Cataphaticism

SR 1989: 3

Perhaps in the Buddhist context “cataphaticism” is to be understood in the sense of expressing of the ultimate reality via affirmationis.

Religiology

“Religiology” is a term coined/proposed by Hideo Kishimoto to express “science of religion” or “scientific study of religion,” very close to German Religionswissenschaft. I personally like the term, better than “Religious Studies.” I propose chos lugs rig pa in Tibetan (if it has not yet been opposed). For details, Hideo Kishimoto, “Religiology.” Nvmen 14 (2), 1967, pp. 81–86.

 

An Apology for Buddhist Philosophy and Buddhist Philology

Why Philosophia Buddhica? Even as someone who tries to do philology, one’s actual interest lies in philosophy. One does philology because one has to. One does philosophy because one likes it. The temptation, however, is that one does what one likes, but does not do what one has to. This seems to be particularly true in the field of Buddhology (i.e. Buddhist Studies). So honestly, I am sceptical about those of us who do (or rather try to do) Buddhist philosophy without relying on historical-philological works. Let us say all of us are interested in what the Buddha thought or said, what Nāgārjuna thought or said, and so on, but how are we to be sure that is what the Buddha actually thought or said and what Nāgārjuna thought or said. One of the greatest challenges thus is finding out if our attribution of a certain Buddhist philosophical idea to a certain person, a certain time, a certain place, a certain work, and so on, is accurate and thus reliable. None of us would, I would assume, prefer to live in a fool’s paradise! Because of such difficulties regarding past thoughts and ideas, we have no choice but to resort to historical-philological works, which may not always succeed in meeting these challenges but at least address these difficulties and draw caution to them. To be sure, historical-philological works are dreary and tedious, but that in way should suggest that we do not need them. In my view, a good student of Buddhist philosophy is also a good student of Buddhist philology, and vice versa. A student of Buddhist philology who does not understand Buddhist philosophy cannot do good Buddhist philology. A student of Buddhist philosophy who does not practise Buddhist philology cannot do good Buddhist philosophy. Of course, it is also a matter of personal interest. Not everyone who can do Buddhist philology or philosophy may want/like to do Buddhist philology or philosophy. This is an absolutely legitimate choice. But we should resist the temptation or tendency (in our academia, mostly those of us who are politicians in the academia) to denounce (or undermine) those fields or disciplines at which we are not particularly good at. The simple (il)logic seems to be: We do not need all those difficult disciplines at which I am not particularly good at. This is an apology for both Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist philology! 

Buddhist Misology?

According to a Wikipedia entry, “misology” is “the hatred of reasoning; the revulsion or distrust of logical debate, argumentation, or the Socratic elenchus.” The question is whether we can speak of “Buddhist misology” or designate any Buddhist philosophy or ideology as “misology.” According to Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 2, one of the various terms used to describe the doctrine of Madhyamaka school and particularly of Nāgārjuna, is “misology,” which he, of course, rejects. Mādhyamikas would claim that the Madhyamaka reasoning is reasoning par excellence and if there is one person that truly loves and lives reasoning then that person would be a Mādhyamika. Hence nothing can be more off the tract than describing Madhyamaka philosophy as “misology.” For Tibetan scholars such as Rong-zom-pa, there would no such thing as absolutely immaculate reasoning that can prove or disprove everything to everyone and thus all kinds of reasoning are maculate and limited, but there are various kinds of reasoning, one reasoning more incisive than the others. The more incisive ones can refute the less incisive ones. We can assume that Buddhist logicians and philosophers would like to think that they have some of the most incisive kinds of reasoning ever. They would contend that the Buddha taught only what is logical/rational/reasonable, and anything or everything that is logical/rational/reasonable should be acceptable to the Buddha and a Buddhist philosopher. From such a perspective, it would make no sense at all to talk of “Buddhist misology.” But what about Buddhist yogins and devotional Buddhists? Are they not supposed to hate reasoning? Buddhist yogins would warn people of the limitation of theoretical type of reasoning, pure speculation, and “eristics” (i.e. arguments that aim at winning rather than gaining insights) but they cannot be said to hate reasoning. Devotional Buddhists, knowledgeable about Buddhist logics and reasoning, would not hate reasoning. Devotional Buddhists, who are ignorant of the Buddhist logics and reasoning, might hate reasoning, but as Candrakīrti states, fools are never authorities. Any way, the word “hate” is totally inappropriate. Even if a person is ignorant of reasoning or disproves reasoning, it does not mean that the person actually hates it. In short, the term “Buddhist misology” would be a complete misnomer.

With regard to the limitation of theoretical type of reasoning, pure speculation, and “eristics,” I think we can glean quite a bit of information from materials associated with different periods, places, and persons. Propositions and deliberations on the status of logic and epistemology in Buddhism will be of particular relevance and interest. In this regard some studies have already been done. We would find Buddhist thinkers who seem markedly pro-Pramāṇic, and others who appear markedly anti-Pramāṇic, but in the end we might find a consensus. That is, when people like Atiśa tell us that anumāṇas and pratyakṣa are dispensable for Buddhist soteriology, they really do not really or actually seem to reject altogether the utility or instrumental/epistemic value of inferences and perceptions as such. Because if this were the case, they would have to even reject existence and utility of yogic perceptions (e.g. śuddhalaukikajñāna and nirvikalpajñāna), which, however, could have hardly been the case. For most, if not for all, buddhajñāna would be the ultimate pratyakṣa. What these people are perhaps trying to tell is that Buddhists, who aspire for Arhathood or Buddhahood, do not need a system of theory (or a theory system) that is devoted to the theorization of logic and epistemology. Perhaps something like: You just play or enjoy the music. You don't have to theorize it. The consistent and categorical rejection of pure speculations as being irrelevant to and detrimental for one’s aspiration for salvation is attributed to the Buddha himself. Dignāga, too, warns us against dragging Buddhist teachings along “eristic paths” (rtog ge’i lam). The points of consensus between (seemingly) pro-Pramāṇic and anti-Pramāṇic Buddhist thinkers is perhaps that (a) risks of being carried away by pure theoretical speculations and not being able to avail oneself of the teachings of the Buddha that are actually and initially meant as medicine against the ills of saṃsāra, but (b) liberating insight, be it prajñaic or jñānaic, which must be ultimately acquired through meditation, is indispensable for causing one’s soterical breakthrough. 

There is also the relativisation of pramāṇa (i.e. kind of “higher” and “lower”). gNubs-chen, (citing the sPyi bcings) bSam gtan mig sgron (pp. 295–296):

gsang sngags rgya mtsho chen po ni ||

dpe dang tshad ma gtan tshigs dang ||

rjes su dpog pa’i shes rab kyis ||

rtogs par nus pa ma yin te ||

de bas gsang sngags bdag nyid che ||

dngos grub rlabs chen ’khrigs pa can ||

bsam yas gting ni dpag dka’ bas ||

lung dang man ngag thob pas ’grub  ||.

   

X-Lehre

Actually I like the German word “Lehre,” which has the meaning of “doctrine” or “theory.” 
Here are some of the terms used by Frauwallner:

Alleinheitslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: xxv)

Atemlehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 56)

Ātman-Lehre (Frauwallner 1953/94: 9)

Atomlehre (Frauwallner 1953/94: 218) = Atomistik (Frauwallner 1953/56: 17)

Aufzählungslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 16)

Dharma-Lehre (Frauwallner 1953/94: 65)

Elementenlehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 89)

Erkenntnislehre (Frauwallner 1953/94: 7)

Erlösungslehre  (Frauwallner 1953/94: 1)

Evolutionslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 145)

Feuerlehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 48)

Formenlehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 277)

Fünf-Feuer-Lehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 48)

Kausalitätslehre (Frauwallner 1953/94: 177)

Lautlehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 277)

Māyā-Lehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 22)

Relativitätslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 400)

Schlaflehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 83)

Schöpfungslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 120)

Seelenwanderungslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 457)

Staatslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 296)

Wahrnehmungslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 183)

Wasserlehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 61)

Wortbildungslehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 277)

Yogalehre (Frauwallner 1953/56: 154)

Argumenta

Argumentum e silentio “argument from silence”

Argumentum ex silentio “argument from silence”

Argumentum ad antiquitatem “appeal to tradition/antiquity”

Argumentum ad baculum (i.e. argument/apeal to the cudgel/stick)

Argumentum ad captandum (to capturing)

Argumentum ad consequentiam (to the consequence)

Argumentum ad crumenam (to the purse)

Argumentum ad feminam (to the woman)

Argumentum ad hominem (to the person)

Argumentum ad ignorantiam (to ignorance)

Argumentum ad judicium (to judgment)

Argumentum ad lazarum (to poverty)

Argumentum ad logicam (to logic)

Argumentum ad metum (to fear)

Argumentum ad misericordiam (to pity)

Argumentum ad nauseam (to nausea)

Argumentum ad novitatem (to novelty)

Argumentum ad personam (to the character)

Argumentum ad numerum (to the number)

Argumentum ad odium (to spite)

Argumentum ad populum (to the people)

Argumentum ad temperantiam (to moderation)

Argumentum ad verecundiam (to reverence)

Argumentum in terrorem (into terror)

Argumentum e contrario (from/to the opposite)

Buddhist Eschatology

According to a dictionary, “Eschatology” is said to be “the part of theology concerned with death, judgment, and the final destiny of the soul and of humankind.” Etymologically eschatology said to be derived from Greek eschatos/eschatē/eschaton meaning “last” and logia “theory/study.” I would like to tentatively define it as a kind of “theory of the final destiny of the world and its inhabitants,” according to any religious or non-religious ideology or philosophy. Some of us might object to using terms such as eschatology in the Buddhist context with the argument the term and concept are alien to Buddhism. If one writes in Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan, or Chinese, one might forgo using such terms but as long as we attempt to express in a European language, I think we cannot avoid employing these terms. Sometimes, such terms might even help us to capture Buddhist ideas (for which there is not fixed technical term) in a precise, pregnant, and crystal-clear manner. As far as I am concerned, we do not seem to have, for example, a Sanskrit or Tibetan term for eschatology. Admittedly, utter care should be taken that the terms we employ are clearly defined so as to minimize wrong associations and ambiguities. Needless to state that terms are like the proverbial finger that points to the moon.

There is a Wikipedia entry on “Buddhist eschatology,” which is, however, pretty poor. “Buddhist eschatology” would be like Buddhology. Every Buddhist system or scripture might have its own ideas of eschatology. The challenge is, therefore, how best can we gain a diachronic and synchronic view of Buddhist eschatology. The kind of eschatology that a Buddhist system proposes or presupposes would depend on the theories of cosmology, cosmogony, soteriology, Buddhology, ontology, epistemology, gnoseology, and what I call “Sentientology” (i.e. theory of sentient beings) that that particular system would presuppose or propose. So we will have to first try to trace, examine and determine eschatological ideas found in the most conservative form of Buddhism and then study how these ideas have developed. This is obviously not an easy task.

I wish to propose a typology of Buddhist eschatology. First, we may speak of (a) bhājanalokaic eschatology, (b) a sattvalokaic eschatology, and (c) saddharmic eschatology. The first concerns the final destiny of the world of habitat. One may also call this a cosmological eschatology. The latter concerns the  final destiny of the world of inhabitants, namely, the sentient beings. One may call this a sententiological eschatology. The third concerns the final destiny of the Doctrine of the Buddha. Second, one may also consider types of recurring eschatology and nonrecurring eschatology.  The latter would refer to nirvāṇa.

Here are some avenues of exploration: (a) What are the ideas of evolution and devolution (and dissolution) of the external and internal world? (b) What forces sustain external and internal world? (c) Can one speak of an individual or personal eschatology and a universal eschatology in Buddhism? (d) Where do the Buddha and his teaching (or more so their disappearance from the world) fit into the broader picture of Buddhist eschatology? (e) How absolute are the Buddhist eschatological ideas? (f) Is an absolute end of the world and its inhabitants at all possible? Is nirvāṇa the eschatological absolute (LS 1969: 159, referring to de La Vallée Poussin)? If so, is nirvāṇa possible on a universal scale, or is it possible only on a personal level? What about the ideas that buddhas never pass away, and dharma would never disappear? Is emptying of saṃsāra possible? What about sems can gsar skye?

As in every domain of Buddhist philosophy, we may speak of the eschatology of common Buddhism and of uncommon Buddhism. Let us suppose that Buddhist eschatology is as a part of Buddhist philosophy concerned with death, judgement, and the final destiny of human beings and of humankind. (a) We may say that for Buddhism in general death is neither an end of a person nor is there an end to death. Life and death would continue as long as causes and conditions for life and death come together.  Thus asking the question as to whether there is an end to death is tantamount to asking whether there is an end to saṃsāra. Such a speculative question would be found reproachable  in Buddhism because it would be considered irrelevant and detrimental to one’s aspiration for Arhathood or Buddhahood. The question is actually similar to the question of whether apple seeds in general would have an end or not. While in general, one can never know if and when apple seeds in general would become extinct, on an individual level, a powerful force such a fire can cause a certain apple seed to be burnt. Burnt seeds would never sprout again. Similarly, an individual person can burn his or her seed of saṃsāra thereby breaking the cycle of birth and death. Some Tibetan Buddhism scholars thus came to propose that one cannot speak of the end of saṃsāra in general, but one can speak of the end of an individual saṃsāra. This would be a kind of a common Buddhist eschatology. But we may find some ideas of emptying the saṃsāra. We shall have to examine how such an idea would be understood or interpreted.