Buddhism on Apostasy? Apostasy in Buddhism?

According to the Wikipedia, “Apostasy (Greek: apostasia ’a defection or revolt’) is the formal disaffiliation from or abandonment or renunciation of a religion by a person. One who commits apostasy (or who apostatizes) is known as an apostate. The term apostasy is used by sociologist to mean renunciation and criticism of, or opposition to, a person’s former religion, in a technical sense and without pejorative connotation.” The Wikipedia discuses apostasy as viewed by several religions but not by Buddhism. I think one can legitimately raise the question as to how Buddhism (or Buddhists) would view someone who has abandoned Buddhism. It seems in general no follower of a religion or ideology would endorse or encourage another person to renounce or abandon the religion or ideology that one follows. A Buddhist would perhaps also never happily endorse or encourage a fellow Buddhist to renounce Buddhist teachings. This is because the teaching of the Buddha is often seen as a cure against all saṃsāric ills. Endorsing or encouraging others to give up Buddhism would be like endorsing or encouraging a patient to give up medicine. But should a patient choose to renounce the life-saving medicine, one cannot do anything. What one can do at the most is be compassionate to the patient and wish him/her well. Exacting death penalty or other forms of punishment or persecution from an apostate of Buddhism would be like executing or torturing a patient because he/she has refused to take medicine. Such a Buddhist attitude towards apostates of Buddhism would only make sense only in the light of the Buddhist notion of what Srinivasan once called “salvific privatism” (Heilsprivatismus). That is, salvific mechanism functions according to a certain law of nature, and one is solely responsible for detangling oneself from one’s own saṃsāric bondage. If one slanders the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha, one does so at one’s own risk. If one respects the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha, one does so for one’s own good.

“Dharma-Fatigue Syndrome”

The story of dGe-slong Legs-pa’i-skar-ma (Sunakṣatra) is a warning to all of us who may be suffering from what I call “Dharma-fatigue syndrome.” People like dPal-sprul have been particularly vocal in trying to raise awareness of this particular disease. A typical symptom of a person suffering from such a syndrome is that a person would have lost all senses of emotionality and rationality, which is expressed in Tibetan: “No compassion [arises] even [upon witnessing] a sentient being, whose intestines are dangling out. No devotion/appreciation [arises] even [upon witnessing] an awakened being flying in the sky” (sems can rgyu ma lug kyang snying rje med. sangs rgyas nam mkhar phur kyang dad pa med). Particularly those who deal with the Dharma—full-time practicians and full-time theoreticians—seem to be prone to this illness. (Please note that “practician” is a word and I prefer to use it here.) The situation is particularly acute when practicians and theoreticians are “successful,” “powerful,” and “healthy.” Under such circumstances, we lose all senses of reality. We tend to forget the very purpose of Dharma. We use Dharma for Adharmic purposes. We become corrupt. We become “self-conceited” (mngon pa’i nga rgyal can). All—including sprul skus, bla mas, mkhan pos, and professors—fall victim to this disease. We start to think we are eternal and invincible. We trample upon morality, rationality, and spirituality. We know that actually in Buddhism, to be too well is not very well. That is why a human existence with a bearable dose of suffering is better than a celestial existence that is overwhelmingly good. Too good is not very good. We cease to grow intellectually and emotionally. Most teachings of bla mas may now seem so shallow, and may no longer inspire or satisfy one. One may attend an academic gathering only to get disappointed by the frivolity of most scholars and the superficiality of most scholarship. What can one do in such a case? The Buddhist answer to this would be to look within, to be self-critical, to tackle one’s own intellectual-emotional defilements, to resort to nges ’byung gi sems and byang chub kyi sems. There is no such thing as a perfect person, a perfect scholar, or perfect scholarship. There are varying degrees of good or bad qualities. Even one percent of good quality in anyone is to be cognized, recognized, cherished, and appreciated. Why? Because it is good quality. In the mean time, one will have to keep on pursuing the goal of maximizing one’s prajñā and karuṇā, all the while trying to minimize the collateral damage that the pursuit of one’s goal might cause others. This, in my view, is the very meaning and essence of life.

Buddhist Suicidology

Suicidology is said to be “the scientific study of suicidal behavior and prevention.” But in the Buddhist context, the word “suicidology” may be used in the sense of the “academic study of the cases of killing oneself in Buddhist sources and of the Buddhist attitude towards it.” With regard to the academic (i.e. historical-philological-philosophical) study of the topic of suicide in Buddhism, I can only recommend the studies by Martin Delhey.[1] He is, in my view, the expert on the study of suicide in Buddhism. His study not only demonstrates the complexity of the issue of suicide in Buddhism but, in my view, offers a very nuanced picture of the state of affairs from its both diachronic (i.e. here historical) and synchronic (i.e. here doctrinal) perspectives. I wish to add only two points here. First, my initial pretext and context of discussing the case of suicide in Buddhism has been the question whether Vasubandhu committed suicide. According to the accounts of how he died,[2] Vasubandhu goes to Nepal and there he witnesses an ordained Buddhist monk holding a pot of alcohol and ploughing a field. He says: “The doctrine has ceased to exist.” He recites the Uṣṇīṣavijayā’s dhāraṇī in the reverse order or sequence, and dies! If we study Delhey’s studies, we would learn that cases of voluntarily relinquishing one’s impulse of life is not very unusual. What is perhaps unusual here in the hagiogaphy of Vasubandhu is the method or manner of doing that. Second, I wish to understand the Buddhist doctrinal context in which the topic of suicide becomes philosophically relevant. If one’s existence itself is intrinsically painful and unsatisfactory, can one simply not put a total end to existence by committing suicide? From a Buddhist perspective, suicide cannot be a solution to the saṃsāric existence characterized by pain and discontentment at least for two related reasons. First, Buddhism takes the theory of repeated births (or rebirths) of a sentient being for granted. If a sentient being were to live just one once, suicide could be a possible solution in putting an end to the painful or unsatisfactory existence. This is not the case and hence suicide is no solution to the problem. Second, according to Buddhism, the driving force of one’s birth or saṃsāric existence characterized by pain and discontentment is one’s thirst or desire, and unless one eradicates or dismantles it, one would continue to be born and suffer. Suicide is thus no solution. The actual solution lies elsewhere (e.g. the Eight Noble Paths or the Eight Paths of the Noble Ones).[3] The question, however, is if suicide (i.e. killing oneself), like killing others (i.e. paracide?), is karmically unwholesome. Just like any volitionary action in Buddhism, suicide can never be apodictically considered negative, positive, or neutral. 

Bibliography

Delhey 2002	Martin Delhey, “Buddhismus und Selbstötung.” In Grundfragen buddhistischer Ethik. Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart 7. Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, 2002, pp. 155–165.
Delhey 2006a	Martin Delhey, “Views on Suicide in Buddhism: Some Remarks.” In Buddhism and Violence, edited by Michael Zimmermann with the assistance of Chiew Hui Ho & Philip Pierce. Lumbini: Lumbini International Research Institute, 2006, pp. 26–63.
Delhey 2006b	Ibid., “Zum Verständnis der Selbstötung in Buddhismus.” In Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit. Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart 10. Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, 2006, pp. 155–165.
Schmithausen 2003	Lambert Schmithausen, “Zum Problem der Gewalt im Buddhismus.” In Krieg und Gewalt in den Weltreligionen: Fakten und Hintergründe, edited by Adel Theodor Khoury, Ekkehard Grundmann & Hans-Peter Müller. Freiburg, Basel, Vienna: Verlag Herder Freiburg im Breisgau, 2003, pp. 83–98 [on “suicide,” see pp. 97–98].

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[1] Delhey 2002; Delhey 2006a; Delhey 2006b; cf. also Schmithausen 2003: 97–98.

[2] Bu ston chos ’byung (pp. 156–157).

[3] Cf. Schmithausen (inaccessible Ms. A).