Buddhology-Related Typology

Rong-zom-pa (RZ2: 38) seems to recognize the following typology of buddha:

(a) ontological buddha (sc. dharmatā = buddha)

(b) gnoseological buddha (sc. advayajñāna = buddha)

(c) physiological buddha (sc. rūpakāya = buddha)

He maintains that this concept is found in Sūtric scriptures. Note that, as pointed out in Almogi 2009: 224, n. 121, for Rong-zom-pa, one of the arguments for positing that all phenomena are already/primordially/inherently/immanently awakened is that all dharmas can impossibly be not buddha if dharmatā is buddha. And for him, dharmas and dharmatā are essentially connected.

Buddhism on Epilation/Depilation!

Just a random thought on how Buddhism would view the custom/practice of “hair removal.” (a) Of course, we know that according to the Vinaya, monks and nuns must shave their heads and beards/moustaches. It is said to be a sign of “renunciation” (or Vinayic asceticism). Lay Indians usually must have kept long hair and moustaches. But monks and nuns are not supposed to shave their other body hair, mainly, pubic hair. Perhaps shaving pubic hair was rather seen as related to sexuality and sensuality. Lay people in ancient India seem to have shaved even pubic hair. Thus the rule in this case seems to have been the reverse of the custom of the laity. (b) If I remember correctly, Sa-paṇ discusses the issue of shaving “eye-brows.” According to some Vinayic traditions, it is a transgression to shave eye-brows, according to others, it is a transgression not to shave eyebrows. (c) Now what about the case in Mantric forms of Buddhism? According to the Subāhuparipṛcchātantra (cited by Rong-zom-pa) and which is said to be a Mantric Vinaya, prohibits shaving of any body-hair (p. 297): byin pa dag dang mchan khung spu rnams ni || lag pas kyang ni btog par mi bya zhing || me yis mi bsreg spu gris breg mi bya || spu med bya phyir sman gyis mi byug go ||. Interestingly, this text reveals several ways of hair-removal and various kind of hair that people must have removed. Removing hair with fire (for example facial hair or hair in and around nose and ears) is perhaps not uncommon amongst some Middle-Eastern or Kurdish/Persian barbers. The text also suggests that people even used hair-removing ointments or creams! 

For Mantric practitioners (particularly when they are in strict retreat), shaving hair would be an act of artificiality and vanity, or at least a waste of time. What happens if such a Mantric practitioner happens to be someone ordained? In Tibetan traditions, there seems to be at least two positions or rather practices. Most monks and nuns would at least shave their heads even when staying in strict retreat but by all means once the retreat is over. But some bKa’-brgyud monks seem to keep their long hair even after the Mantric retreat is over. During my stay in Dharamsala, I often met a bKa’-brgyud yogin, a dge tshul who wore normal monk’s robes but kept long matted hair. Once while attending the fourth-nightly confession ceremony (gso sbyong) in the mTshan-nyid-grwa-tshang, I happened to see that yogin. He, too, was attending the gso sbyong, wearing chos gos, like everyone else in the gathering but with his usual long matted yogic hair. With such abhor, one dGe-lugs monk tugged at his chos gos, and whispered contemptuously: “What are you doing here, you disgrace to the Buddha’s doctrine?” (’dir ga re byed kyi yod, bstan pa’i zhabs ’dren khyod). While my heart ached for the yogin, I could also understand the monk's horror (though not his contempt) at seeing a yogin (clad as a monk) with long matted hair attending the gso sbyong!

Eternal Oblivion?

Can nirvāṇa in a conservative sense called “eternal oblivion”? In a sense perhaps, one could.

Cf. “Oblivion, or eternal oblivion, is the philosophical concept that the individual self ‘experiences’ a state of permanent non-existence after death. Belief in oblivion denies the belief that there is an afterlife (such as a Heaven, Purgatory or Hell), or any state of existence or consciousness after death. The belief in ‘eternal oblivion’ stems from the idea that the brain creates the mind; therefore, when the brain dies, the mind ceases to exist. Some reporters describe this state as ‘nothingness.’ Many people who believe in an eternal oblivion, believe that the concept of an afterlife is scientifically impossible. Such views are typically held by atheists” (Wiki, s.v.).

Buddhist Temporalogy and Spaceology

Apologies for employing weird terms such as “temporalogy” and “spaceology” but I do need some terms to express the ideas of “study/theory of time” and “study/theory of space.” But nowadays, one looks up for any conceivable word in the world-wide-web and lo, you find that someone somewhere in some context has already employed the term. If we remind ourselves that terms are like the proverbial finger that points to the moon, I am sure we can be quite relaxed about using any term that helps us to best express an idea.

To begin with, Buddhist philosophy does not seem to deny the ideas of time and space. Time in the sense of duration (i.e. span of time including moments, days, weeks, months, seasons, years, decades, centuries, and eons, all of which can be subsumed under the so-called dus mtha’i skad cig ma and bya rdzogs kyi skad cig ma), time in the sense of past, present, and future, even of a fourth dimension of time called the dus bzhi mnyam pa nyid (mostly popular in rNying-ma philosophy). The expression phyogs  bcu dus bzhi is quite common. Space here is more in the sense of “spatial direction” (not necessary in the sense used, for example, in astrophysics). And there is also the notion of good time and bad time, good space and bad space.

What interests me and provokes me to write this entry is the question of the nature of time and space as understood by Tibetan Buddhist thinkers. Many years ago, I recall sitting under the Bodhi tree (i.e. on the spot the Buddha became a buddha), not because I was at the brink of getting awakened myself but because I was there trying to make aspirational wishes with thousands of fellow Tibetan Buddhist monks. One day, as is common, we received donations of copies of certain Buddhist texts. Among them was the Thub chog byin rlabs gter mdzod, that is, a buddha-sādhana, by Mi-pham. During one break, I was reading through it, particularly the text printed in small letters, which is meant as a kind of theoretical explanation of the text one is supposed to recite. As a typical Buddhist logician and epistemologist, Mi-pham offered a syllogism, which I paraphrase approximately as follows: “If one thinks that the Buddha is in front of you, he would by all means be there in front of you, because the Body of the Buddha, being a Body of Gnosis, has no limitation/discrimination (nye ring) with regard to space and time.” He then goes on to cite some authoritative scriptures. What he means that we cannot say that the Buddha was there and then and not here and now. This idea is linked with the Buddhist idea of the notion of self. To begin with, notion of self according to Buddhism is a mistaken notion because there is no corresponding content of that notion. But interestingly, notion of self is the center of one’s identity and existence. It is the center of one’s universe. It is the point of reference for everything. It is particularly a point of reference for the notion of space and time. This notion of self allows us to make an existential distinction between “myself” and “others,” a (temporal) distinction between “now” and “then,” and a (spatial) distinction between “here” and “there.” Without the notion of self and when it disintegrates, all these distinctions seem no longer possible. And indeed for the Buddha or a buddha, who has eliminated the notion of self, what would time and space mean?

Rong-zom-pa, my Tibetan intellectual mentor, also offers an interesting idea on time and space. He, in his commentary of the *Guhyagarbhatntra (p. 173) states that time is sems kyi snang ba (“appearance/projection/representation of [one’s] mind,” and as long as one does not obtain complete command over one’s mind, time and space would “appear to be fixed/definite” (nges par snang) but once one attains complete command over one’s mind, time and space would “appear as one wishes (i.e. arbitrarily)” (ci dgar snang).

Just like some spots or points in space are considered sacred so are points in time (i.e. hours, day, month, and year) are considered special, sacred, and suitable for certain activity. In the Sarvabuddhasamayogatantra (RZ2: 527), 8th, 14th, and 15th are considered “special times” (khyad par gyi dus).      

Apophaticism

SR 1989: 3

Perhaps in the Buddhist context “apophaticism” is to be understood in the sense of expressing of the ultimate reality via negationis.

Substantialism

Substantialism: SR 1989: 41.

Cataphaticism

SR 1989: 3

Perhaps in the Buddhist context “cataphaticism” is to be understood in the sense of expressing of the ultimate reality via affirmationis.