ignorance is Buddhism can perhaps never be bliss!

Buddhist Iconology = Buddhist Symbology

If “iconology” is “the study of icons or artistic symbolism,” “Buddhist Iconology” may be defined as the “study of Buddhist icons and symbols.” Cf. “Symbology, the study or use of symbols.”

Buddhist Bromatology = Buddhist Nutriology = Buddhist Sitiology = Buddhist Sitology = Buddhist Alimentology

This blog note records my personal reflections on venues for exploring what may be called “Buddhist Bromatology = Buddhist Nutriology = Buddhist Sitiology = Buddhist Sitology = Buddhist Alimentology.” 

“Bromatology” is defined as “the science of aliments or food.” In the Buddhist context, I would like to define “Buddhist Bromatology” or “Buddhist Nutriology” simply as “the Buddhist philosophy of food or nutrition.” Note that “sitiology/sitology” is said to be “the science of food and nourishment.” Cf. Trophology.

While reading the bSam gtan mig sgron, I just happened to wonder if there is something called “a philosophy of food” and specifically if there is something called a “a Buddhist philosophy of food.” So what do we nowadays? Just google and see if something pops up. And lo the first thing I find is “The Philosophy of Food” (a Sammelband edited by David M. Kaplan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). I did not read the book but people are talking about the book. The publisher ad says: “This book explores food from a philosophical perspective, bringing together sixteen leading philosophers to consider the most basic questions about food: What is it exactly? What should we eat? How do we know it is safe? How should food be distributed? What is good food?” According to a reader, it is said to take up a “a number of philosophical/ethical issues related to food, food production, and the aesthetic experience of eating and enjoying food” and about “ethical gourmandism, the myth of happy meat, veganism as a moral baseline, and nutritionism and functional foods.” I also googled up “Gastronomology,” but this does not seem to be a serious attested word. I also googled to see if I could find “Nutritionology.” One does find it though perhaps not an established word. We can also find “nutritionism.” Now can we speak of a “Buddhist philosophy of food,” or, perhaps “A Buddhist Nutritionology”? I think, we can. I have a feeling the Buddhist sources would have a great deal to tell us about food. Buddhist philosophy of food or Buddhist Nutritionology would be intricately linked with the Buddhist perception and conception of the body, its nature, status, value, and function, and this in turn, with Buddhist soteriology.

Again here, too, it would be ideal if we can obtain a diachronic and synchronic view of the issues. Here are some random points: (a) First of all, a definition and typology of food should be examined. Can food be defined as a “means of sustenance”? What about the types of food? In this regard, one immediately would think of the four types of food discussed in Abhidharmic sources: kham gyi zas, reg pa’i zas, sems pa’i zas, and rnam par shes pa’i zas (or rnam shes kyi zas). Also Vinayic sources would be valuable for extracting information about food. (b) Foods and medicines would often be discussed together in the Vinayic sources. (c) Ethically/ascetically/spiritually permissible foods and drinks. (d) The problem of meat-eating and vegetarianism. (e) The idea of “right livelihood” (yang dag pa’i ’tsho ba) and log pa’i ’tsho ba would become relevant. (f) Most Buddhist sources would look at food from an ascetic point of view and hence simply regard it like a fuel for the automobile. I think we will also find sources that tell us that we should eat food to feed micro-organism in our body. Not eating too much or too little. One third of the stomach must be filled with solid food, one third with water, and one third with air. (g) The topic of fasting might be relevant as well. The issue of starvation? (h) The topic of avoiding dinner would be an issue as well. (i) The issue of alcohol consumption would be relevant as well.  (h) Perhaps like the types of food in general, the types of plant ingredients: roots, stem, flowers, fruits, and seeds. (i) As one enters the terrains of Tantric Buddhism, one would the encounter “white foods” (vegetarian) and “red foods” (non-vegetarian). Why does Kriyā system prescribe “three whites” and “three sweets” whereas some Mahāyoga systems prescribe “five meats” and “five nectars.” (j) Foods one adopts/avoids in general or only during specific occasions and situations. The theory and practice of fasting is relevant here. So it seems the venue for exploration is very vast.

In addition, the various kinds of tastes (i.e. 6 as described in the Abhidharmic literature) and also the sense of taste and enjoyment and its pros and cons from a Buddhist spiritual point of view would be relevant. What about the idea of “Tantric feast” (gaṇacakra: tshogs kyi ’khor lo)? Of course, we also find references to “table manners” (in Vinayic sources): making noises, playing with food, forming food into a shape of animals, etc. Consider: lha bshos, zhal zas ro rgya ldan pa, lto mchod, ja mchod, chang mchod. Food prohibition? What about kha srung “dietary restriction”? Where does the idea of nya phag gong gsum come from? From the idea of dug gsum? I think veganism was not known. Any discussion on cannibalism? All in all, we may see that Buddhist philosophy of food is influenced by the Buddhist philosophy of life and soteriology.