Eternal Oblivion?

Can nirvāṇa in a conservative sense called “eternal oblivion”? In a sense perhaps, one could.

Cf. “Oblivion, or eternal oblivion, is the philosophical concept that the individual self ‘experiences’ a state of permanent non-existence after death. Belief in oblivion denies the belief that there is an afterlife (such as a Heaven, Purgatory or Hell), or any state of existence or consciousness after death. The belief in ‘eternal oblivion’ stems from the idea that the brain creates the mind; therefore, when the brain dies, the mind ceases to exist. Some reporters describe this state as ‘nothingness.’ Many people who believe in an eternal oblivion, believe that the concept of an afterlife is scientifically impossible. Such views are typically held by atheists” (Wiki, s.v.).

Buddhist Temporalogy and Spaceology

Apologies for employing weird terms such as “temporalogy” and “spaceology” but I do need some terms to express the ideas of “study/theory of time” and “study/theory of space.” But nowadays, one looks up for any conceivable word in the world-wide-web and lo, you find that someone somewhere in some context has already employed the term. If we remind ourselves that terms are like the proverbial finger that points to the moon, I am sure we can be quite relaxed about using any term that helps us to best express an idea.

To begin with, Buddhist philosophy does not seem to deny the ideas of time and space. Time in the sense of duration (i.e. span of time including moments, days, weeks, months, seasons, years, decades, centuries, and eons, all of which can be subsumed under the so-called dus mtha’i skad cig ma and bya rdzogs kyi skad cig ma), time in the sense of past, present, and future, even of a fourth dimension of time called the dus bzhi mnyam pa nyid (mostly popular in rNying-ma philosophy). The expression phyogs  bcu dus bzhi is quite common. Space here is more in the sense of “spatial direction” (not necessary in the sense used, for example, in astrophysics). And there is also the notion of good time and bad time, good space and bad space.

What interests me and provokes me to write this entry is the question of the nature of time and space as understood by Tibetan Buddhist thinkers. Many years ago, I recall sitting under the Bodhi tree (i.e. on the spot the Buddha became a buddha), not because I was at the brink of getting awakened myself but because I was there trying to make aspirational wishes with thousands of fellow Tibetan Buddhist monks. One day, as is common, we received donations of copies of certain Buddhist texts. Among them was the Thub chog byin rlabs gter mdzod, that is, a buddha-sādhana, by Mi-pham. During one break, I was reading through it, particularly the text printed in small letters, which is meant as a kind of theoretical explanation of the text one is supposed to recite. As a typical Buddhist logician and epistemologist, Mi-pham offered a syllogism, which I paraphrase approximately as follows: “If one thinks that the Buddha is in front of you, he would by all means be there in front of you, because the Body of the Buddha, being a Body of Gnosis, has no limitation/discrimination (nye ring) with regard to space and time.” He then goes on to cite some authoritative scriptures. What he means that we cannot say that the Buddha was there and then and not here and now. This idea is linked with the Buddhist idea of the notion of self. To begin with, notion of self according to Buddhism is a mistaken notion because there is no corresponding content of that notion. But interestingly, notion of self is the center of one’s identity and existence. It is the center of one’s universe. It is the point of reference for everything. It is particularly a point of reference for the notion of space and time. This notion of self allows us to make an existential distinction between “myself” and “others,” a (temporal) distinction between “now” and “then,” and a (spatial) distinction between “here” and “there.” Without the notion of self and when it disintegrates, all these distinctions seem no longer possible. And indeed for the Buddha or a buddha, who has eliminated the notion of self, what would time and space mean?

Rong-zom-pa, my Tibetan intellectual mentor, also offers an interesting idea on time and space. He, in his commentary of the *Guhyagarbhatntra (p. 173) states that time is sems kyi snang ba (“appearance/projection/representation of [one’s] mind,” and as long as one does not obtain complete command over one’s mind, time and space would “appear to be fixed/definite” (nges par snang) but once one attains complete command over one’s mind, time and space would “appear as one wishes (i.e. arbitrarily)” (ci dgar snang).

Just like some spots or points in space are considered sacred so are points in time (i.e. hours, day, month, and year) are considered special, sacred, and suitable for certain activity. In the Sarvabuddhasamayogatantra (RZ2: 527), 8th, 14th, and 15th are considered “special times” (khyad par gyi dus).      

Apophaticism

SR 1989: 3

Perhaps in the Buddhist context “apophaticism” is to be understood in the sense of expressing of the ultimate reality via negationis.

Substantialism

Substantialism: SR 1989: 41.

Cataphaticism

SR 1989: 3

Perhaps in the Buddhist context “cataphaticism” is to be understood in the sense of expressing of the ultimate reality via affirmationis.

Religiology

“Religiology” is a term coined/proposed by Hideo Kishimoto to express “science of religion” or “scientific study of religion,” very close to German Religionswissenschaft. I personally like the term, better than “Religious Studies.” I propose chos lugs rig pa in Tibetan (if it has not yet been opposed). For details, Hideo Kishimoto, “Religiology.” Nvmen 14 (2), 1967, pp. 81–86.

 

An Apology for Buddhist Philosophy and Buddhist Philology

Why Philosophia Buddhica? Even as someone who tries to do philology, one’s actual interest lies in philosophy. One does philology because one has to. One does philosophy because one likes it. The temptation, however, is that one does what one likes, but does not do what one has to. This seems to be particularly true in the field of Buddhology (i.e. Buddhist Studies). So honestly, I am sceptical about those of us who do (or rather try to do) Buddhist philosophy without relying on historical-philological works. Let us say all of us are interested in what the Buddha thought or said, what Nāgārjuna thought or said, and so on, but how are we to be sure that is what the Buddha actually thought or said and what Nāgārjuna thought or said. One of the greatest challenges thus is finding out if our attribution of a certain Buddhist philosophical idea to a certain person, a certain time, a certain place, a certain work, and so on, is accurate and thus reliable. None of us would, I would assume, prefer to live in a fool’s paradise! Because of such difficulties regarding past thoughts and ideas, we have no choice but to resort to historical-philological works, which may not always succeed in meeting these challenges but at least address these difficulties and draw caution to them. To be sure, historical-philological works are dreary and tedious, but that in way should suggest that we do not need them. In my view, a good student of Buddhist philosophy is also a good student of Buddhist philology, and vice versa. A student of Buddhist philology who does not understand Buddhist philosophy cannot do good Buddhist philology. A student of Buddhist philosophy who does not practise Buddhist philology cannot do good Buddhist philosophy. Of course, it is also a matter of personal interest. Not everyone who can do Buddhist philology or philosophy may want/like to do Buddhist philology or philosophy. This is an absolutely legitimate choice. But we should resist the temptation or tendency (in our academia, mostly those of us who are politicians in the academia) to denounce (or undermine) those fields or disciplines at which we are not particularly good at. The simple (il)logic seems to be: We do not need all those difficult disciplines at which I am not particularly good at. This is an apology for both Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist philology!