According to a Wikipedia entry, “misology” is “the hatred of
reasoning; the revulsion or distrust of logical debate, argumentation, or the
Socratic elenchus.” The question is whether we can speak of “Buddhist misology”
or designate any Buddhist philosophy or ideology as “misology.” According to
Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 2, one of the various terms used to describe the doctrine
of Madhyamaka school and particularly of Nāgārjuna, is “misology,” which he, of
course, rejects. Mādhyamikas would claim that the Madhyamaka reasoning is
reasoning par excellence and if there is one person that truly
loves and lives reasoning then that person would be a Mādhyamika. Hence nothing
can be more off the tract than describing Madhyamaka philosophy as “misology.”
For Tibetan scholars such as Rong-zom-pa, there would no such thing as
absolutely immaculate reasoning that can prove or disprove everything to
everyone and thus all kinds of reasoning are maculate and limited, but there
are various kinds of reasoning, one reasoning more incisive than the others.
The more incisive ones can refute the less incisive ones. We can assume that
Buddhist logicians and philosophers would like to think that they have some of
the most incisive kinds of reasoning ever. They would contend that the Buddha
taught only what is logical/rational/reasonable, and anything or everything
that is logical/rational/reasonable should be acceptable to the Buddha and a
Buddhist philosopher. From such a perspective, it would make no sense at all to
talk of “Buddhist misology.” But what about Buddhist yogins and devotional
Buddhists? Are they not supposed to hate reasoning? Buddhist yogins would warn
people of the limitation of theoretical type of reasoning, pure speculation,
and “eristics” (i.e. arguments that aim at winning rather than gaining
insights) but they cannot be said to hate reasoning. Devotional Buddhists,
knowledgeable about Buddhist logics and reasoning, would not hate reasoning.
Devotional Buddhists, who are ignorant of the Buddhist logics and reasoning,
might hate reasoning, but as Candrakīrti states, fools are never authorities.
Any way, the word “hate” is totally inappropriate. Even if a person is ignorant
of reasoning or disproves reasoning, it does not mean that the person actually
hates it. In short, the term “Buddhist misology” would be a complete misnomer.
With regard to the limitation of theoretical type of reasoning, pure speculation, and “eristics,” I think we can glean quite a bit of information from materials associated with different periods, places, and persons. Propositions and deliberations on the status of logic and epistemology in Buddhism will be of particular relevance and interest. In this regard some studies have already been done. We would find Buddhist thinkers who seem markedly pro-Pramāṇic, and others who appear markedly anti-Pramāṇic, but in the end we might find a consensus. That is, when people like Atiśa tell us that anumāṇas and pratyakṣa are dispensable for Buddhist soteriology, they really do not really or actually seem to reject altogether the utility or instrumental/epistemic value of inferences and perceptions as such. Because if this were the case, they would have to even reject existence and utility of yogic perceptions (e.g. śuddhalaukikajñāna and nirvikalpajñāna), which, however, could have hardly been the case. For most, if not for all, buddhajñāna would be the ultimate pratyakṣa. What these people are perhaps trying to tell is that Buddhists, who aspire for Arhathood or Buddhahood, do not need a system of theory (or a theory system) that is devoted to the theorization of logic and epistemology. Perhaps something like: You just play or enjoy the music. You don't have to theorize it. The consistent and categorical rejection of pure speculations as being irrelevant to and detrimental for one’s aspiration for salvation is attributed to the Buddha himself. Dignāga, too, warns us against dragging Buddhist teachings along “eristic paths” (rtog ge’i lam). The points of consensus between (seemingly) pro-Pramāṇic and anti-Pramāṇic Buddhist thinkers is perhaps that (a) risks of being carried away by pure theoretical speculations and not being able to avail oneself of the teachings of the Buddha that are actually and initially meant as medicine against the ills of saṃsāra, but (b) liberating insight, be it prajñaic or jñānaic, which must be ultimately acquired through meditation, is indispensable for causing one’s soterical breakthrough.
There is also the relativisation of pramāṇa (i.e. kind of “higher” and “lower”). gNubs-chen, (citing the sPyi bcings) bSam gtan mig sgron (pp. 295–296):
gsang sngags rgya mtsho chen po ni ||
dpe dang tshad ma gtan tshigs dang
||
rjes su dpog pa’i shes rab kyis ||
rtogs par nus pa ma yin te ||
de bas gsang sngags bdag nyid che
||
dngos grub rlabs chen ’khrigs pa
can ||
bsam yas gting ni dpag dka’ bas ||
lung dang man ngag thob pas ’grub
||.