Sanskritology

A person who is a specialist in Sanskrit language and literature would be called a “Sanskritist.” But see Marczell 2007: 177, where the word “Sanskritologist” is also used. Following this, Sanskrit Studies can be called “Sanskritology.”

‪Bodhisattvic Polyamory?

In my study of bodhicitta (Wangchuk 2007), of which I am neither too proud nor too ashamed, I briefly discussed an idea in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, according to which “a bodhisattva cares for all sentient beings as a man does for his wife but still remains unaffected by the worldly aspects of such a bond.” This is how I attempted to translate the pertinent passage: 

“These two are the unique, amazing, [and] extraordinary qualities of a bodhisattva who has firmly generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha]. What are the two? [a] [He] embraces all sentient beings as [though they were his] wife, and [b] yet is not tainted by the fault of having taken a wife. In this regard, the fault of taking a wife is this: the defiled gratification or hostility (kliṣṭānurodhavirodha) that comes from the benefit [received or] detriment [sustained by one’s] wife. But these two are not found in a bodhisattva.” 

As a footnote to the word “embraces,” I made the following comment: 

“The choice of the verb parigṛhṇāti is noteworthy here because it means not only ‘to embrace’ and ‘to assist’ (among many other things), which fit the context better when sentient beings in general are the object, but also means ‘to take (a wife)’ or ‘to marry’ (MW, s.v. pari-√grah). The pun, which is certainly intended, conveys the idea that a bodhisattva cares for all sentient beings as a man does for his wife but still remains unaffected by the worldly aspects of such a bond. This issue is addressed once again in Bodhisattvabhūmi 3.2 (Wogihara, p. 362.5–10; Dutt, p. 249.5–7): “Even upon his having first generated the resolve [to become a buddha], all sentient beings are embraced by a bodhisattva as [though they were his] wife. [He will make the following resolution:] ‘For them, all types of [resources required for] their benefit and happiness will be gathered by me to the best of [my] ability and to the best of [my] power.’ And [he indeed] does just that. This is the bodhisattva’s simultaneous embracing of all sentient beings” (prathama eva cittotpāde bodhisattvena sarvaḥ sattvadhātuḥ kalatrabhāvena parigṛhītaḥ | eṣāṃ mayā yathāśakti yathābalaṃ sarvākārahitasukhopasaṃhāraḥ karaṇīya iti | tathaiva ca karoti | ayaṃ bodhisattvasya sakṛtsarvasattvaparigrahaḥ |). This simile was already noted by Dayal 1932: 63.”

So today on St. Valentine’s Day (14.2.2014), I wish to (by way of fun) discuss briefly if we can speak of ‪“Bodhisattvic polyamory,” or even “Bodhisattvic polygamy” (at least as a metaphor or simile). There is a long entry on “polyamory” (Wikipedia, s.v.) and it is said to be from Greek πολύ (poly), meaning “many” or “several,” and Latin amor, “love” and is said to be “the practice, desire, or acceptance of having more than one intimate relationship at a time with the knowledge and consent of everyone involved.” If we take the main components of the concept of “polyamory,” namely, “more than one” and “loving,” then we might say a bodhisattva loves more than one but unfortunately, it does not involve an “intimate relationship at a time with the knowledge and consent of everyone involved.” It is a one-sided love. A bodhisattva is a kind of an “anonymous lover,” an “anonymous husband/wife” of all sentient beings. At least in Tibetan a bodhisattva is described as an “unacquainted kin/relative/friend” (ma ’dris pa’i mdza’ bshes). If we can at all speak of “love” in such a case then perhaps a “Bodhisattvic love” is a “Platonic love.” An important question in this context, in my view, is: Is amor possible without intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa)?

Buddhist Hierographology

I have noted this term “Buddhist hierographology” for myself in one of our entries and is meant to express “study of Buddhist sacred scriptures.” Now, I wish to be more specific and talk about only “Tibetan Buddhist hierographology.” To begin with, the following has been said with regard to  the term “Hierographology” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_text):

“Hierographology (Ancient Greek: ἱερός, hieros, ‘sacred’ or ‘holy,’ + γραφή, graphe, ‘writing,’ + λόγος, logos, ‘word’ or ‘reason’) (archaically also ‘hierology’) is the study of sacred texts. Increasingly, sacred texts of many cultures are studied within academic contexts, primarily to increase understanding of other cultures, whether ancient or contemporary. Sometimes this involves the extension of the principles of higher criticism to the texts of many faiths. It may also involve a comparative study of religious texts.”

For my purpose here, I wish to define “Tibetan Buddhist hierographology” as the study or theory of the ideas of sacred Buddhist scriptures that one finds primarily in textual sources in Tibetan language. Although we cannot always isolate the three layers of sacred scriptures, namely, of buddhavacana (sangs rgyas kyi bka’) in the sense of the Buddha’s doctrine or teaching, pravacana (gsung rab) in the sense of scriptures that contain those doctrines, and pustaka (glegs bam) in the sense of tangible and physical books, I think, we have to be very clear about the distinction. I would think that “Buddhist hierographology” would mainly concern pravacana.

Some of the venues of explorations are: (1) nature of Buddhist scriptures, (2) types, (3) functions, (4) formation, (5) translation, (6) transmission, (7) reception, and so on.

  

A Buddhist Position on Telling Lies

My freshly gained FB friend, Mike Dickman, posted a link on the FB timeline to a review (“The Unbearable Truth: Why we must tell lies”) by Clancy Martin (a professor of philosophy at the University of Missouri at Kansas City). Here is it: http://bookforum.com/inprint/020_05/12752. It is a review of the book, Lying by Sam Harris, and made me reflect on the problems of telling lies from a Buddhist axiological (i.e. ethical-moral-spiritual) standpoint. 

(a) Although lying is one of the four cardinal transgressions, let us say, for a bhikṣu, a fully ordained Buddhist monk, it is not any kind of lie and not by any standard. It has to be a lie about one’s extraordinary (better übermenschliche) spiritual accomplishment or abilities (e.g. the lie that I have uprooted once and for all all my intellectual-emotional defilements such as anger, desire, and ignorance, when it is actually not the case). Also the act of lying would become full-fledged (or fully committed) only if these four criteria are fulfilled: (1) There is a clear motive for deception. (2) There is the credulity of the “intended dupe” (as the reviewer calls). (3) The act of lying is complete/consistent/successful. (4) There is no immediate regret (but rather there is even a sense of success). 

(b) The review also reminds of me a reported accusation (of course jocularly) made by the Tibetan mendicant Mi-la-ras-pa against the Buddha that the latter had deceived sentient beings by lying to them about the true reality. That is,  Mi-la-ras-pa considered  propaedeutic and therapeutic teachings of the Buddha as “lies.” But by traditional standard, and particularly what one might call Mahāyānic standard, it seems that the ethical-moral justifiability or culpability of an act of telling the truth or an act of telling lies is to be determined, not by the act itself, but by the motive behind it. Theoretically, telling the truth out of maliciousness or with an intent to cause harm to the intended target would be (ethically-morally) as problematic or at least as questionable as telling lies with the same motive/intent. Thus, if to use Nāgārjuna’s Mahāyānic ethical-moral yardstick, we could sum up the Mahāyānic position on the problematic issue of telling lies thus: “If it benefits, tell even lies. If it harms, do not even tell the truth.”

Buddhist Soteriological Exclusivism

Apologies for not providing any source for this entry because it is just for collecting my thoughts. I have been interested in the idea of “soteriological exclusivism” in Buddhism for quite sometime and have discussed in some detail elsewhere. So I may not repeat it here. A careful, comprehensive, and systematic treatment of the theme is still wanting. By “soteriological exclusivism” (in the Buddhist context), I mean a kind of theory or doctrine according which one cannot obtain release from saṃsāra   (and obtain Arhatship or Buddhahood) without realizing the true reality of some kind or without realizing it to a minimum required degree (Wangchuk 2007; RZ1: on thabs shes; gNubs-chen, bSam gtan mig sgron, p 259: thabs dang shes rab ma rogs pas || ma grol khams gsum ’khor ba yin || [citing the rGyad bcu pa]). This is, actually, quite a significant, complex, and knotty issue. We will have to leave up to the scholars specializing in Theravāda or Sino-Japanese Buddhism to inform us regarding the issue of “soteriological exclusivism” in these traditions. My study concerns primarily ideas of “soteriological exclusivism” found in Indian sources and their interpretations by various schools of Tibetan Buddhism.

(a) To be sure, the issue is naturally pertinent to only those Buddhist doctrines or theories that deal with soteriology. Most Buddhist traditions would perhaps agree that Buddhism also teaches ways of obtaining a fortunate destiny in saṃsāra. In other words, Buddhism is not all, though primarily, about obtaining Arhatship and Buddhahood. I argue, however, that Buddhism, like perhaps all major world religions, is unique because of its unique soteriology. A form of Buddhism that has no soteriology would be no Buddhism at all.

(b) Here comes the first difficulty. Historically speaking, Buddhist tradition eventually split up into eighteen (or more) Nikāyic schools. Are all these schools authentic? Importantly, this question is tantamount to the question as to whether one can, by following any one of these eighteen or more Nikāyic schools, obtain at least Arhatship. How do various Tibetan Buddhist scholars answer this question? This is the first venue for exploration. While most Tibetan scholars world not even doubt the Buddhist status of most of these schools, the ability of the doctrine of Vātsīputrīya school to lead one to Arhatship becomes an issue. How do the various Tibetan scholars view this issue? This is fascinating.

(c) Fundamentally in the Madhyamaka context, as I already suggest elsewhere, Tibetan positions seem to fall into two distinct camps: (1) one that follows either-everything-or-nothing kind of interpretation, and (2) each-according-to-his/her-capacity kind of interpretation. The former is represented mainly by the anti-Yogācāric interpreters of Madhyamaka (e.g. dGe-lugs-pas) and the latter by the pro-Yogācāric interpreters of Madhyamaka (e.g. non-dGe-lugs-pas). Each group has its own arguments. The issue now comes to be differentiated. The issue is no longer whether a Buddhist system x is capable of leading one to the soteriological goal but rather whether that system is “independently” able to lead one to the soteriological goal. For the former camp, the only system that is “independently” able to lead one to the soteriological goal is the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school.

(d) The next significant issue is how (or in what respects) is Mantric Mahāyāna superior to Sūtric Mahāyāna and whether the latter form of Mahāyāna is capable of leading one to the Mahāyānic soteriological goal, namely, the Buddhahood. The rNying-pa-pas are divided on this. According to one strand (i.e. Zur-lugs), the answer is in the negative. According another strand (i.e. Rong-lugs), the answer is in the affirmative. But even the Rong-lugs (RZ1: 202) proposes a kind of soteriological exclusivism, that is, there is no way of becoming a buddha without realizing the great reality of equality or homogeneity (mnyam pa chen po’i don). Is this also taught by the Sūtric Mahāyāna? If so, how and why should Mantric Mahāyāna excel Sūtric Mahāyāna? If not, it would be impossible for one to attain Buddhahood by following the Sūtric Mahāyāna. These are yet some additional venues for exploration.

(e) For most Sa-skya-pas and dGe-lugs-pas, Mantric views does not excel Sūtric (Madhyamic) view. This is usually the position in a Sūtric context. But in a Mantric context, the issue becomes complicated. How about Sa-skya-pa’s ’khor ’das dbyer med kyi lta ba? Is this view identical with Sūtric (Madhyamic) view? For the dGe-lugs-pa, there is yet another issue. Is Sūtric Mahāyāna able to bring about saṃbhogakāya? If not, Sūtric Mahāyāna is after all not adequate in bringing about the full qualities of a buddha, and one must rely on the sexual yogic initiation offered by only the highest Yoga system.  

(f) Last but not the least, there is yet another venue for exploration. Almost every Tibetan Buddhist school would associate itself with what it believes is its highest doctrine. Perhaps one might subsume all these highest doctrines into the “Three Great Ones” (Chen-po-gsum), namely, dBu-ma-chen-po, Phyag-rgya-chen-po, and rDzogs-pa-chen-po. The most fascinating issue here is how the proponents of each of these Three Great Ones view the Great Ones of other competing schools. The elements of soteriological exclusivism among Tibetan Buddhist schools become very conspicuous in such contexts. For example, from a radical dGe-lugs-pa perspective, gZhan-stong-dbu-ma-chen-po falls outside the domain of the Buddha’s doctrine.