Buddhist Deontology

The term “deontology” is said to be derived from Greek deon “obligation, duty” and logia “discourse.” Deontology (or deontological ethics) is said to be “the normative ethical position that judges the morality of an action based on the action’s adherence to a rule or rules. It is sometimes described as ‘duty’ or ‘obligation’ or ‘rule’-based ethics, because rules ‘bind you to your duty.’ Deontological ethics is commonly contrasted to consequentialism, virtue ethics, and pragmatic ethics. In this terminology action is more important than the consequences” (Wikipedia). The question for me is whether we can speak of “Buddhist deontology.” I feel that we can speak of “Buddhist deontology,” particularly in the Mahāyāna context, insofar as Buddhism accepts that the rightness or wrongness (or perhaps better, in the Buddhist context, the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness or neutrality) of one’s verbal and physical conduct is determined by the wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral character or nature of the behavior itself rather than the outcomes of the conduct. Two related arguments seem to support the fact in Buddhism even if the action carried out of a compassionate motive or intention turns out to harm other people, it would nonetheless be considered wholesome.

We are told by some that Kantanism (or Immanuel Kant’s theory of ethics) is deontological for at least two different reasons: First, Kant has argued that to act in the morally right way, people must act from duty (deon). Second, Kant has argued that it was not the consequences of actions that make them right or wrong but the motives of the person who carries out the action. 

Kant’s first argument that to act in the morally right way, people must act from duty (deon) is said to be based on the argument that the highest good must be both good in itself and good without qualification. Does this argument make any sense from the perspective of Buddhist axiology? Not being sure if Kant’s position has been represented accurately, it is difficult to say. What does seem questionable is the idea of “duty” in Buddhism. Does it exist in Buddhism and what does it mean? On the one hand, prima facie, at least, we might get an impression that in Buddhism no one is obliged to do anything for anyone, and thus the idea of duty in the sense of obligation simply makes no sense. Such an impression is perhaps created by the fact that Buddhism proposes karmic mechanism and presupposes what Srinivasan has once called Heilsprivatismus (“Salvific Privatism”), which means that each person is responsible for his or her this-worldly or other-worldly mundane destiny and also for one’s soteriological destiny. Whatever one does, one does so out of self-responsibility and not on account of one’s obligation or responsibility towards others. What about one’s duty towards one’s parents, family, and the like? One may perhaps state that this is nothing specifically Buddhistic but rather a societal norm accepted by the society at large. One might thus argue that duty is akin to a penalty and it robs one’s personal freedom to choose and decide. Thus the very word “duty” sounds somewhat contrarious to the Buddhist pattern of thinking. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that Buddhist axiology does prescribe ethical-moral-ascetical commitment and responsibility. Although “duty” or “obligation” may be synonymous to “commitment,” the latter term seems more appropriate in the Buddhist context. The basic idea here is that although one is not obliged to do anything for anyone, one does have the complete freedom to commit oneself to do something or not to something. But once one has taken a commitment upon oneself, one is usually bound by one’s commitment. Even here, one take full responsibility for keeping or breaking one’s commitment. This distinction, in my view, seems crucial. For a person who has not committed himself or herself to refrain from killing, abstaining from killing a human being out of maliciousness is not a duty. For a person who has committed himself or herself to refrain from killing, abstaining from killing a human being out of maliciousness is a duty.

Kant’s idea of “good in itself and good without qualification” seems to be reconcilable with the Buddhist idea of certain mental factors/associates (caitta: sems las byung ba) that are by nature wholesome (ngo bo nyid kyis dge ba). By the way, its opposite, those that are by nature unwholesome (ngo bo nyid kyis mi dge ba), too, is possible in Buddhism. If to (re)formulate Kant’s argument in Abhidharmic terms, it would be thus: “To act in the ethically-morally right way, people must act with wholesome mental factors (dge ba’i sems byung).” Better still: “Any action carried out with wholesome mental factors (dge ba’i sems byung) is ethically/morally right.”

Kant’s second reason, in my view, seems to be ad sensum same as the first argument and thus both arguments seem readily acceptable from a Buddhist perspective. This is also the reason why I think Buddhist axiology proposes deontological ethics.

What would a Buddhist philosopher think of Kant’s categorical imperative? “Act only according to that maxim by which you can also will that it would become a universal law.” I think it would be found laudable and endorsable. I have a feeling that the Mahāyānic values crystalized in the six kinds of perfections (pāramitā: pha rol tu phyin pa) imply categorical imperative.

Does Buddhist axiology propose “moral absolutism,” according to which certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, regardless of the intentions behind them as well as the consequences? From a Buddhist perspective, it would seem that the very idea of “moral absolutism” (i.e. if what I read is what it says) seems to be based on the presupposition (or rather on the misconception) that there is an intention-free action. Action, deed, or exertion in Buddhism must be volitional. Action is not a motivation-free or intention-free motion. The rustling of dry leaves in the wind is not an action. One may, however, conceive of a Buddhist version of “moral absolutism,” according to which certain mental actions are absolutely right or wrong, regardless of their consequences. In other words, a unwholesome mental action is always and absolutely wrong, and a wholesome mental action is always and absolutely right. 

On the one hand, the so-called “Divine Command Theory,” according to which “an action is right if God has decreed that it is right” would be deprecated by a Buddhist philosopher as utterly nonsensical because it would be tantamount to stating that “an action is right if the Son of a Barren Woman (or Rabbit’s Horn) has decreed that it is right.” On the other hand, Buddhist sources classify misdeeds that are considered by nature unwholesome and thus by nature reproachable (prakṛtisāvadya: rang bzhin gyi kha na ma tho ba) and those that are reproachable in virtue of prohibition or decree (pratikṣepaṇasāvadya, also rendered into Tibetan as bcas pa’i kha na ma tho ba). The question here is to find something to be “reproachable” by whom? The answer is: a wise person (e.g. the Buddha). A fool’s judgment of something as “reproachable” or “irreproachable” is not valid.

Buddhist Kalology

“Buddhist Kalology” may be defined here as the Buddhist concept or theory of beauty, and may be seen as a branch of Buddhist axiology (dealing with aesthetic values).

https://sites.google.com/site/nygamma/home/kalology

Buddhist Killology or Cideology

Killology is said to be “the study of the psychological and physiological effects of killing and combat on the human psyche” and the term is said to have been coined by the retired Lt. Col. Dave Grossman (US Army). Perhaps I may be the first person to try to employ the word “killology” in a Buddhist context. I would, however, propose to define “Buddhist Killology” (or perhaps better “Buddhist Cideology,” from French -cide, from Latin cida “cutter, killer”) as a “scholarly study of the Buddhist attitude towards the act of killing.” For the sake of discussing the Buddhist attitude toward killing, one might primarily consider those x-cide words. To be noted is that an x-cide word usually mean one of these four things: (a) “killing x,” where x is an animate or sentient being (e.g. matricide), (b) “killing through or by means of x,” where x is often a tangible entity (e.g. autocide),(c) “a kind of substance that is used to kill x,” where x is often a nuisance-causing and hence unwanted small creature such as bug or vermin (e.g. German Ungetier and Ungeziefer) (e.g. pesticide), or (d) the act of destroying x (literarily or figuratively), where x is usually an inanimate and intangible entity (e.g. chronocide “the killing or wasting of time,” famacide “the killing of another’s reputation, a slander,” liberticide “the destruction of liberties, linguicide “intentionally causing the death of a language,” and libricide “the destruction of books and libraries mainly with a religious or political ideology”). Our main concern in this context would be x-cide in the first sense.

Some random points may be made in this regard. First of all, killing may be defined by Buddhist sources as a physical act of the destruction or cutting (short) of or putting an abrupt end to life or life-faculty (jīvendriya: srog gi dbang po) of a sentient being. Naturally therefore the issue of what is sentient is crucial in Buddhism. Lambert Schmithausen’s study of the issue of sentiency of plants in Buddhism should be presupposed here. According to him and if I remember correctly, Buddhists in the beginning were reticent about the sentiency of plants and that plants were considered borderline cases by them but in course of time, they decided in favor of the in-sentiency of plants. In other words, according to Buddhism, plants may be considered living things but not living or sentient beings. Killing here thus refers to only killing of sentient beings. 

Second, killing, being a physical or bodily act or deed in Buddhism, can never be considered categorically or apodictically unwholesome, wholesome, or neutral, although most acts or deeds of killing would be committed through motives tinged by intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa) such as desire, hatred, greed, jealousy, and so forth, and thus considered unwholesome ethically, morally, spiritually (or ascetically), and karmically (or legally). The most decisive factor is thus the wholesomeness, unwholesomeness, or neutrality of the preceding, accompanying, or concluding volitional impulse or motivation of the main agent of the act of killing. I specify here “main agent” to exclude a “commissioned killer” (who may be mostly considered an instrument of killing). A “commissioned killer” may or may not be an accomplice in the volitionary act of killing. The equivocality or equivocacy of the act of killing in terms of ethical, moral, spiritual (or ascetic), and karmic positivity, negativity, or neutrality, makes the act of killing one of the greatest challenges in Buddhist philosophy. I may have killed a person and claim that I did it out of pure compassion and benevolence. I may have killed a person out of pure hatred and maliciousness. I may have killed someone in the course of a sleep-walking. Can one, who can, and how can one determine the positivity, negativity, or neutrality of the motive behind an act of killing and thus judge accordingly as wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral? 

Third, one may classify types of killing in several ways. Killing may be classified based on (a) the kind of species of sentient being killed (e.g. homicide “killing of a human being”), (b) the killer’s family and other relationship with the victim (i.e. matricide and patricide), (c) spiritual or social status (e.g. regicide “the killing of a monarch”), (d) ways of killing (i.e. capital punishment “the judicial killing of a human being for odious crimes” and euthanasia (also mercy killing) “the killing of any being for compassionate reasons i.e. significant injury or disease,” and so on. But perhaps all types of killing maybe subsumed under suicide (i.e. intentional killing oneself) and paracide (i.e. intentional killing of other sentient beings). For suicide, see q.v. Buddhist Suicidology.

Fourth, the gravity of the act of killing and thus also the karmic (or legal) accountability for it would be determined by a number of factors. Some of such factors presupposed in Buddhism seem to be (a) the size of physical size of a sentient being (e.g. it is not the same killing an ant and an elephant),  (b) number of sentient beings (e.g. whether one kills one cow or a thousand cows), (c) the frequency (e.g. whether one kills a sentient being once or regularly), (d) the intensity or extensity of preceding, accompanying, and concluding volitional impulse, (e) the degree or extent to which the victim happens to be a guṇakṣetra (yon tan gyi zhing) or puṇyakṣetra  (bsod nams kyi zhing), that is, even among human beings it would depend whether the victim is a parent, patient, saint, and the like.

In Buddhism, I doubt that a human being can kill a celestial being (i.e. god) and hence deicide would be, according to Buddhism, an impossibility. Similarly, Buddhocide (i.e. “the killing of the Buddha or a buddha”) would be an impossibility. Nobody can ever kill the Buddha or a buddha! To be noted is that not everyone who is said to possess the Buddha (or Buddhomorphic) Element (buddhadhātu: sangs rgyas kyi khams) can be considered a buddha. Perhaps hagiocide (i.e. killing of a saint), however, is possible insofar as one may be able to kill an arhant or a bodhisattva would get killed. The killing of Tibetan king ’U-dum-btsan may be regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as tyrannicide (i.e. “the killing of a tyrant”), which would be theoretically endorsable. Self-immolation (i.e. suicide by setting oneself on fire, a form of extreme protest), like any other form of suicide or paracide, is subject to equivocality. From a Buddhist point, there would be nothing honorable about the so-called “honor killing” (i.e. the act of killing a family member who has or was perceived to have brought disgrace to the family) would be categorically and apodictically considered reproachable and dishonorable. What about judicial killing? Judicial system is a worldly system and Buddhism (initially and mainly as a discipline of attaining release from the bondage of saṃsāra) would not normally lay down legal systems for the society unless a king or a country happens to follow Buddhist teachings. Some Buddhists may even see a country’s law a kind of jungle’s law and would only hope that people in the jungle would not unjustly send one to the gallows. To change a political or legal system of a country, lay and ordained Buddhist community would have to meddle into and muddle in the dirty waters of politics. One would be free to do so if one can and will but would that be the raison d’être of Buddhist teachings in the first place? What about Euthanasia? Difficult! How can one ensure and be sure that “mercy killing” is indeed merciful and beneficial? Buddhism is bound to view the very intent of genocide (i.e. the systematic extermination of an entire national, racial, religious, or ethnic group) and particularly omnicide (i.e. the act of killing all humans, to create intentional extinction of the human species) heinous. How might Buddhism view human sacrifice (i.e. the killing of a human for religious reasons)? Perhaps it would be viewed as a practice based on completely erroneous views. What about dominicide (i.e. the act of killing one’s (Buddhist) master? It would be usually viewed very negatively. What about episcopicide (i.e. the act of killing a bishop) or vaticide (i.e. the act of killing a prophet)? It may depend on what kind of person that particular bishop or prophet is. If he or she happens to be a person who spreads religion of hate and destruction, a bodhisattva or tāntrika might consider “liberating” him or her. If he or she happens to contribute to compassion, insight, happiness, and peace in the world, episcopicide and vaticide would be a heinous crime.

Disanalogy in Buddhist Philosophy

Disanalogy (i.e. dpe med pa) does not seem to be recorded by Merriam-Webster but by Collins. It is said to mean “a lack of analogy.” If we somehow assume that “analogy” is semantically coextensive with Tibetan dpe (dṛṣṭānta), which can also mean an “instance” or a “case,” or “exemplification” then one might speak of “disanalogy” in Buddhist philosophy. The Mādhyamikas have argued that one of the reasons why “reality” or “essentiality” or “substantiality” or “hypostatic existence” of an entity or phenomenon can never be proven because there is not a single dpe (“analogy,” “case,” or “instance”) of an entity or phenomenon or any given that is “real,” “substantial,” “essential” or “hypostatically existent.” A single dpe of an hypostatically existent entity would undermine or topple the entire Madhyamaka theory of emptiness. The Mādhyamikas would claim that all reasons that are put forward to refute the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness are actually ineffectual in achieving their objectives but would consolidate the Madhyamaka position. All reasons employed by the critics of Madhyamaka are like additional fuel that causes the Madhyamaka fire to burn even more brightly. Nāgārjuna, Śāntideva, and the like should be cited. In this connection, consider Mi-pham’s: chos gcig bden par grub na de nyid kyis || chos kun snang ba gtan nas ’gog ’gyur phyir || gcig kyang bden pa med pa’i nges shes kyis || mtha’ bral dbu ma’i lam bzang ….

A few  more points come to my mind. First, we also have to bear in mind that there is mthun dpe as well as mi mthun pa’i dpe (i.e. a kind of opposite case, counter-example, or counter-analogy). Second, a formally correct and complete syllogism is said to require a mthun dpe, that is, regardless of whether or not the proponent needs to demonstrate it to the qualified opponent. Third, I have encountered several intelligent and well-educated lay Buddhists in Europe who have problems with classical dpe used in Buddhist sources. One of the most common remarks is that a dpe, because of its dissimilarity with the don, often does not apply. To this, I have been trying to point out a few things. (a) In an Indian or Buddhist philosophical context, a dpe must primarily work for the qualified dialogue or debate partner. If a dpe is unknown (or makes no sense) to the opponent or partner, the proponent should not use it. (b) Usually The kind of dpe employed need not exist as a (concrete) particular entity. A dpe is usually an abstract concept of an entity or a non-entity. Thus, one can use “pot” (bum pa) as a dpe or “a rabbit’s horn.” (c) Importantly, the exemplifying dpe should never be totally similar to the to-be-exemplified don (meaning). If it does, it would not function as a dpe. A dpe is usually employed because of its at least one shared quality or similarity with the don. Therefore, it would be absolutely correct to the employ “rabbit’s horn” as a dpe in the following syllogism: A “pot,” if analyzed or ultimately, would turn out to be non-arisen just like a “rabbit’s horn.” Now in this case, the argument that “rabbit’s horn” cannot be employed as a dpe because of its dissimilarity with the “pot” would not be valid and the objection simply suggests that the opponent does not actually know the rules of the dialogue/debate. If both parties see the quality or attribute of being non-arisen in both “pot” and “rabbit’s horn,” that would suffice. (d) Perhaps the difficulty lies in the use of the word “analogy” itself. The idea of analogy in the Western intellectual culture is perhaps more rigid than the idea of dpe (dṛṣṭānta) in Indian Buddhist intellectual culture. One must, however, note that even in the Buddhist contexts, dpe could be used loosely and non-technically or narrowly and technically. Perhaps one may state dpe (dṛṣṭānta) in Buddhist context may be used on a micro or individual level (i.e. one dpe for a single don) on a macro or over-all level (i.e. a series of dpes for a series of dons). The dpe (dṛṣṭānta) thus may include analogy, allegory, and any kind of comparison and exemplification.

Buddhist Fetishism or Fetishism in Buddhism

I just happened to read Andrew Lang’s “Fetishism and Spiritualism” (The Making of Religion. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1900, pp. 147–159) and the Wikipedia entry on “fetishism.” To be begin with, the word “fetish” is said to be derived from the French fétiche; which comes from the Portuguese feitiço; and this in turn from Latin facticius meaning “artificial” and facere “to make”) and is thus “an object believed to have supernatural powers, or in particular, a man-made object that has power over others. Essentially, fetishism is the emic attribution of inherent value or powers to an object.” The idea of fetishism itself seems to have a rather long history. Sigmund Freud, in his essay on “Fetishism,” is said to have stated that the meaning and purpose of the fetish turns out, through analysis, to always be the same, namely, “the fetish is a substitute for the penis,” a particular and special kind of penis. The belief in the supernatural power of phallus (cf. “phallicism”) is popular not just among non-Buddhists in India but also among the Buddhists in Bhutan). Karl Marx’s idea of “commodity fetishism” (i.e. in which objects are imagined to dictate the social activities that produce them) and Alfred Binet’s “sexual fetishism” (i.e. the sexual attachment to an object in place of a person) are very interesting as well. Besides such forms of “secular fetishism,” fetishism is said to be present in all religions, which maybe called “sacral fetishism.” If this is the case, there must be fetishism in Buddhism as well. The topic that I dare thematize here is thus “Buddhist Fetishism” or “Fetishism in Buddhism.”

         A working definition of “Buddhist Fetishism” would be “a Buddhist belief in the supernatural or paranormal power in certain physical or inanimate objects.” That Buddhists believed, to varying degrees, in the supernatural or paranormal power of inanimate objects, can hardly be denied. Some random Buddhist ideas maybe mentioned here as some venues for exploration. First, the belief in the power of relics would be an ideal case of fetishism in Buddhism. To be noted is that a relic may even be conceived of as a sentient entity. The belief in the power of other organic or inorganic objects or substances such urine or implements or clothes of realized masters may be seen as an extension of the belief in the power of relics. Second, the Indian or Buddhist belief in the power of wish-fulfilling jewel, too, may be seen a kind of fetishism. Third, while the idea of three receptacles (rten gsum)—i.e. statues, scriptures, and stūpas—may not by itself suggest the idea fetishism, the idea of a statue or thanka that speaks or smiles, for example, may be indicative of some elements of fetishism. Fourth, objects that are regarded by some Tibetan Buddhists as btags grol, mthong grol, myong grol, reg grol, and the like, may also suggest elements of fetishism in Tibetan Buddhism. 

         Importantly, it would be true to state that in Buddhism the power of mind or meditation (and hence perhaps “psychical fetishism”) has precedence over the power of speech or mantras or truth (i.e. “verbal fetishism”) or of matter (i.e. “physical/material fetishism”).