Here are a few personal thoughts
on Buddhist egology. Obviously I am not the first person to employ this term.
No doubt, the Buddhist theory of anātman is well known. It
seems to be uniquely Buddhist. But did the Buddha categorically and
apodictically reject an ātman? There seem to be some indications
that he was somewhat reticent about the rejection of an ātman. This
is obviously because he knew that human beings tend to be categorical, radical,
and extreme, and thereby turn even medicine into poison and thereby causing
much pain, death, and destruction. The Buddha’s approach of teaching is
compared to a tigress’s approach of handling her cubs. She neither holds her
cubs too tight in her jaws lest she injures them nor does she hold them too
loose lest she drops them. A categorical and apodictic rejection of an ātman would
have robbed sentient beings of any basis of ethical-ascetical integrity thereby
encouraging them to become ruthless and irresponsible monsters who are bent on
ruining oneself and others. A categorical and apodictic proposition of an ātman would
have encouraged sentient beings to further bind themselves to a fictitious core
of existence and thereby causing them to go on suffering. This apparent
reticence or caution or ambivalence of the Buddha seems to have provided his
subsequent followers with two alternatives. While most Buddhist schools decided
for anātman, Vātsīputrīyas opted for ātman.
But unlike the non-Buddhist Ātmavādins, the latter maintained that ātman is
actually inexpressible because it can neither be expressed and identified as
being identical with or separate from a person’s psychical-physical complex (skandha:
phung po). They actually seem to have preferred to call it pudgala. Vātsīputrīyas are
said to have regarded this ātman/pudgala to be momentary as
opposed to non-Buddhist Ātmavādins, for whom ātman is always
eternal. But Vātsīputrīyas’ works on their ātman/pudgala theory
have not been transmitted to us and thus what little we know about it is based
on reports of it given by its opponents who might not have necessarily
portrayed Vātsīputrīyas’ position fairly or accurately. It becomes clear that
for Vasubandhu, Vātsīputrīyas’ theory of ātman/pudgala would
be problem only if it is said to be “substantially existent” (dravyasat:
rdzas su yod pa). If it is accepted to be only “nominally existent” (prajñaptisat:
btags par yod pa), it would not be a problem at all.
Most Buddhist schools
subsequently proposed anātman. In this regard, we have to ask this
question, which was probably asked by past Buddhist philosophers. That is, if
the Buddha was reticent about the ātman and anātman,
was it because both of them were epistemically wrong or right but he did not
specify as such for therapeutic, propaedeutic, or pedagogic reasons or
purposes? Most Buddhist schools seem to have taken for granted that
the Buddha indeed taught that ātman does not exist, which
is the truth, but nonetheless, he was careful because not everyone can digest
the truth and benefit from it. From a Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka’s perspective, one
could perhaps state that there are actually no ‘I’ and ‘Mine’ but nonetheless,
the Buddha, in accordance with the conventions known in the world (lokaprasiddha:
’jig rten grags pa), spoke in terms of ‘I’ and ‘Mine’ for the
benefit of sentient beings. Similarly, there are actually no psychical-physical
complexes (skandha) and entitative elements (dhātu: khams) but nonetheless,
the Buddha, in accordance with the conventions known in the world, spoke of
the psychical-physical complexes and entitative elements for the
benefit of sentient beings. Likewise, there is actually not
even cittamātra, but nonetheless, the Buddha, in
accordance with the conventions known in the world, taught the doctrine cittamātra for
the benefit of sentient beings. And finally, there is actually not
even śūnyatā, but nonetheless the Buddha taught the
doctrine śūnyatā for the benefit of sentient beings. The
teaching of śūnyatā itself is an antidote against the view
that phenomena exists in reality. Once the illness is cured one should no
longer cling to even medicine. Thus, let alone hypostatizing ātman, one
should not even hypostatize śūnyatā. By hypostatizing the
ultimate medicine, one would turn it into poison. If this happens, the illness
would become incurable and there is no other cure.
Schmithausen has pointed out
that the term anātman has been interpreted in two ways,
namely, as (1) a tatpuruṣa (bdag ma yin pa) “non-Self”
and as (b) a bahuvrīhi (bdag med pa) “no-Self”
(Schmithausen 2007: 221, n. 27). These two interpretations also seem to serve
as doctrinal basis of what are called the two kinds of negation with regard
to nairātmya (“non/no-essentiality”) or śūnyatā (“emptiness”),
namely, “implicatory negation/exclusion” (ma yin dgag) and
“non-implicatory negation/exclusion” (med dgag). I personally feel that
these two were not seen as mutually contradictory but rather complementary.
That is, if none of the phenomena are ātman (i.e. ma
yin dgag), there is no ātman (i.e. med dgag).
If none of the persons present in a room is a thief (i.e. ma yin dgag),
one could conclude that there is no thief in the room (i.e. med dgag).
The basic Buddhist philosophical
argument against the existence of an ātman is that ātman,
which is explicitly or implicitly understood to be autonomous, eternal, and
unitary core of a person, is impossible because all conditioned phenomena are
heteronomous, transient, and multiple. A person or self is nothing but a vague
fuzzy and arbitrary label given to a collection and continuum of heterogeneous
and heteronomous psychical-physical complexes, and there is such thing as
an ātman in the sense of a kind of meta-psychical or
meta-physical core or essentiality (ātmya) that underlies a person. Thus
all conditioned phenomena are transient. All defied phenomena subjected to or
associated with pain, suffering, and discontentment. All phenomena are
characterized by non-essentiality and emptiness. The cessation of the suffering
and discontentment and their causes alone is characterized by tranquility or
quiescence.
There are all kinds or degrees
of egotism, egoism, egocentricity, or egomania, such as the seven kinds of
‘ego’ (sapta mānāḥ: nga rgyal rnam pa bdun = nga rgyal bdun): māna, atimāna, mānātimāna, abhimāna, ūnamāna, mithyāmāna,
and asmimāna. There is also a list of nine. But the root of all
seems to be asmimāna, the notion of self or
self-identity/self-identification. It is the notion of an ego (ahaṃkāra:
ngar ’dzin pa). This is also the basis of “grasping to [someone or
something as] mine” (mamakāra: bdag gir ’dzin pa = nga yir ’dzin pa).
One grasps to one as “I” and to other persons and things as “mine.” This fuels
the motor of one’s saṃsāric engine.
In course of time, there arose
two kinds of non/no-essentiality (nairātmya: bdag med pa) corresponding
to the two kinds of “essentiality” (ātmya: bdag): non/no-essentiality of
person (pudgalanairātmya: gang zag gi bdag med pa) and
non/no-essentiality of phenomena (dharmanairātmya: chos kyi bdag med pa).
The classical argumentative
reasoning for pudgalanairātmya is the “sevenfold analysis of a
chariot,” that is, the rnam bdun shing rta’i rigs pa. Candrakīrti’s
employment of it is more popular in Tibet. But this seems to go back in some
form already to earlier sources such as the Millindapañha and Vajjirasutta.
The doctrines of pudgalanairātmya and dharmanairātmya have
obviously been seen not only as being key to soteric goals but also to
therapeutic purposes. The therapeutic value of the doctrine of pudgalanairātmya seems
to be gained through the depersonalization of phenomena. That is, the
realization that there is no pudgala (“person”) involved in
whatever terrible and horrible happens in the world would help one cope with
the world. Persons and their actions, too, are mere phenomena (dharmamātra:
chos tsam) determined through constellation and interaction of causes and
conditions. If this does not make sense, just compare how humans
psychologically deal with pudgala-made (i.e. men-made) and dharma-made
(i.e. natural) disasters!
The most important critique
against the nairātmya theory is the lack of an agent or bearer
for the karmic and salvific mechanism. For Buddhists, there is no need for an
owner or bearer of karmic and salvific consequences. These just take place like
a wild fire in an empty village. Just as one employs the term “chariot” so does
one employ the term “I” or “self.” In other words, there is no problem even for
the Buddha and philosophers such as Nāgārjuna to resort to the convention of
the first person singular “I” (or “self”). This convention is used, so to speak,
naively and analytically. Some scholars call this “mere I” (nga tsam).
Some Buddhist responses to the critiques, however, had far reaching
consequences. It gave rise to many doctrines and ideas that were not directly
related to Buddhist soteriology.
Buddhist sources recognize two kinds of ātman or rather notions of ātman. The first notion of ‘I’ is instinctive, inborn, and natural (lhan skyes). We are born with a notion of ‘I.’ It is erroneous and arbitrary. But apparently this is of existential necessity. ‘I’ is the spatial and temporal point of reference for everything. Ironically, this vague, feeble, blurry, erroneous, and arbitrary notion of ‘I’ is the center of one’s universe. That is, a premature loss of personal identity; split-personality; multiple-personality complex; and the like, would lead to an identity crisis in our saṃsāric existence, thereby rendering us unfit for taking up any kind of responsibility. The second notion of ‘I’ is the notion of a meta-psychical and meta-physical ātman acquired through indoctrination. It is conceptually constructed (kun brtags) and artificial. Although this artificial notion of ‘I’ is certainly erroneous, it is not the actual cause of our saṃsāric existence and thus the cognition that such an ātman does not exist will not free us from our saṃsāric bondage. The instinctive notion of ‘I’ is the actual culprit. It is responsible for our saṃsāric bondage. Gaining direct jñānaic access to the non-existence of such a ‘self’ would uproot the root cause of saṃsāric bondage thereby causing one’s freedom from saṃsāric shackles. The second notion of ‘I’ cannot exist without the first notion of ‘I’ but the first notion of ‘I’ can exist without the second notion of ‘I’.
Later trans/ultra-phenomenal
reality (e.g. tathatā and tathāgatagrabha) came to
be called ātman, not in the sense of traditional non-Buddhist
Ātmavādins’ theory of ātman, but in a sense that transcends the two
extremes or poles of ātman and anātman. The
trans/ultra-phenomenal reality that transcends the dichotomy of ātman and anātman has
been described as the ātmapāramitā (“perfection of self”). The
transcendence of what has been referred to as the extremes of ātman and anātman is
not limited to cataphatic Mahāyāna strands of Buddhism (e.g. in Tathāgatagarbhic
scriptures) but also found in apophatic strands of Mahāyāna strands of Buddhism
(e.g. in the Kāśyapaparivarta). These, in a way, are continuation
of the approach of the Buddha as insinuated by the analogy of
a tigress’s handling of her cubs.
