Suicidology is said to be
“the scientific study of suicidal behavior and prevention.” But in
the Buddhist context, the word “suicidology” may be used in the sense of the
“academic study of the cases of killing oneself in Buddhist
sources and of the Buddhist attitude towards it.” With regard to the academic
(i.e. historical-philological-philosophical) study of the topic of suicide in
Buddhism, I can only recommend the studies by Martin Delhey.[1] He
is, in my view, the expert on the study of suicide in Buddhism. His study not
only demonstrates the complexity of the issue of suicide in Buddhism but, in my
view, offers a very nuanced picture of the state of affairs from its both
diachronic (i.e. here historical) and synchronic (i.e. here doctrinal)
perspectives. I wish to add only two points here. First, my initial pretext and
context of discussing the case of suicide in Buddhism has been the question
whether Vasubandhu committed suicide. According to the accounts of how he died,[2] Vasubandhu goes to Nepal
and there he witnesses an ordained Buddhist monk holding a pot of alcohol and
ploughing a field. He says: “The doctrine has ceased to exist.” He recites
the Uṣṇīṣavijayā’s dhāraṇī in the reverse order or
sequence, and dies! If we study Delhey’s studies, we would learn that cases of
voluntarily relinquishing one’s impulse of life is not very unusual. What
is perhaps unusual here in the hagiogaphy of Vasubandhu is the method or manner
of doing that. Second, I wish to understand the Buddhist doctrinal context in
which the topic of suicide becomes philosophically relevant. If one’s existence
itself is intrinsically painful and unsatisfactory, can one simply not put a
total end to existence by committing suicide? From a Buddhist perspective,
suicide cannot be a solution to the saṃsāric existence characterized by pain
and discontentment at least for two related reasons. First, Buddhism takes the
theory of repeated births (or rebirths) of a sentient being for granted. If a
sentient being were to live just one once, suicide could be a possible solution
in putting an end to the painful or unsatisfactory existence. This is not the
case and hence suicide is no solution to the problem. Second, according to
Buddhism, the driving force of one’s birth or saṃsāric existence characterized
by pain and discontentment is one’s thirst or desire, and unless one
eradicates or dismantles it, one would continue to be born and suffer. Suicide
is thus no solution. The actual solution lies elsewhere (e.g. the Eight Noble
Paths or the Eight Paths of the Noble Ones).[3] The
question, however, is if suicide (i.e. killing oneself), like killing others
(i.e. paracide?), is karmically unwholesome. Just like any volitionary action
in Buddhism, suicide can never be apodictically considered negative, positive, or neutral.
Bibliography
Bibliography
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Delhey 2002
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Martin
Delhey, “Buddhismus und Selbstötung.” In Grundfragen buddhistischer
Ethik. Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart 7. Hamburg: Universität
Hamburg, 2002, pp. 155–165.
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Delhey 2006a
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Martin
Delhey, “Views on Suicide in Buddhism: Some Remarks.” In Buddhism and
Violence, edited by Michael Zimmermann with the assistance of Chiew
Hui Ho & Philip Pierce. Lumbini: Lumbini International Research
Institute, 2006, pp. 26–63.
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Delhey 2006b
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Ibid., “Zum
Verständnis der Selbstötung in Buddhismus.” In Gewalt und
Gewaltlosigkeit. Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart 10. Hamburg:
Universität Hamburg, 2006, pp. 155–165.
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Schmithausen 2003
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Lambert
Schmithausen, “Zum Problem der Gewalt im Buddhismus.” In Krieg und
Gewalt in den Weltreligionen: Fakten und Hintergründe, edited by Adel Theodor
Khoury, Ekkehard Grundmann & Hans-Peter Müller. Freiburg, Basel, Vienna:
Verlag Herder Freiburg im Breisgau, 2003, pp. 83–98 [on “suicide,” see pp. 97–98].
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