A Buddhist Etiology

I am tempted to use the term “Buddhist etiology,” primarily to express the Buddhist theory of the origination of internal world consisting of sentient beings (sattvaloka) or saṃsāric inhabitants and the external world consisting of habitat (bhājanaloka). In certain strands of Buddhism, it may also deal with the origination of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and in others with the origination of a human being. The word etiology (or aetiology or ætiology) is said to be the “the study of causation, or origination. The word is derived from the Greek αἰτιολογία, aitiología, ‘giving a reason for’ (αἰτία, aitía, ‘cause,’ and -λογία, -logía).  More completely, etiology is the study of the causes, origins, or reasons behind the way that things are, or the way they function, or it can refer to the causes themselves. The word is commonly used in medicine, (where it is a branch of medicine studying causes of disease) and in philosophy, but also in physics, psychology, government, geography, spatial analysis, theology, and biology, in reference to the causes or origins of various phenomena.” In Buddhist context, too, it can best be employed to express samudayasatya (i.e. causal aspect of saṃsāra) as opposed to duḥkhyasatya (i.e. resultant aspect of saṃsāra). One can also employ this term to express mārgasatya as the cause of nirodhasatya.

Buddhist Xenology

I use the word “xenology” here in the way Halbfass used, namely, as “attitude towards others.” What I write here is not an outcome of some research. It is something spontaneous. Needless to state that xeno- is said to be from Greek xenos meaning “stranger, foreigner.” I like the word. It provides one with a basis of thinking about something very personal and fundamental. The fundamental presupposition seems to be that there is a sense of “oneself” as opposed to a sense of “others.” Otherwise the very concepts of xenophobe and xenophile would make so sense. Buddhist philosophy would not propose a metaphysical, transpersonal, hypostatic, or substantial Self. Belief in such a Self, if one has, would be seen as being induced by an indoctrinator. Buddhist philosophy would not, as far as I am concerned, deny the possibility of an instinctive notion of personal self based on the continuum (rgyun) and conglomeration (tshogs pa) of psychical-physical complex (phung po), which is, however, epistemically speaking, false, misconstrued, vague, and arbitrary. The notion of self therefore has no epistemic value or validity. But it does have an instrumental value or efficacy. So long as one wanders around in the cyclic existence, one needs a sense of personal identity. A premature loss of identity, or split personality, or a multiple-personality complex would be detrimental to one’s mundane and supramundane responsibilities and aspirations. In fact, one’s self is the spatial and temporal point of reference for everything. As long as one roams around in saṃsāra, which is of one’s creation, and as long as one has the notion of self, it is completely natural to have the notions of “self” and “others.” On this level, we cannot deny that there are differences as well similarities among human beings with regard to color, creed, race, gender, culture, ethnicity, cognitive-emotive-conative faculty, and so on. The fulcrum upon which the self–other lever hinges, however, is a misconception. As long as there is the fundamental nescience, there is bound to be xenophobes or xenophiles. One tends to see anyone foreign as a potential foe, or anything foreign as dangerous. Taking a cobra for a rope and a rope for a cobra are both misperceptions or misconceptions. Until nescience is replaced by insight, it is going to affect oneself and others. The challenge is how should one and how can one and how best can one perform this tricky balance act.

            Histories or stories about the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet is full of references to xenophobic aptitudes and actions. For examples, Śāntarakṣita, Padmasambhava, and Vimalamitra,   

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Buddhist Reasonology

(1)   reasoning of intrinsic reality,

(2)   reasoning of causal efficacy/affectivity (knowing effect through cause),

(3)   reasoning of result’s dependency (knowing cause through effect), and

(4)   reasoning that demonstrates the rationality/logicality of reason.

A Buddhist Kāmology

Here I am again. It has been a while since I wrote something on my blog “Philosophia Buddhica.” To remind my (potential) readers, this is a blog for pure speculations. I let my imaginations run wild here. During my high school days, economics was not one of my favorite subjects. Due to my newfound interest in Buddhist philosophy, economics seemed so remote and strange. Nonetheless, one point that is attributed to Adam Smith (1723–1790), “father of economics,” left an indelible print in my mind, namely, to put his ideas in my own words, the infinity of human wants/desire/needs, and the finity/scarcity of resources. This idea, I felt already then, sounds quite Buddhistic or rather compatible with Buddhist ideas.

Desire, according to Buddhist philosophy, is usually a problem. But it can also be an opportunity. A moth’s desire for a flame can be destructive. On the other hand, one’s desire for one’s freedom (e.g. mokṣa/vimokṣa or mukti/vimukti) can be constructive. Several words in Sanskrit and Tibetan would more or less express “desire.” like in English, several synonyms and near synonyms are possible.  

A Buddhist Raceology

On the one hand, we live in a multiracial (also multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious) society. On the other hand, or perhaps precisely because of it, our society is beset with racial tension and racial discrimination/hatred/conflicts. We also live in a time when on the one hand we propagate that race does not matter but on the other hand we play identity politics based on race. As someone who attempts to study Buddhist texts and ideas—mainly, Indian and Tibetan—one inevitably asks what would be a Buddhist theory of human race, that is, a Buddhist raceology. And what would be a Buddhist position on racism?

To be sure, I am not even sure which words in Sanskrit or Tibetan would best convey the idea of “race.” I am not a Sanskritist and so I cannot tell with certainty which Sanskrit words express the idea of “race.” It appears that vaṃśa (rigs/rus), varṇa (rigs), jāti (rigs) and gotra (gdung/rigs/rus/cho ’brang) cover the semantic range of “caste, family, and race,” all of which are believed to be determined by birth. Buddhism, an Indian religion, seems to have taken the existence of different castes in the society and the societal perception that some castes are more respectable than others for granted. Thus, it is said that, the Buddha, before taking birth in the world, considered “five types of considerations” (gzigs pa rnam pa lnga), one being the “consideration of the caste.” Analogously perhaps, all 1000 or so buddhas of the bhadrakalpa aeon are said to appear in the kṣatriya or brāhmaṇa caste. The only reason, as far as I know, is that whichever caste or form of existence would best benefit sentient beings, the Buddha would manifest in that caste or form of existence. If a hunter, fisherman, or prostitute were to benefit sentient beings the best/most, the Buddha would manifest as a hunter, fisherman, or prostitute. Later on, it seems, the possibility was extended also to other species (i.e. to all five or six forms of existences) and even to inanimate objects such as islands and bridges.

Buddhism seems to recognize two kinds of caste/race, namely, a biological/physiological and a spiritualogical/soteriological one. While the biological/physiological caste/race may be said to be determined or acquired by birth, the spiritualogical/soteriological caste/race can be acquired by cultivation and training. Buddhism also seems to override the significance of the biological/physiological caste/race by spiritualogical/soteriological caste/race. This can be seen by the Buddha’s reevaluation and reinterpretation of key terms such as brāhmaṇa and ārya. The purity of heart and mind overrides the supposed purity of blood and bones. The nobility of the heart and mind overrides the supposed nobility of one’s questionable biological caste/race. Here Bhāviveka’s thoughts on this would be worth referring to.

With regard to the spiritualogical/soteriological caste/race, Buddhism in course of time has developed two theories, namely, a five-gotra theory and a one-gotra theory. Both were probably proposed with the best of intentions. The first theory should enable Buddhists to accord complete personal liberty to all sentient beings. They are free to choose any kind of soteriological model or not to choose any at all. The second allows Buddhists to accord respect to all sentient beings as equally being buddha potentials or hidden buddhas.

Various Tantric classes and systems also suggest that some form of Buddhism recognizes the soteriological potentials of human beings of the four castes. In fact, there seems to be a reverse of the soteriological potentiality of human beings of the four castes. The lower the caste one belongs to, the better suited is one said to be for the more profound Tantric teachings! Here, too, the caste system has been presupposed but has been reevaluated in a reverse way.

Some Vinaya sources may suggest that ordaining persons from certain social groups or background including those from “bad caste/family” (rigs ngan pa) have been seen as obstacles (bar chad) for the ordination. A closer look, however, reveals that this has been due to the potential undermining of the social standing of the ordained community. One cannot deny the potential difficulty that the ordained community would have faced if the majority of its members consisted of convicts and social groups that were not held in high esteem. Being from a lowly caste, though perceived to be a bit of an image problem, has not been seen as a hindrance for the arising of the precept of ordination. Once ordained, no one is supposed to discriminate anyone on the basis of one’s former caste. Obviously discrimination on the basis of caste is a transgression in the Vinaya. The Buddha is said to have said: “In my doctrine, caste is not important, race/family is not important. Important is the [three types of] training (i.e. adhiśīla, adhicitta, adhiprajñā)” (nga’i bstan pa ’di la | rigs mi gtso | rus mi gtso | bslab pa gtso ||).

Buddhism may have to accept race and racism as social realities, no matter how undesirable or desirable a society might consider them to be. But they would be seen as mere social conventions and constructions. While we cannot deny our physiology, Buddhism seems to want human beings to relocate their values to spiritual purity. I may be born in a śūdra caste but I can be reborn in this life as a brāhmaṇa in the Buddha’s sense. I may not belong to an ārya race (according to some racist ideology) but I can be an ārya in the Buddha’s sense. I may not be born as a biological son of Siddhārtha, but I can be born in this lifetime as the legitimate son of the Buddha, namely, as a bodhisattva.

From a broader perspective of Buddhist philosophy, the very assumption that race, caste, skin color, creed, religiosity, ethnicity, nationality, gender, and so on—even when the diversity and multiplicity of which cannot be denied and hence may even be worth preserving—as a kind of a static entity/identity/reality fixed for eternity is very irrational and bizarre. All of these, again from a Buddhist perspective, are mere temporary features of our physical bases (lus rten). What guarantee is there that I will not die in the next instant and thus change my race, caste, skin color, creed, religiosity, ethnicity, nationality, and gender!