Buddhist Fetishism or Fetishism in Buddhism

I just happened to read Andrew Lang’s “Fetishism and Spiritualism” (The Making of Religion. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1900, pp. 147–159) and the Wikipedia entry on “fetishism.” To be begin with, the word “fetish” is said to be derived from the French fétiche; which comes from the Portuguese feitiço; and this in turn from Latin facticius meaning “artificial” and facere “to make”) and is thus “an object believed to have supernatural powers, or in particular, a man-made object that has power over others. Essentially, fetishism is the emic attribution of inherent value or powers to an object.” The idea of fetishism itself seems to have a rather long history. Sigmund Freud, in his essay on “Fetishism,” is said to have stated that the meaning and purpose of the fetish turns out, through analysis, to always be the same, namely, “the fetish is a substitute for the penis,” a particular and special kind of penis. The belief in the supernatural power of phallus (cf. “phallicism”) is popular not just among non-Buddhists in India but also among the Buddhists in Bhutan). Karl Marx’s idea of “commodity fetishism” (i.e. in which objects are imagined to dictate the social activities that produce them) and Alfred Binet’s “sexual fetishism” (i.e. the sexual attachment to an object in place of a person) are very interesting as well. Besides such forms of “secular fetishism,” fetishism is said to be present in all religions, which maybe called “sacral fetishism.” If this is the case, there must be fetishism in Buddhism as well. The topic that I dare thematize here is thus “Buddhist Fetishism” or “Fetishism in Buddhism.”

         A working definition of “Buddhist Fetishism” would be “a Buddhist belief in the supernatural or paranormal power in certain physical or inanimate objects.” That Buddhists believed, to varying degrees, in the supernatural or paranormal power of inanimate objects, can hardly be denied. Some random Buddhist ideas maybe mentioned here as some venues for exploration. First, the belief in the power of relics would be an ideal case of fetishism in Buddhism. To be noted is that a relic may even be conceived of as a sentient entity. The belief in the power of other organic or inorganic objects or substances such urine or implements or clothes of realized masters may be seen as an extension of the belief in the power of relics. Second, the Indian or Buddhist belief in the power of wish-fulfilling jewel, too, may be seen a kind of fetishism. Third, while the idea of three receptacles (rten gsum)—i.e. statues, scriptures, and stūpas—may not by itself suggest the idea fetishism, the idea of a statue or thanka that speaks or smiles, for example, may be indicative of some elements of fetishism. Fourth, objects that are regarded by some Tibetan Buddhists as btags grol, mthong grol, myong grol, reg grol, and the like, may also suggest elements of fetishism in Tibetan Buddhism. 

         Importantly, it would be true to state that in Buddhism the power of mind or meditation (and hence perhaps “psychical fetishism”) has precedence over the power of speech or mantras or truth (i.e. “verbal fetishism”) or of matter (i.e. “physical/material fetishism”).

Buddhist Thaumaturgy or Thaumaturgy in Buddhism

I am sure some scholars would disapprove my use of the term “Buddhist Thaumaturgy,” perhaps with the argument that there is no such thing as “miracle-working,” “miracle,” “marvel,” and “magic” in Buddhism.  While it is true that there is no such thing as a Creator God who acts as a source of supernatural entities, events, or activities, and while we can understand why some of us may not like to have Thaumaturgy in Buddhism because it does not suit the image of Buddhism that we may have created ourselves, namely, Buddhism as a form of pure rationalism, it is not true that there are no elements of “miracles” and “miracle-working” in Buddhism. As far as I see, Buddhism seems to take for granted the existence of “miracle,” “marvel,” “magic,” “mystery,” “sorcery,” and the like, as some kind of “supernatural” phenomenon or reality. These realities are “supernatural” only in relative perspectives. That is, an entity, reality, or activity, is regarded as a “miracle,” “marvel,” or “magic,”  or “mystery” by normal mortals only insofar as such an entity, reality, activity, or, the underlying mechanism, appears to lie beyond their domain of cognition, conception, and explanation. From the perspectives of those who see through the mechanism of pratītyasamutpāda underlying any entity, reality, activity, there is nothing marvellous, magical, or mysterious about anything. In other words, as scientists might say, there is a logical or rational explanation to everything including magics and miracles.

While the existence of magic or marvel is not denied in Buddhism, its value, status, or role is relegated. Only a limited instrumental value is attributed to the magical means or power. It may be supernatural but fundamentally worldly (laukika: ’jig rten pa) in its nature, function, and scope, even when employed by a buddha or an arhant for beneficial purposes. A buddha, for example, can never put someone in a nirvāṇic state through his miraculous powers. If he could, he would have done that already. It is merely a pre-product or byproduct of one’s spiritual accomplishment and realization. Therefore, the higher one’s spiritual accomplishment is the greater would be one’s magical power. Nobody, from a Buddhist perspective, can outdo the magical feats of the Buddha or a buddha. As benevolent and beneficent as he is, however, he would never misuse his magical powers. If he sees that his magical feats would benefit sentient beings, he would demonstrate them. A Buddhist reinterpretation (or relativization) of magical and miraculous prowess and power would be thus: The greatest magical feat would be the elimination, transformation, or cognitive penetration of one’s intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa) as a result of which one obtains complete freedom from the bondage of saṃsāra. One who can do this would be a real magician,  or the greatest magician ever. 

Magical power is thus not denied in Buddhism but its value is relegated. But admittedly, it is also true for Buddhism that absolute power can corrupt one absolutely, the primum mobile of any form of corruption, according to Buddhism, being (negative) egoism characterized by lack of benevolence and beneficence. Magical power is seen as a powerful tool. One can wield one’s tool constructively or destructively; for benevolent or malevolent purposes; with beneficent or maleficent motives. Magic employed for a malevolent and destructive purpose with a maleficent motive may be considered “black magic.” Magic employed for a benevolent and constructive purpose with a beneficent motive may be considered “white magic.” Who can judge all these? It is often difficult to judge. In the end, a thaumaturgist alone should be his or her own witness and judge. A thaumaturgist alone is responsible for his or her thaumaturgy.

In Buddhist history and literature, we find ample accounts of the Buddha and his disciples demonstrating magical prowess and feats. The supernormal powers of the Buddha and his disciples are not considered abnormal in Buddhism. Each Buddhist society may have its own accounts of masters, saints, and yogins demonstrating magical feats. Tibetan Buddhist society is no exception. Particularly, the legendary accounts of Padmasambhava and his disciples are full of them. But this is not limited to rNying-ma school alone. Mi-la-ras-pa is known for the practice of black magic—which he is said to have learnt from a rNying-ma tāntrika (sngags pa)—the aftermath of which caused a turning point in his spiritual career. The legends of Rwa-lo-tsā-ba, for example, also contain full of accounts of he employing his magical powers to “liberate” (bsgral) thirteen bodhisattvas who have attained one of ten bodhisattva stages and thirteen translators of his standing (Shin rgyas, vol. 10, p. 74). He is said to have killed Mar-pa’s son Dharma-mdo-sde but he could not kill Mi-la-ras-pa. It is said that he could not kill Lang-lab, too, who was a shepherd and a Vajrakīla adept.

Where, according to Buddhism, should the magical power come from? There is a collective expression in Tibetan Buddhism: “three kinds of inconceivable [power]” (bsam gyis mi khyab pa gsum), namely, “inconceivable power of substance (i.e. of bodily or material entities)” (rzdas kyi nus pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa), “inconceivable power of mantras (i.e. of speech)” (sngags kyi nus pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa), and “inconceivable power of meditative concentration (i.e. of mind)” (ting nge ’dzin gyi nus pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa). If we are not convinced of the power of substance, we might just think of the nuclear bomb, venom, or potassium cyanid. If we are not convinced of the power of speech, we might try verbally insulting someone and see what happens. If we are not convinced of the power of concentration, we might try doing things after getting totally drunk. A Buddhist thaumaturgist might use one or a combination of these three means or powers, which would then be considered “magical” or “marvellous” by ordinary mortals like myself.

  

Buddhist Suitheism?

“Suitheism” is said to be “the belief in self as a deity.” Can one treat the Buddhist Tantric idea of seeing/visualizing/meditating oneself as divinity a kind of “Buddhist Suitheism”? Just a random food for thought!

Buddhist Agnoiology? Agnotology in Buddhism?

The word “agnoiology” is said to mean “the science or study of ignorance, which determines its quality and conditions” or “the doctrine concerning those things of which we are necessarily ignorant,” and it is said to describe a branch of philosophy studied by James Frederick Ferrier in the nineteenth century. I employ expressions such as “said to be mean/be” to suggest that I am not an authority on the topic and hence I do hold accountable for its correctness, reliability, and the difficulties such statements might entail. Similarly, “agnotology” (formerly “agnatology”), a neologism coined by Robert N. Proctor, Stanford University professor, specializing in the history of science and technology, is said to be “the study of culturally induced ignorance or doubt, particularly the publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific data.” More generally, the term is also said to highlight “the increasingly common condition where more knowledge of a subject leaves one more uncertain than before.”

My interest here is mainly whether we can speak of a “Buddhist agnoiology,” and to a lesser degree, whether we can speak of “agnotology in Buddhism.” I think we sure can. One may define “Buddhist agnoiology” as the “the science or study of ignorance from a Buddhist perspective.” Just as we may talk of “Buddhist epistemology” or “Buddhist gnoseology,” we can well talk of “Buddhist agnoiology.” I like it. Some venues for exploration would be the ideas of “nescience” (avidyā: ma rig pa), “disorientedness” (moha: gti mig), “lack of knowledge/cognition” (ajñāna: ma shes pa). How have these terms been defined or understood or used? What types of ignorance or nescience can we trace in Buddhist sources? What are lhan cig skyes pa’i ma rig pa (i.e. “innate non-cognition”?) and kun tu brtags (or btags?) pa’i ma rig pa (i.e. “acquired non-cognition”?)? This distinction, though not quite clear to me, seems important. It seems to suggest that there are types of ignorance we are born with and other types we acquire through indoctrination. What about ma rtogs pa, log par rtog pa, and phyogs tsam rtogs pa? What about the idea of duḥprajñā (shes rab ’chal ba)? What about ’dres pa’i ma rig pa and ma ’dres pa’i ma rig pa? Are all kinds or degrees of ignorance or non-cognition obstructive or impedimentary to the attainment of vimokṣa or vimukti? The Mahāyānic answer seems to be in the negative. This is suggested by the idea of jñeyāvaraṇa (shes bya’i sgrib pa), a kind of obscuration that hinders one to know all objects of knowledge. One can possess such a subtle kind of ignorance or nescience and yet one could attain the state of an Arhatship. To become a buddha, however, one must eradicate all traces of nescience, for a buddha is said to possess omniscience. (Note, however, that there seems to be several concepts of omniscience in Buddhism.) Such a subtle nescience can be due to the spatial remoteness of the object of knowledge, or, due to the temporal remoteness of the object of knowledge, or, due to the infinity-cum-transcendentality of the object of knowledge (e.g. qualities of a buddha), or, due to the subtlety of the object of knowledge (e.g. causes and conditions necessary for giving rise to a single multi-colored patch of a peacock’s feather). Tibetan Buddhist sources would describe the idea of the “four causes of non-cognition“ (mi shes pa’i rgyu bzhi) that even a traditional arhant is said to be subject to. Of course, to understand “Buddhist agnoiology,” we will have to understand the reverse side of the coin, namely, “Buddhist Epistemology” and “Buddhist gnoseology.” Buddhist logic and epistemology would reveal a great deal about the Buddhist concepts of non-perception, non-cognition, misperception, misconception, perceptual and conceptual errors, and syllogistic fallacies of various kinds.

And what about “agnotology in Buddhism”? Can we talk of a kind of culturally induced ignorance in Buddhism? Perhaps we can but only to a certain extent and in certain contexts. Some Buddhist masters might discourage acquiring knowledge that is not of direct relevance to the attainment of Arhathood or Buddhahood. That is to say, they might indirectly encourage certain form/degree of ignorance. Some Tibetan Buddhist masters are said to discourage or even prohibit their disciples, especially young monks and nuns, to study, with the argument that they would not remain in the monastery if they were to study. In other words, such masters prefer that their disciples remain ignorant! Should this turn out to be true, it would be a case in which an effort is made by some sections of the society to induce ignorance so that the status quo can be maintained. Although I can neither sympathize with these masters nor can I conscientiously endorse such an attitude, I must, however, mention that Buddhism does recognize the existence of knowledge or cognition that is considered useless, for example, the knowledge about the number of worms in the world. Also investigations and treatises such as those dealing with the “analysis of crows‘ teeth” (bya rog so brtag) are considered to be totally futile.

What about the idea that “ignorance is bliss”? Usually in Buddhism: “Ignorance is suffering/painful” (mi shes pa ni sdug bsngal lo). On the other hand, we do find some sources which suggest that “ignorance can be bliss.” If I am not mistaken, Āryadeva has suggested that if a common person were to know or see the sufferings of the entire world, he or she would die then and there. That is to suggest that if we do not know or see the suffering of the world, we tend to be naive and happy. Why? My explanation is that we cannot often psychologically cope with the reality or truth! This would bring us to the Buddhist idea of kṣānti. It is often rendered as “patience” or “tolerance,” but if we take the entire semantic range or spectrum of the term, “patience” or “tolerance” does not seem to work. Particularly consider the expression: mi skye ba’i chos la bzod pa. It seems to make no sense to understand “tolerance with regard to the phenomena which is characterized by non-arising.” Thus I am tempted to understand kṣānti in Buddhism as the intellectual and psychological capacity or readiness of the mind to confront reality or truth (no matter how painful, dreadful, unpleasant, subtle, or profound). To cope with reality, truth, or knowledge or cognition, one would require the necessary courage to confront it. Buddhist sources speak of “fear for emptiness,” that is, comparable to horror vacui or kenophobia. In my view, it is because of the phobia for reality, truth, knowledge, or cognition, that people induce or resort to ignorance, rejection, and denialism. 

What about the idea of docta ignorantia in Buddhism? I would suppose the idea of “learned ignorance” would be cherished by the wise/learned ones in Buddhism as a very useful convention. Usually people in the society transact on a conventional level and those conventions adopted by the wise and the learned are said to be preferable. For example, the distinction between “good and bad,” or, “wholesome and unwholesome” is occasionally said to be whether or not something is found to be “irreproachable or reproachable by the wise/learned.” If a fool knows or does not know something, it may not mean much or anything! If a learned/wise person does not know something, it would mean something! So much for now on Buddhist agnoiology and agnotology in Buddhism. 

Does Buddhism Presuppose or Propose Apoliticism?

One question that occurs to me is whether we can claim that Buddhism presuppose or propose “apoliticism.” But what is “apoliticism”? It is said to be “apathy and/or antipathy towards all political affiliations. (1) Being apolitical can also refer to situations in which people take an unbiased position in regard to political matters. (2) The Collins Dictionary defines apolitical as ‘politically neutral; without political attitudes, content, or bias.‘” (Wikipedia, s.v. apoliticism). Initially and doctrinally I think Buddhism as represented mainly by the ordained community of monks and nuns, who were the main addressees of the Buddha’s teachings, can said to be “apolitical” but perhaps not so much in the above senses but rather in the sense that an ordained Buddhist monk or nun should not get involved in “worldly matters.” Obviously “political matters” are seen intrinsically as worldly matters. Ordained Buddhist monks or nuns should not get involved in, or, interfere in political matters. They should remain detached from them. They should not, however, be anti-political because a political atmosphere or power that is opposed to or antagonistic towards Buddhism or Buddhist community of monks and nuns would not be favorable to the existence of Buddhism itself. The pragmatic challenge from a Buddhist perspective is how to be apolitical and yet live in a world governed by politics.

Historically, there have been monks who were also politicians but doctrinally it would be perhaps not easily justifiable. The next issue is: What about lay Buddhists such as kings or rulers? How political or apolitical should they be? But such a question is tantamount to the question: How worldly should a Buddhist be? In the end, it is up to each individual lay Buddhist to decide for himself or herself. 

In course of time, the Bodhisattvayāna (Mahāyāna) ideals have been used to doctrinally justify the compatibility of religion (i.e. in this case Buddhism) and politics. Even Mahāyāna teachings would, however,concede that worldly and political affairs are essentially messy, and ultimately, each bodhisattva would decide for himself or herself to what extent he or she indulges or engages in political affairs and each bodhisattva would be solely responsible for his or her attitudes and actions.

Radicalism

There is something deeply unsettling about extreme religiosity and radicality. In this case, I am thinking of Buddhist religiosity. Interestingly, the more radical one is the less rational one seems to be. Radicalism seems to leave no room for diversity, no room for reason, no room for insight.