Buddhist Xenology

I use the word “xenology” here in the way Halbfass used, namely, as “attitude towards others.” What I write here is not an outcome of some research. It is something spontaneous. Needless to state that xeno- is said to be from Greek xenos meaning “stranger, foreigner.” I like the word. It provides one with a basis of thinking about something very personal and fundamental. The fundamental presupposition seems to be that there is a sense of “oneself” as opposed to a sense of “others.” Otherwise the very concepts of xenophobe and xenophile would make so sense. Buddhist philosophy would not propose a metaphysical, transpersonal, hypostatic, or substantial Self. Belief in such a Self, if one has, would be seen as being induced by an indoctrinator. Buddhist philosophy would not, as far as I am concerned, deny the possibility of an instinctive notion of personal self based on the continuum (rgyun) and conglomeration (tshogs pa) of psychical-physical complex (phung po), which is, however, epistemically speaking, false, misconstrued, vague, and arbitrary. The notion of self therefore has no epistemic value or validity. But it does have an instrumental value or efficacy. So long as one wanders around in the cyclic existence, one needs a sense of personal identity. A premature loss of identity, or split personality, or a multiple-personality complex would be detrimental to one’s mundane and supramundane responsibilities and aspirations. In fact, one’s self is the spatial and temporal point of reference for everything. As long as one roams around in saṃsāra, which is of one’s creation, and as long as one has the notion of self, it is completely natural to have the notions of “self” and “others.” On this level, we cannot deny that there are differences as well similarities among human beings with regard to color, creed, race, gender, culture, ethnicity, cognitive-emotive-conative faculty, and so on. The fulcrum upon which the self–other lever hinges, however, is a misconception. As long as there is the fundamental nescience, there is bound to be xenophobes or xenophiles. One tends to see anyone foreign as a potential foe, or anything foreign as dangerous. Taking a cobra for a rope and a rope for a cobra are both misperceptions or misconceptions. Until nescience is replaced by insight, it is going to affect oneself and others. The challenge is how should one and how can one and how best can one perform this tricky balance act.

            Histories or stories about the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet is full of references to xenophobic aptitudes and actions. For examples, Śāntarakṣita, Padmasambhava, and Vimalamitra,   

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Buddhist Reasonology

(1)   reasoning of intrinsic reality,

(2)   reasoning of causal efficacy/affectivity (knowing effect through cause),

(3)   reasoning of result’s dependency (knowing cause through effect), and

(4)   reasoning that demonstrates the rationality/logicality of reason.

A Buddhist Kāmology

Here I am again. It has been a while since I wrote something on my blog “Philosophia Buddhica.” To remind my (potential) readers, this is a blog for pure speculations. I let my imaginations run wild here. During my high school days, economics was not one of my favorite subjects. Due to my newfound interest in Buddhist philosophy, economics seemed so remote and strange. Nonetheless, one point that is attributed to Adam Smith (1723–1790), “father of economics,” left an indelible print in my mind, namely, to put his ideas in my own words, the infinity of human wants/desire/needs, and the finity/scarcity of resources. This idea, I felt already then, sounds quite Buddhistic or rather compatible with Buddhist ideas.

Desire, according to Buddhist philosophy, is usually a problem. But it can also be an opportunity. A moth’s desire for a flame can be destructive. On the other hand, one’s desire for one’s freedom (e.g. mokṣa/vimokṣa or mukti/vimukti) can be constructive. Several words in Sanskrit and Tibetan would more or less express “desire.” like in English, several synonyms and near synonyms are possible.  

A Buddhist Raceology

On the one hand, we live in a multiracial (also multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious) society. On the other hand, or perhaps precisely because of it, our society is beset with racial tension and racial discrimination/hatred/conflicts. We also live in a time when on the one hand we propagate that race does not matter but on the other hand we play identity politics based on race. As someone who attempts to study Buddhist texts and ideas—mainly, Indian and Tibetan—one inevitably asks what would be a Buddhist theory of human race, that is, a Buddhist raceology. And what would be a Buddhist position on racism?

To be sure, I am not even sure which words in Sanskrit or Tibetan would best convey the idea of “race.” I am not a Sanskritist and so I cannot tell with certainty which Sanskrit words express the idea of “race.” It appears that vaṃśa (rigs/rus), varṇa (rigs), jāti (rigs) and gotra (gdung/rigs/rus/cho ’brang) cover the semantic range of “caste, family, and race,” all of which are believed to be determined by birth. Buddhism, an Indian religion, seems to have taken the existence of different castes in the society and the societal perception that some castes are more respectable than others for granted. Thus, it is said that, the Buddha, before taking birth in the world, considered “five types of considerations” (gzigs pa rnam pa lnga), one being the “consideration of the caste.” Analogously perhaps, all 1000 or so buddhas of the bhadrakalpa aeon are said to appear in the kṣatriya or brāhmaṇa caste. The only reason, as far as I know, is that whichever caste or form of existence would best benefit sentient beings, the Buddha would manifest in that caste or form of existence. If a hunter, fisherman, or prostitute were to benefit sentient beings the best/most, the Buddha would manifest as a hunter, fisherman, or prostitute. Later on, it seems, the possibility was extended also to other species (i.e. to all five or six forms of existences) and even to inanimate objects such as islands and bridges.

Buddhism seems to recognize two kinds of caste/race, namely, a biological/physiological and a spiritualogical/soteriological one. While the biological/physiological caste/race may be said to be determined or acquired by birth, the spiritualogical/soteriological caste/race can be acquired by cultivation and training. Buddhism also seems to override the significance of the biological/physiological caste/race by spiritualogical/soteriological caste/race. This can be seen by the Buddha’s reevaluation and reinterpretation of key terms such as brāhmaṇa and ārya. The purity of heart and mind overrides the supposed purity of blood and bones. The nobility of the heart and mind overrides the supposed nobility of one’s questionable biological caste/race. Here Bhāviveka’s thoughts on this would be worth referring to.

With regard to the spiritualogical/soteriological caste/race, Buddhism in course of time has developed two theories, namely, a five-gotra theory and a one-gotra theory. Both were probably proposed with the best of intentions. The first theory should enable Buddhists to accord complete personal liberty to all sentient beings. They are free to choose any kind of soteriological model or not to choose any at all. The second allows Buddhists to accord respect to all sentient beings as equally being buddha potentials or hidden buddhas.

Various Tantric classes and systems also suggest that some form of Buddhism recognizes the soteriological potentials of human beings of the four castes. In fact, there seems to be a reverse of the soteriological potentiality of human beings of the four castes. The lower the caste one belongs to, the better suited is one said to be for the more profound Tantric teachings! Here, too, the caste system has been presupposed but has been reevaluated in a reverse way.

Some Vinaya sources may suggest that ordaining persons from certain social groups or background including those from “bad caste/family” (rigs ngan pa) have been seen as obstacles (bar chad) for the ordination. A closer look, however, reveals that this has been due to the potential undermining of the social standing of the ordained community. One cannot deny the potential difficulty that the ordained community would have faced if the majority of its members consisted of convicts and social groups that were not held in high esteem. Being from a lowly caste, though perceived to be a bit of an image problem, has not been seen as a hindrance for the arising of the precept of ordination. Once ordained, no one is supposed to discriminate anyone on the basis of one’s former caste. Obviously discrimination on the basis of caste is a transgression in the Vinaya. The Buddha is said to have said: “In my doctrine, caste is not important, race/family is not important. Important is the [three types of] training (i.e. adhiśīla, adhicitta, adhiprajñā)” (nga’i bstan pa ’di la | rigs mi gtso | rus mi gtso | bslab pa gtso ||).

Buddhism may have to accept race and racism as social realities, no matter how undesirable or desirable a society might consider them to be. But they would be seen as mere social conventions and constructions. While we cannot deny our physiology, Buddhism seems to want human beings to relocate their values to spiritual purity. I may be born in a śūdra caste but I can be reborn in this life as a brāhmaṇa in the Buddha’s sense. I may not belong to an ārya race (according to some racist ideology) but I can be an ārya in the Buddha’s sense. I may not be born as a biological son of Siddhārtha, but I can be born in this lifetime as the legitimate son of the Buddha, namely, as a bodhisattva.

From a broader perspective of Buddhist philosophy, the very assumption that race, caste, skin color, creed, religiosity, ethnicity, nationality, gender, and so on—even when the diversity and multiplicity of which cannot be denied and hence may even be worth preserving—as a kind of a static entity/identity/reality fixed for eternity is very irrational and bizarre. All of these, again from a Buddhist perspective, are mere temporary features of our physical bases (lus rten). What guarantee is there that I will not die in the next instant and thus change my race, caste, skin color, creed, religiosity, ethnicity, nationality, and gender!

 

 

 

 

On the Lords of the Three Families

This blog contribution is dedicated to Adele, a former student of mine, who inspired me to make a few thoughts on the “Lords of the Three Families” (rigs gsum mgon po). Mahāyāna sources abound in names of bodhisattvas. The two of the most famous clusters of bodhisattvas seem to be what are known as the “Eight Great Close Spiritual Sons [of the Buddha]” (nye ba’i sras chen brgyad) and the “Lords of the Three Families” (rigs gsum mgon po). The names of the eight have been listed, for example, in the Mahāvyutpatti (nos. 645–652). I do not know of any Western-language study or publication devoted exclusively to the eight figures as a group or to any individual figure. Among the traditional Tibetan works, however, the one that comes to my mind immediately is Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho’s (1846–1912) Byang chub sems dpa’ chen po nye ba’i sras brgyad kyi rtogs brjod nor bu’i phreng ba. What is remarkable is that in Tibetan Buddhism either the eight are revered collectively or the focus is placed on the “Lords of the Three Families” (rigs gsum mgon po). Iconographic depictions of these would be widespread. Unlike in East Asian Buddhism, Kṣitigarbha seems not to have played such an eminent position in Tibetan Buddhism. One wonders if the Chinese rendering of the name Kṣitigarbha and the role attributed to Kṣitigarbha coupled with the indigenous East Asian view of the yonder or (subterranean) world especially regarding the destiny of prematurely deceased children have contributed to the rise of Kṣitigarbha cult in a way that is not known in India or Tibet. By contrast, what are known as the Lords of the Triadic Families (rigs gsum mgon po), namely, Mañjuśrī (representing the Body family), Avalokiteśvara (representing the Speech family), and Vajrapāṇi (representing the Mind family) enjoy a prominent place. By the way, Maitreya, too, as a crown prince and regent of the Buddha and as the future Buddha, enjoys a special place in Tibetan Buddhism. In the case of Maitreya, it would be useful to study modern hypotheses of the provenance (e.g. Indo-Iranian origin) of the concept and figure Maitreya. At any rate, I do not know of any study devoted exclusively to the triadic group, or, for that matter, also to one of the three figures. I personally believe that each of the three figures would make an excellent topic of study, but one that would be tremendously challenging because a careful and comprehensive study that takes into account both its diachronic and synchronic perspectives must have both the breadth and depth of knowledge of Buddhist sources in many different sources languages and texts, and also the necessary methodic rigor. Scholars like myself who do not possess such prerequisites and expertise should not touch such topics lest we leave behind a huge mess and thereby hampering advancement of research in these areas.

As venues of exploration for a study of the triadic figures of Rigs-gsum-mgon-po in Tibetan cultural sphere, a few questions come to my mind. What would be earliest Indian sources where the three occur, if at all, as a group? What would be the Sanskrit (or other Indic term)? How probable is the Sanskrit word *trikulanātha (employed by Dan Martin in his Tibskrit) to reconstruct a work title? Can we take for granted that the term or concept of kulatraya is secured in Indian sources? What would be earliest textual or arte-factual sources that testify the three individual figures? Could it be possible that the concepts and cults of Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi had different and independent origins and milieu and latter they are brought together as a group? If so, what could have been factors or motives? Since the inception of these figures, how have they evolved in various non-Mantric and Mantric forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism within and without the Indic cultural sphere? What would be a possible relative chronology of the inception and evolution of these figures and cults? Can one perhaps assume that the concept of Vajrapāṇi (initially a yakṣa/yakkha) precedes the concepts of Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara? Can we find concepts/figures of Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara in pre/non-Mahāyāna sources? What roles were they initially and eventually attributed to? Is it not the case that Mahāyāna apologists have claimed that the Mahāyāna scriptures were codified by the triadic figures? What and where are the terrestrial and celestial abodes (kṣetra: zhing khams) of Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi supposed to be? What kinds of roles do they play in the Mahāyāna soteriology, ontology, gnoseology, epistemology, axiology, cosmology, iconology, eschatology, and so on? Most important of all, how are they relevant, it at all, to Mahāyāna soteriology? Because they have certainly not been conceived of as historical figures confined to a specific time and place, how do Mahāyāna traditions deal with these atemporal and ahistorical figures?

Conceivably, the Mahāyāna Buddhist perceptions of the triadic figures may fall into three groups. First, some may view Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi as historical figures in the same way we would view, for examples, Tsong-kha-pa, mKhas-grub-rje, and rGyal-tshab-rje. Second, possibly some may view the triadic figures to be complete fictional characters just like fictitious figures in a novel, and thus reject them as having anything to do with Buddhist soteriology. Third, some would neither accept them to be historical figures confined to a specific period and place nor would they reject them as complete nonsense. This group would recognize that although these figures cannot be treated strictly as historical in the same way the rJe-yab-sras-gsum are, but nonetheless, the idea of the triadic figures has its own history and that it has its own role in Mahāyāna soteriology just as the ideas of upāya and kāruṇā, and of the Buddhahoood and Bodhisattvahood are essential to Mahāyāna soteriology. I personally think that those who take the first and second stances would fall into extreme views of eternalism and nihilism, respectively, and the third position alone be consistent with the middle way. I personally do not subscribe myself to the former two views. The third view, in my view, is indispensable for understanding and appreciating Mahāyānic mentality and spirituality. If one is not interested in understanding Mahāyānic mentality and spirituality, it is, of course, a different matter. The attitude and approach of the third group, in my view, is crucial for those who pursue academic study of religions in general and for those who pursue academic study of Buddhism in particular. Otherwise, one would end up becoming a laughing stock of those who possess both science and conscience.     

According to the third group, who are these figures known as Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi? In my view, these are the idealized and idolized bodhisattvas of the highest and best kind and order. They have been conceived of as the embodiments of the wisdom, compassion, and power or strength of all conceivable buddhas and bodhisattvas! This way of looking at Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi is not confined to individuals like myself. I recall mKhan-po ’Jigs-med-phun-tshogs (1933–2004), from whom I have had the honor and privilege to receive teachings for two months, clearly stating that if we view Mañjuśrī as a person holding at all times a sword and uptala flower, we have not understood what or who Mañjuśrī is. Mañjuśrī is the representation of the knowing or gnostic mind of all buddhas (sangs rgyas thams cad kyi thug mkhyen pa’i ye shes)!  Mañjuśrī is primarily an idealized and iconized representation of the jñāna or prajñā of all buddhas and bodhisattvas. Avalokiteśvara is primarily an idealized and iconized representation of the karuṇā of all buddhas and bodhisattvas. Vajrapāṇi is primarily an idealized and iconized representation of the balas of all buddhas and bodhisattvas. When one thinks of Mañjuśrī, one thinks of the wisdom and insight of the Buddha or a buddha. When one thinks of Avalokiteśvara, one thinks of the compassion of the Buddha or a buddha. When one thinks of Vajrapāṇi, one thinks of the strength and courage of the Buddha or a buddha. When one invokes the three, one tries to inculcate one’s wisdom, compassion, and strength or courage. Mañjuśrī is thus an icon of the best possible cognitive element. Avalokiteśvara is an icon of the best possible emotive element. Vajrapāṇi is the best possible conative element. Those of us who wish to explore the best kind of cognitive, emotive, and conative elements that are inherent in us, naturally look up to certain idols. Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi happen to be precisely those ahistorical and atemporal idols.

In the world of Tibetan Buddhism, we can find countless triadic historical figures, who have been identified and associated (arbitrarily or otherwise) with Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi. Consider Chos-rgyal-mos-dbon-rnam-gsum, Khu-rngog-’brom-gsum, and so on. Here, too, one can see a purpose, a sense. We just cannot brush such phenomena  as nonsensical aside. Look at the current Dalai Lama. He is traditionally identified and associated with Avalokiteśvara. Unless one is psychically and intellectually blind or impervious, one cannot deny that he does represent Avalokiteśvara. He represents compassion. He stands for compassion. He promotes compassion. He breathes compassion. He is compassion. Regardless of whether he is indeed the rebirth of the previous Dalai Lamas or not, I personally think that it has been such a sheer luck that the search team discovered this A-mdo child. They made him Avalokiteśvara and he became Avalokiteśvara. He became compassion. He is now compassion.

On a personal note, I have had the fortune to receive many teachings from many Tibetan masters. Some are more prominent, some less prominent, but to whom I am nonetheless equally grateful. Among the prominent ones, we used to say, we have three masters who are Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi. mKhan-po ’Jigs-med-phun-tshogs is our Mañjuśrī master; the Dalai Lama our Avalokiteśvara master; and Pad-nor Rin-po-che (actually my main guru) our Vajrapāṇi master. I also have many teachers who are mkhan pos. Amongst the senior-most ones, mKhan-po rNam-grol is our Mañjuśrī mkhan po; mKhan-po Tshe-dbang-rgya-mtsho aka mKhan-po Guru our  Avalokiteśvara mkhan po; mKhan-po Padma-shes-rab our Vajrapāṇi mkhan po. I do not know if they would like this distribution of the role and identity. While each of these masters and teachers is endowed with all three aspects of wisdom, compassion, and integrity, what seem their prominent traits have been used to characterize them in this way. I am sure each one of you are, in your daily life, actually surrounded by your own Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi masters, teachers, friends, and family members.

In short Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi stand for mkhyen brtse nus/dpal gsum. In order to explore and fully exploit the potentialities of one’s own mkhyen brtse nus/dpal gsum, we need some visions, some models. Therefore it makes much more sense to look up to Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāṇi as our models, and not up to those who pop up in the social and other media.