Madhyamic Deconstructionism

I am not a specialist of Jacques Derrida’s (1930–2004) philosophy of “Deconstruction,” which is said to be based principally on his 1967 work Of Grammatology. I have tried to understand the quintessence of his philosophy but I failed because it turned out to be quite slippery and jelly-like. His critics, however, seem to make better sense to me. According to John Rogers Searle’s (b. 1932) critique of it (Wikipedia), “the consistent pattern of Derrida’s rhetoric is: (a) announce a preposterous thesis, e.g. “there is no outside-text” (il n’y a pas de hors-texte); (b) when challenged on (a) respond that you have been misunderstood and revise the claim in (a) such that it becomes a truism, e.g. il n’y a pas de hors-texte means nothing else: there is nothing outside contexts;” (c) when the reformulation from (b) is acknowledged then proceed as if the original formulation from (a) was accepted. The revised idea—for example—that everything exists in some context is a banality but a charade ensues as if the original claim—nothing exists outside of text [sic]—had been established. Searle wrote in The New York Review of Books that he was surprised by “the low level of philosophical argumentation, the deliberate obscurantism of the prose, the wildly exaggerated claims, and the constant striving to give the appearance of profundity by making claims that seem paradoxical, but under analysis often turn out to be silly or trivial.” Actually, the term “deconstructionism” would seem more suitable for characterizing the philosophical approach of the Madhyamaka school. That is, according to (I would assume all) schools or strands of Madhyamaka school, a phenomenon, entity or reality (“x”) seems existent only when viewed naively and non-analytically (ma brtags gcig pur nyams dga’ bar), but in actuality no entity or reality can withstand the Madhyamic analysis. There is no entity or reality that one cannot “deconstruct.” All phenomena, realities, or propositions are deconstructible. According to my understanding of the eleventh-century Tibetan philosopher Rong-zom-pa, there is no nothing that cannot be deconstructed by logical reasoning (rigs pas gzhig tu mi rung ba) and there is nothing that cannot be deconstructed by antidote (gnyen pos gzhig tu mi rung ba). According to dGe-lugs-pa exegetes, however, what is existent (e.g. kleśa) cannot be deconstructed by logical reasoning and one can only deconstruct what is non-existent (e.g. bden par grub pa). So actually dGe-lugs Mādhyamikas cannot be considered “deconstructionists”? In the Buddhist context, “deconstructionism” would include the approach of taking phenomena or realities apart by means of logical analysis (i.e. via theoretical examination) and also the aspect of actual or practical destruction of phenomena (i.e. through meditation or practical application just like destroying a clay pot with a hammer) and hence “deconstructionism” (in this context) would also include a kind of “destructionism.”

Buddhist Fideism or Fideism in Buddhism?

As usual, whenever I ponder over a question as to whether there is an idea or theory of “x” in Buddhism. I try to see how the word “x” is understood outside “Buddhism.” In this case, it is “Fideism.” What is “Fideism” supposed to mean and is there such a thing as “Fideism” in Buddhism? It is supposed to be “an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths…. The word fideism comes from fides, the Latin word for faith, and literally means ‘faith-ism.’ Theologians and philosophers have responded in various ways to the place of faith and reason in determining the truth of metaphysical ideas, morality, and religious beliefs. A fideist is one who argues for fideism. Historically, fideism is most commonly ascribed to four philosophers: Pascal, Kierkegaard, William James, and Wittgenstein; with fideism being a label applied in a negative sense by their opponents, but which is not always supported by their own ideas and works or followers. There are a number of different forms of fideism” (Wikipedia, s.v.). 

The question in the Buddhist context would be what we mean by “faith” and whether there is at all such a thing as “faith.” Some of the words that come to my mind are dad pa, dang ba, mos pa, and so on. We can also consider Sanskrit, Pāli, and Chinese terms for these. We shall have to see how these words have been explained or defined, for example, in Abhidharmic sources. While mos pa (adhimokṣa or adhimukti) is a kind of “believing trust” (in something or someone), dang pa and dad pa seem to be described as a clear state of mind which is able to reflect the good qualities of others (i.e. of the Three Jewels); a state of mind which is capable of appreciation (and emotions such as compassion, although objects  of appreciation and compassion are different). A person with dad pa and dang ba is often touched or moved by the good qualities of others; is capable of tears of appreciation (e.g. upon hearing the teaching of emptiness)(and compassion, e.g. upon witnessing sentient beings in pain and suffering). The former case is expressed very eloquently by Candrakīrti in his Madhyamakāvatāra. Faith, if it is one and in this sense, is, of course considered positively in Buddhism. 

But the question is whether faith in this sense is seen (a) as self-sufficient and independent of reason and is thus capable of causing one to gain direct meditative access to the true reality thereby causing one to attain one’s soteriological goal; (b) if faith is seen hostile or contradictory to reason, and (c) if faith is superior to reason. Most Buddhist philosophers would perhaps propose that (a) faith is inadequate and not totally independent of reason, (b) faith and reason are not mutually exclusive, and (c) faith is not superior to reason. An aspirant would need both faith and reason; a reason-based faith is ideal and possible. One can, however, begin one’s spiritual aspiration with either faith or reason, or both at the same time. A faith-oriented person is usually considered dull and a reason-oriented person usually sharp (i.e. in terms of cognitive faculty) but to be noted is that theoretically one can also consider dull or sharp in terms of one’s “faculty of faith” (dad pa’i dbang po). It seems that both faculties of faith and reason are seen as means of gaining direct access into the true reality and for some faith works better and for others reason works better. In either case, what counts is that one is capable of penetrating the true reality with one’s direct meditative insight for which there is no other alternative.

There is, however, a statement according to which one can realize the ultimate truth only through faith. Such a position seems to be indicate Fideism in Buddhism but even faith in such a context may be easily reconcilable with reason. Buddhism would normally deprecate faith (such as faith in the Creator God) as being completely detrimental to one’s aspiration for one’s nirvāṇic release, for a faith in an non-existent God or substantial (or metaphysical) Self is an “acquired/superimposed ignorance/nescience” (kun tu btags pa’i ma rig pa), induced through indoctrination. Ignorance is Buddhism can perhaps never be bliss!

Buddhist Iconology = Buddhist Symbology

If “iconology” is “the study of icons or artistic symbolism,” “Buddhist Iconology” may be defined as the “study of Buddhist icons and symbols.” Cf. “Symbology, the study or use of symbols.”

Buddhist Bromatology = Buddhist Nutriology = Buddhist Sitiology = Buddhist Sitology = Buddhist Alimentology

This blog note records my personal reflections on venues for exploring what may be called “Buddhist Bromatology = Buddhist Nutriology = Buddhist Sitiology = Buddhist Sitology = Buddhist Alimentology.” 

“Bromatology” is defined as “the science of aliments or food.” In the Buddhist context, I would like to define “Buddhist Bromatology” or “Buddhist Nutriology” simply as “the Buddhist philosophy of food or nutrition.” Note that “sitiology/sitology” is said to be “the science of food and nourishment.” Cf. Trophology.

While reading the bSam gtan mig sgron, I just happened to wonder if there is something called “a philosophy of food” and specifically if there is something called a “a Buddhist philosophy of food.” So what do we nowadays? Just google and see if something pops up. And lo the first thing I find is “The Philosophy of Food” (a Sammelband edited by David M. Kaplan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). I did not read the book but people are talking about the book. The publisher ad says: “This book explores food from a philosophical perspective, bringing together sixteen leading philosophers to consider the most basic questions about food: What is it exactly? What should we eat? How do we know it is safe? How should food be distributed? What is good food?” According to a reader, it is said to take up a “a number of philosophical/ethical issues related to food, food production, and the aesthetic experience of eating and enjoying food” and about “ethical gourmandism, the myth of happy meat, veganism as a moral baseline, and nutritionism and functional foods.” I also googled up “Gastronomology,” but this does not seem to be a serious attested word. I also googled to see if I could find “Nutritionology.” One does find it though perhaps not an established word. We can also find “nutritionism.” Now can we speak of a “Buddhist philosophy of food,” or, perhaps “A Buddhist Nutritionology”? I think, we can. I have a feeling the Buddhist sources would have a great deal to tell us about food. Buddhist philosophy of food or Buddhist Nutritionology would be intricately linked with the Buddhist perception and conception of the body, its nature, status, value, and function, and this in turn, with Buddhist soteriology.

Again here, too, it would be ideal if we can obtain a diachronic and synchronic view of the issues. Here are some random points: (a) First of all, a definition and typology of food should be examined. Can food be defined as a “means of sustenance”? What about the types of food? In this regard, one immediately would think of the four types of food discussed in Abhidharmic sources: kham gyi zas, reg pa’i zas, sems pa’i zas, and rnam par shes pa’i zas (or rnam shes kyi zas). Also Vinayic sources would be valuable for extracting information about food. (b) Foods and medicines would often be discussed together in the Vinayic sources. (c) Ethically/ascetically/spiritually permissible foods and drinks. (d) The problem of meat-eating and vegetarianism. (e) The idea of “right livelihood” (yang dag pa’i ’tsho ba) and log pa’i ’tsho ba would become relevant. (f) Most Buddhist sources would look at food from an ascetic point of view and hence simply regard it like a fuel for the automobile. I think we will also find sources that tell us that we should eat food to feed micro-organism in our body. Not eating too much or too little. One third of the stomach must be filled with solid food, one third with water, and one third with air. (g) The topic of fasting might be relevant as well. The issue of starvation? (h) The topic of avoiding dinner would be an issue as well. (i) The issue of alcohol consumption would be relevant as well.  (h) Perhaps like the types of food in general, the types of plant ingredients: roots, stem, flowers, fruits, and seeds. (i) As one enters the terrains of Tantric Buddhism, one would the encounter “white foods” (vegetarian) and “red foods” (non-vegetarian). Why does Kriyā system prescribe “three whites” and “three sweets” whereas some Mahāyoga systems prescribe “five meats” and “five nectars.” (j) Foods one adopts/avoids in general or only during specific occasions and situations. The theory and practice of fasting is relevant here. So it seems the venue for exploration is very vast.

In addition, the various kinds of tastes (i.e. 6 as described in the Abhidharmic literature) and also the sense of taste and enjoyment and its pros and cons from a Buddhist spiritual point of view would be relevant. What about the idea of “Tantric feast” (gaṇacakra: tshogs kyi ’khor lo)? Of course, we also find references to “table manners” (in Vinayic sources): making noises, playing with food, forming food into a shape of animals, etc. Consider: lha bshos, zhal zas ro rgya ldan pa, lto mchod, ja mchod, chang mchod. Food prohibition? What about kha srung “dietary restriction”? Where does the idea of nya phag gong gsum come from? From the idea of dug gsum? I think veganism was not known. Any discussion on cannibalism? All in all, we may see that Buddhist philosophy of food is influenced by the Buddhist philosophy of life and soteriology.

Buddhist Somnology

“Somnology” (or “hypnology”) is said to be “the scientific study of sleep.” It would be of some interest to see what Buddhist sources have to say about asleep. Buddhist reflections of discourse on the phenomenon of sleep may be called “Buddhist Somnology.” “Buddhist Somnology” may be defined as a “Buddhist philosophy of sleep.” Some points to ponder about: (a) Is sleep not considered a mental state or factor (cittasika/caitta: sems las byung ba). One of the 51 such mental factors. It is also one of the gzhan ’gyur bzhi. That is, it axiological value is not fixed and hence can be transformed into positive, negative, or neutral. (b) Sleep is conceived of as having two levels or layers, namely, so to speak, light sleep in which dreams can be dreamt, and deep sleep (gnyid ’thug po), which is one of the five states of mindless-ness (sems med pa’i gnas skabs lnga), and is comparable to a state of coma.   

Here is some thoughts that I have made previously and hence there are some repetitions:

I just happened to reflect on what Buddhist sources say on the phenomenon of sleep. Do they at all say something on the topic and if so what? Here are some random thoughts that occur to me. So what I say here should not be taken as representing my fixed position.

§1. I should first study James Hill, “The Philosophy of Sleep: The Views of Descartes, Locke and Leibniz.” Richmond Journal of Philosophy 6, 2004, pp. 1–7. A copy can be found here: http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/back_issues/rjp6_hill.pdf.

§2. What is sleep? Abhidharmically speaking, “sleep” (gnyid) is considered a “mental associate/factor” (caitta/caittasika: sems las byung ba), that is, one of the (usually) fifty-one caittas “cognitive factors/states” associated with cittas (or vijñānas), the principal cognitive subjects/agents, consisting of the six or eight perceptual-conceptual apparatuses. “Sleep” as a caitta should actually be understood a certain state of citta. It is also counted as one of the so-called gzhan ’gyur bzhi (Sanskrit terms will be added later). That is, gnyid, together with ’gyod pa, rtog pa, and dpyod pa, are considered to be “transformable” into either wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, depending on the wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral state in which the principle mind, that is,  I guess manovijñāna, finds itself, when the process of sleep takes place. The implication of such a theory for Buddhists is that if one spends half of one’s life in sleep, then at least the time spent sleeping would become meaningful. There may be other Abhidharma positions on this.

§3. Tibetan Buddhist sources seem to classify sleep into what one might call “[light] sleep” (perhaps just gnyid) and “deep sleep” (gnyid ’thug po). The difference between the two is that one is capable of dreams in the former state and not in the latter state. That is, no mental or cognitive activity would take place in a state of deep sleep. In fact, deep sleep is considered one of the “five situations in which citta is absent” (sems med pa’i gnas skabs lnga). (Sources for this will have to  be added later.) Deep sleep, thus, may be said to be somewhat similar to a state of coma (although nowadays people seem to talk about different types/levels of coma). Such a concept of state must have posed doctrinal and exegetical problems. For example, why is a living person in a state of deep sleep not dead? The Yogācāras can be said to have come up with a solution, namely, a subliminal vijñāna called the ālayavijñāna. So for them, what ceases during a state of deep sleep and other states of mind-less-ness is the manovijñāna and others but not ālayavijñāna; ālayavijñāna can continue until one becomes a buddha.

§4. The “four states” (gnas skabs bzhi)—namely, “state of being awake” (sad pa’i gnas skabs), “state of dream” (rmi lam gyi gnas skabs), “state of deep sleep” (gnyid stug po’i gnas skabs), and “state of sexual union or meditative poise” (snyoms ’jug gi gnas skabs)—seem to comprise all possible states of one’s existence. Although the last state is understood by some to be only “state of sexual union,” I think, it should include any ecstatic or orgasmic state in which all conceptual constructions or conceptualisations cease.

§5. What is known as the “six intermediate states” (bar do drug) popular in certain Tibetan Buddhist traditions seems to encompass the entire states of existence. 

§6. The Buddhist ideas about “dreams,” though related with the idea of “sleep” should be treated separately. My concern here is not “dreams” but “sleep.”

§7. Buddhist sources negatively associate “sleep” or “slumber” with “ignorance” and “dreams” with “delusions” and “illusions.” The Summum bonum in Buddhism (particularly for the Mahāyāna) is the state of being “Awakened” (buddha: sangs rgyas). Sleep is associated with “eye-closing” and “ignorance” whereas state of being awakened with “eye-opening” and “insight.” Metaphorically speaking, therefore,  all of us (who are not yet buddhas) are still sleeping and dreaming.

§8. The statues of the reclining Buddha is described often as the “Sleeping Buddha.”  I do not see any online references to a living (Tibetan) Buddhist master who is referred to as a “Sleeping Buddha.” But I do recall some Chinese Buddhist friends who referred to sMin-gling-khri-chen Rin-po-che (1931–2008) as a “Sleeping Buddha.” But why? Of course because he is said to be practising rDzogs-chen teachings, so to speak, in a sleeping mode! We critics and skeptics would have all kinds of explanations but let us withhold them for the time being. Our question here is that if the rDzogs-chen tradition takes for granted that there is a practice that can be practiced while sleeping (or perhaps just lying down), how does it doctrinally legitimise such a practice?

§9. Two kinds of ideas seem to be relevant for such a practice. First, the rDzogs-chen tradition maintains that its teachings can be practiced both by “hard-working ones” (brtson ’grus can) and “lazy ones” (le lo can). (Sources should be added later.) The implication is that just because one is “lazily” reclining down or sleeping, it does not mean that one is not practicing. The legend of Śāntideva (Śāntadeva) would be easily used to illustrate this. Most of us have no way to verify such a claim. Only the practitioner himself or herself would know if he or she is indeed practicing or just whiling away her or her time in sleep. Second, gNubs-chen’s bSam gtan mig sgron (pp. 351–352) seems to provide yet another doctrinal justification. The expression employed there is the “Mode of Great Meaningful Sleep” (don chen nyal mo’i tshul), that is, a mode in which the “king of awareness” (rig pa’i rgyal po) “sleeps or reclines” (mnal) in (ngang) the sphere of true reality (chos kyi dbyings). This idea is explained in a purely rDzogs-chen context.