Reductionism

Reductionism

The term “Reductionism” has been employed by Herbert V. Guenther to render the Tibetan term dngos por smra ba (spelled wrongly there as dngos smar ba), that is, Vastuvāda. This philosophy is said to include “what seems to be a kind of naive realism through representative realism towards subjective idealism” (of Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Vijñānavādins, respectively). See Guenther 1989: 162 “This term may best be translated by ‘reductionism because each system so far mentioned tries to reduce the whole of reality to one or more particular existents (dngos-po).” 

But I wonder if this term is useful at all in conveying the ontology posited by those Buddhist schools. What is not made clear there is that the designation Vastuvāda or Vastuvādin is not a term that the proponents of those schools employ but has been (if I am not mistaken) given (not quite flatteringly if not pejoratively) by their Mādhyamika opponents. Some Tibetan schools have gone to the extent of claiming that a Vastuvāda view is not in a position to independently cause the soteriological breakthrough. 

What is, however, true is that Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Vijñānavādins are said to posit some kind of entities (vastu: dngos po), be they be cognitive (shes pa) or inanimate (bem po), to be existent, not just nominally (prajñaptisat: btags par yod pa) but substantially (dravyasat: rdzas su yod pa) and hence they are labelled as Vastuvādins (dngos por smra ba) and also as Sasvabhāvavādins (ngo bo nyid yod par smra ba) as opposed to Niḥsvabhāvavādins (ngo bo nyid med par smra ba). 

What is also true is that all Buddhist schools reject any metaphysical substrate or cause (e.g. God or Self) of the phenomena and each school reduces all existents to “x-mātra.” By understanding the value of “x” that each school accepts and the value of “y” that it rejects, we may understand the kind of ontology proposed by each system. Nonetheless, the term “reductionism” here seems simply unserviceable.

Idea-ism or Mentalism

Herbert V. Guenther points out John Hosper’s suggestion that one should replace the term “idealism” in philosophy, which is a misnomer, by “Idea-ism,” or, by “Mentalism” (as suggested by C. D. Broad). “Idealism” is said to be “the doctrine that the nature of the Universe is such that those characteristics which are ‘highest’ and most valuable must either be manifested eternally or must be manifested in greater and greater intensity, and in wider and wider extent as time goes on.” According to Guenther, if we understand “Idealism” in this sense, all Buddhists have been idealists. See Guenther 1989: 169, n. 14.

Mahāyāna Perfectionism?

It is perhaps undeniable that the theories and practices of Mahāyāna Buddhism center around the so-called six or ten perfections (pāramitā: pha rol tu phyin pa) and hence I am wondering if the philosophy of the Pāramitāyāna or Pāramitānaya can be called “Mahāyāna Perfectionism.” We are told that in psychology, Perfectionism “is a personality disposition characterized by a striving for flawlessness and setting excessively high performance standards, accompanied by overly critical self-evaluations and concerns regarding others’ evaluations.” In the Mahāyānic context, Perfectionism may be defined as “a religio-philosophical system characterized by the assumption that the best means of exploiting the best within oneself and others is to become a fully awakened being (i.e. a buddha) and the only means for doing so is by perfecting the so-called six perfections (i.e. the perfection of generosity or giving, of ethical-spiritual self-discipline, of the psychological and intellectual capacity to confront the state of affairs or reality, of diligence, of concentration, and of insight).

Dayal 1932 still remains a good source for the study of pāramitās.

Vaibhāṣika Atomism

According to the Tibetan doxographical literature, Vaibhāṣika is said maintain that the atoms (rdul phra rab) of sense-faculties (dbang po) and objects (don) to be substantially existent (rdzas su yod pa), conditioned phenomena to be without Self (bdag med) and transient (mi rtag pa), and conditioned phenomena such as nirvāṇa to be static (rtag pa). See, for example, the dKon mchog ’grel (p. 44.16–23).

(Buddhist) Idealism

Customarily Idealism in Buddhism is often ascribed only to Vijñānavāda/Vijñaptimātra(tā)vāda/Cittamātravāda school by modern and some traditional Tibetan scholars. In my view, Eric Frauwallner, however, has made a very significant statement, that is, to the effect that Buddhism is essentially (and philosophically) “Idealism.” See the following (Frauwallner 1956: xii): “Als die sich um 500 v. u.Z. entwickelnde neue Religion nahm der Buddhismus wichtige volkstümliche Elemente in sich auf. Er griff das Ständewesen an und lehrte die natürliche Gleichheit aller Menschen. Er wandte sich aber nicht nur gegen den Materialismus, sondern auch insofern gegen den Upaniṣadidealismus, als er bestritt, daß es ein ewiges brahman oder eine ewige Seele gebe; er verfocht demgegenüber den Gedanken eines ständigen Werdens in allen natürlichen und geistigen Erscheinungen. Das war eine großartige, wenn auch naive  Dialektik. Dessenungeachtet aber war der Buddhismus selbst wesentlich Religion und Idealismus, in dem er die Welt und das Werden letztlich aus einer Verblendung, oder aus einem Wahn avidyā, wörtlich „Nichtwissen,“ also von etwas Geistigem, herleitete.” 

In the Tibetan traditions, two kinds of Idealism have been proposed or presupposed, (a) no-external-entities cittamātra (phyi don med pa’i sems tsam) and (b) no-creator-other-than-mind cittamātra (byed pa po gzhan med pa’i sems tsam). Not all Buddhist philosophical systems may endorse both kinds of idealism, but every Buddhist philosophical system would endorse at least one of them. According to the Tibetan polymath Mi-pham (1846–1912), Buddhism typically accepts Idealism, that is, in the same sense, indicated by Frauwallner above.