Buddhist Philosophology

For some reason, I always feel something odd and pretentious when we attempt to study past Buddhist philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and present ourselves as “Buddhist philosophers.” Inwardly and silently I always tend to protest “Nāgārjuna is a Buddhist philosopher,” and we are students who try to understand his thought based on extant works of his. The fact that we try to make sense (or nonsense) of Nāgārjuna’s thoughts does not make us Buddhist philosophers. We can, for sure, study Buddhist philosophy, history of Buddhist philosophy, intellectual history of Buddhist philosophy, but not call ourselves “Buddhist philosophers.” But just the other day I stumbled upon a term “Philosophology.” This is a term used, for example, by Robert M. Pirsig, in a philosophical novel of his (i.e. Robert M. Pirsig, Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals. New York: Bantam Books, 1991). There he is supposed to have stated “Philosophology is to philosophy as musicology is to music.” I have not read the novel myself. Yes, this is the term I want. We need to distinguish “Buddhist philosophology” from “Buddhist philosophology.” Academics engaged in the study of past Buddhist philosophy are rather “Buddhist philosophologists,” and not “Buddhist philosophers.” Of course, nobody would forbid us to be “Buddhist philosophers.” Nobody would forbid a musicologist to play music and be a musician. But the roles and responsibilities of a musicologist and of a musician must clearly be distinguished.

A Buddhist Etiology

I am tempted to use the term “Buddhist etiology,” primarily to express the Buddhist theory of the origination of internal world consisting of sentient beings (sattvaloka) or saṃsāric inhabitants and the external world consisting of habitat (bhājanaloka). In certain strands of Buddhism, it may also deal with the origination of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and in others with the origination of a human being. The word etiology (or aetiology or ætiology) is said to be the “the study of causation, or origination. The word is derived from the Greek αἰτιολογία, aitiología, ‘giving a reason for’ (αἰτία, aitía, ‘cause,’ and -λογία, -logía).  More completely, etiology is the study of the causes, origins, or reasons behind the way that things are, or the way they function, or it can refer to the causes themselves. The word is commonly used in medicine, (where it is a branch of medicine studying causes of disease) and in philosophy, but also in physics, psychology, government, geography, spatial analysis, theology, and biology, in reference to the causes or origins of various phenomena.” In Buddhist context, too, it can best be employed to express samudayasatya (i.e. causal aspect of saṃsāra) as opposed to duḥkhyasatya (i.e. resultant aspect of saṃsāra). One can also employ this term to express mārgasatya as the cause of nirodhasatya.

Buddhist Xenology

I use the word “xenology” here in the way Halbfass used, namely, as “attitude towards others.” What I write here is not an outcome of some research. It is something spontaneous. Needless to state that xeno- is said to be from Greek xenos meaning “stranger, foreigner.” I like the word. It provides one with a basis of thinking about something very personal and fundamental. The fundamental presupposition seems to be that there is a sense of “oneself” as opposed to a sense of “others.” Otherwise the very concepts of xenophobe and xenophile would make so sense. Buddhist philosophy would not propose a metaphysical, transpersonal, hypostatic, or substantial Self. Belief in such a Self, if one has, would be seen as being induced by an indoctrinator. Buddhist philosophy would not, as far as I am concerned, deny the possibility of an instinctive notion of personal self based on the continuum (rgyun) and conglomeration (tshogs pa) of psychical-physical complex (phung po), which is, however, epistemically speaking, false, misconstrued, vague, and arbitrary. The notion of self therefore has no epistemic value or validity. But it does have an instrumental value or efficacy. So long as one wanders around in the cyclic existence, one needs a sense of personal identity. A premature loss of identity, or split personality, or a multiple-personality complex would be detrimental to one’s mundane and supramundane responsibilities and aspirations. In fact, one’s self is the spatial and temporal point of reference for everything. As long as one roams around in saṃsāra, which is of one’s creation, and as long as one has the notion of self, it is completely natural to have the notions of “self” and “others.” On this level, we cannot deny that there are differences as well similarities among human beings with regard to color, creed, race, gender, culture, ethnicity, cognitive-emotive-conative faculty, and so on. The fulcrum upon which the self–other lever hinges, however, is a misconception. As long as there is the fundamental nescience, there is bound to be xenophobes or xenophiles. One tends to see anyone foreign as a potential foe, or anything foreign as dangerous. Taking a cobra for a rope and a rope for a cobra are both misperceptions or misconceptions. Until nescience is replaced by insight, it is going to affect oneself and others. The challenge is how should one and how can one and how best can one perform this tricky balance act.

            Histories or stories about the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet is full of references to xenophobic aptitudes and actions. For examples, Śāntarakṣita, Padmasambhava, and Vimalamitra,   

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Buddhist Reasonology

(1)   reasoning of intrinsic reality,

(2)   reasoning of causal efficacy/affectivity (knowing effect through cause),

(3)   reasoning of result’s dependency (knowing cause through effect), and

(4)   reasoning that demonstrates the rationality/logicality of reason.